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INTRODUCTION
I had not seriously read a non-white scholar until I attended The University of Chicago
Divinity School for graduate studies, after years of collegiate and seminary training in theology,
Bible, and Christian ministry at Evangelical institutions. Dwight N. Hopkins introduced me to
James Cone, J. Deotis Roberts, Delores Williams, and other Black, Womanist, and liberation
theologians—and my intellectual and theological trajectory was radically disrupted. I was
particularly haunted by M. Shawn Copeland’s words: “We Christian theologians in the United
States work in a house haunted by the ghosts of slavery.”1 This troubled me, confronting me with
the need to reckon with the way in which my racial lens affected my own cultural, theological,
spiritual, and intellectual formation and stance in the world. I knew I had to move forward
differently in how I thought, how I related to others, and how I saw the world.
The change I underwent in this season was only gradual; it was easier to know the
direction in which I had to go, than to do so with the whole of my embodied existence. A couple
years prior, in seminary, I married a Nigerian immigrant in the throngs of her medical school
training, and we had begun to raise our first Black son up in the world. Around this time Trayvon
Martin was murdered and the trial of George Zimmerman ensued. Frankly, I was happy when he
was acquitted: I thought the verdict was just. I could not see the pain in my wife’s countenance; I
could not see Trayvon as an innocent Black boy robbed of life by an unjust world; I could not
see that he could very well have been my own son. Despite my intellectual conviction and desire

1

M. Shawn Copeland, Enfleshing Freedom: Body, Race, and Being (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010), 2.

1
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for change—even the intimate opportunity to see the world through another’s viewpoint—I still
had the same old eyes. But through the toil of listening and learning, some deeper change began
to take root. Not too long after, when the dashcam video of the murder of Laquan McDonald was
released (we were living in Chicago at the time), I was already seeing the world differently and
felt a change had occurred. The overwhelmingly strong Evangelical support of Donald J. Trump
in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, though, shook me to the core of my whiteness—almost
like I was startled by a mirror being held up to the unsightly parts of my upbringing with which I
had yet to fully realize, the complicity of my theology in the problem of racism. In a moment of
great crisis, I experienced a kind of conversion, a reckoning with my racial formation; and I
gained of a new set of eyes to see and ears to hear others. Still, what was I to do with the way my
racial formation continued to hold onto me and work itself out, moving me to inhabit the
privilege and power the world afforded me—even if I desired elsewise? What if, at times, I did
desire to enjoy my whiteness? Was it something that I could fully turn from, or something that
stained me? Was I to jettison my entire cultural, intellectual, and theological upbringing?
I had to figure out what to do with the fact that my racial formation fundamentally shaped
my overall perspective: how my eyes, ears, and all my senses of perception operated in the world
and shaped higher processes of cognition and conception. I heard the testimony of others: that in
my whiteness, I did not see them. W.E.B Du Bois is well known for writing that the white world
shut him out “by a vast veil.”2 Ralph Ellison, in his classic Invisible Man, writes of his
protagonist that he is invisible “simply because [white] people refuse to see” him. The character
laments: “When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of

2

W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2018), 2.
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their imagination – indeed, everything and anything except me.” This is for no reason other than
“the construction of their inner eyes, those eyes with which they look through their physical eyes
upon reality.”3 The inner eyes of whiteness: that is with what I had to reckon.
Let us call the exercising of these inner eyes “white sight,” the phenomenon this text will
seek to define and describe. White sight, I argue, is an historically developed and socially
inculcated symbolic intentional activity, one that depends on the self-concealing, learned ability
to associate moral and ontological meaning with color, particularly as such meaning is framed
within a deeper symbolism of evil. I will wrestle with such a phenomenon in order to put the
white experience—and particularly the way white people see and construct the world, especially
with the help of theological discourses—under radical critique.4 The experience of seeing, and
the tension between physical sight and immaterial or “spiritual” sight, is a central theological
matter for Christianity, understood through wresting with notions like the beatific vision or the
visio Dei (vision of God). Particularly, in the words of Bernard McGinn, “the problem of seeing
God is central to Christian mysticism.”5 The mystical question of sight arises specifically from
the tension in the biblical tradition of desiring to see—and at times apparently seeing—a God
whom one cannot see.6 Anchoring myself in this theological problem, I ask what it would mean

3

Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man, 30th Anniversary Edition (New York: Random House, 1982), 3.

As I will explain, when I refer to “white” and “whiteness,” I approach it phenomenologically: I do not firstly mean
biologically or phenotypically white, but how those with skin that is symbolized as “white” are engaged in an
experience crafted in a broader symbolism as a response to opacity and the consequences thereof.
4

5

Bernard McGinn, The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany (1300-1500), vol. 4 of The Presence of God: A
History of Western Christian Mysticism (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2005), 458. Emphasis
mine.
Cf. e.g., how God tells Moses (Exodus 33:20), “You cannot see my face; for no one shall see me and live,” with
Jacob’s claim, “I have seen God face to face, and yet my life is preserved” (Genesis 32:30). Cf. Exod. 24:10; Num.
12:8; Isa. 6:5; Isa 45:15; Matt. 5:8; John 1:18; 1 Tim. 6:16; among other verses. For discussion, see McGinn, The
Harvest of Mysticism, 456-457.
6
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to take the central Christian assertion that we see through a mirror “enigmatically,” “darkly,” or,
we might say, “opaquely” (δι᾽ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, 1 Corinthians 13:12) as the starting point
for a theological philosophy of seeing that is concerned with how the perception of white people
specifically becomes a matter of racial seeing. Here, we are taken by the demand to understand
how it is the case that our perspective, as a seeing in the face of darkness or the unknown, has
unfolded human sensual reality toward symbolic-cum-material commitments in response to
blackness. Modern rationality, forged through a powerful monocular perspective apparatus, has
been crafted to see nothing here, or to intentionally see right through the problem. A
phenomenology of whiteness (that is, an examination of how white people approach and
experience the lived world) will hold the key to critically examining this way that whiteness
gives sight. The notion of opacity will be key, for me, in putting white sight under a critical lens
to understand the formation of white subjectivity, the shaping of a racialized world, and,
ultimately, the nature of and importance of perspective.
Paul Ricoeur and Charles Long: Opacity and a Symbolism of Evil
Let me center my approach more specifically. Early in my doctoral training, I discovered
a conversation between Paul Ricoeur and Charles H. Long from which point I saw the symbol
and its opacity as important in critically examining the problem of whiteness. For both Ricoeur
and Long, the symbol (a notion I will soon discuss) is key to meaning-making, as it is at the basis
of thought—indeed, “the symbol gives rise to thought.”7 For both, too, the symbol is essentially

7

This important phrase is central to Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston:
Beacon, 1967); see esp. 348. Long writes concerning religion that “[its] first and fundamental expression is not on
the level of thought. It gives rise to thought, but a form of thought that embodies the precision and nuances of its
source.” Charles H. Long, Significations: Signs, Symbols, and Images in the Interpretation of Religion (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1986), 7. Similar to Ricoeur, the mode of religious experience and understanding is through symbols
and myths. The “mythic imagination” becomes “a basis for speculative thought.” Significations, 28-32. Cf. to
Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 3-24.
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opaque, this opacity constituting the inexhaustibility of the symbol and its possibility for
meaning-making. Moreover, Ricoeur and Long agree about the significance of opacity and the
symbol in relation to the experience of evil. Yet, Long goes a different direction, discussing the
symbolism of evil in terms of the significance of racial color. While Ricoeur would write in The
Symbolism of Evil that opacity is that profundity and depth of the symbol which enriches genuine
thought, Long in his Significations would explain race and the problem of colonialism in terms
of the racialization of the symbol’s opacity within a symbolism of evil. Long’s approach, which
picks up Ricoeur’s thought on evil yet thinks beyond him about race, is a starting point and
catalyst for my own argument on whiteness.8
Long on Opacity and Race
Long sought to explore black consciousness and religion in view of an “archaic
modality.” With his “archeological” approach, Long utilizes the notion of arche, which embraces
ideas such as the starting point or principle, the original, even the indigenous and primitive; it
also carries ideas like rule and order.9 Long is interested in how the “beginning” and “order” of
black religion emerges with the development of the trans-Atlantic slave economy that engenders

8

Some of what follows closely reflects my earlier effort to explore this conversation and its importance: see Nathan
D. Pederson, “The Symbol Gives Rise to Race” in A Companion to Ricoeur’s The Symbolism of Evil, ed. Scott
Davidson (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books: 2020), 153-168. Long’s Signification is a collection and re-publishing of
a number of his works under one title. The main points of interaction I will highlight come from chapters
representing two published articles from 1967 and one from 1983. The 1967 article, only the same year the first
English translation of Symbolism was published, is actually drawing on Paul Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of
Symbols and Philosophical Reflection.” International Philosophical Quarterly 2, no. 2: 191-218. In this article,
Ricoeur summarizes key pieces of his argument in Symbolism.
See J. Kameron Carter, “Anarchē; or, the Matter of Charles Long and Black Feminism.” American Religion 2, no.
2 (Spring 2021), 106 for helpful summary. An associate of Mircea Eliade at the University of Chicago, Long was at
the forefront of the developing Religionswissenschaft which called into question how modernity’s discipline of
history of religions views religion and its symbols, specifically how it deals with the religious other. See J. Kameron
Carter, Race: A Theological Account (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 201. For Long’s general
approach, see especially Long, Significations, 3-9, 14-23.
9
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modernity, and how African flesh and religion came to be seen and constituted in this process;
more broadly, in fact, how notions of the “imagination of matter” were (re)constituted upon
black flesh.10 A significant part of what is at stake here is how blackness of skin color was
interpreted or understood—how it was symbolized. Long specifically connects Ricoeur’s thought
on the symbol of defilement to race (or, more specifically, blackness). Long writes that
“nonwhite color” is symbolized as, and
its significations have been acted upon with the modern Western world as signs of
defilement and uncleanness. Paul Ricoeur's analysis of the originary form of the primary
symbolism of evil would aptly apply to the historical-cultural formation of the symbolism
of blackness in the history of the modern West. The significations of stain, pollution, and
guilt accompany the archaic level of the modern Western consciousness in its
confrontation with the 'meaninglessness' and neutrality of color.11
Long quotes directly from Ricoeur’s Symbolism where Ricoeur discusses the nature of
defilement: how “impurity was never literally filthiness, dirtiness” and then finishes quoting
Ricoeur about the “representation of defilement” dwelling “in the half-light of a quasi-physical
infection that points towards a quasi-moral unworthiness.” Commenting on this passage, Long
parenthetically notes that “we might add that black was never literally dirty or unclean.” Like
defilement, comments Long, that “thing” of blackness “must be suppressed, but the very act of
suppression introduces the thing suppressed into the symbolic universe that it stakes out.”12
Thus, while for Ricoeur opacity relates fundamentally to the symbol’s meaning and
openness for interpretation, Long argues that through colonialism opacity comes to relate to a
purely first-order negative value statement: over against the transparency of whiteness, black

See Carter, “Anarchē,” 107. I will continue to describe this central dynamic, later in this chapter and in Ch. 4 with
Long’s notion of the fetish.
10

11

Long, Significations, 189.

12

Long, Significations, 190. Long here is quoting from Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 35.
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“opaqueness” is associated with “impurity” and “defilement.” Thus (after again quoting directly
from Symbolism) Long writes that “blacks” and “the colored races” were
caught up into this net of the imaginary and symbolic consciousness of the West,
rendered mute through the words of military, economic, and intellectual power,
assimilated as if by osmosis structures of this consciousness of oppression. ... But even in
these symbolic structures there remained the inexhaustibility of the opaqueness of this
symbol for those who constituted the ‘things’ upon which the significations of the West
deployed its meanings. This doubleness of consciousness, this existence in half-lights and
within the quasi fields of human infection, is the context for the communities of color, the
opaque ones of the modern world. These twilight zones of half-light and quasi-physical
infection were inhabited by the semirealities of the modern world.13
In this discussion of opacity and the symbolism of evil, Long goes beyond Ricoeur, and indeed
provides a challenge to his thought. Long, one could say, attempts to think out how the
fundamental indeterminacy at the heart of the symbol’s opacity can take on a life of its own in a
pathologization that spins out economies of evil through modern logics of race and colonialism.
It is still true that for Long, opacity represents a kind of surplus of meaning that is
productive: “These bodies of opacity, these loci of meaninglessness … were paradoxically loci
of a surplus of meaning. … These opaque ones were centers from which gods were made.”14 But
this is negative because, first, opacity (and the dark body) is a kind of obscurity or wholly
otherness, a “Somewhat,” in opposition against which meaning is made in symbol and myth by
the whiteness that encounters it. In this, Long is drawing on Gerardus van der Leeuw and his
central understanding of religion as encounter with power.15 The intricacies of the symbol of
blackness, as racially constructed, are such that blackness becomes the nontransparent
semireality through which America and the West encounters itself, knows itself, and becomes

13

Long, Significations, 190. Emphasis mine

14

Long, Significations, 197.

15

Carter, Race, 215-218.
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“another reality;” it is also the byproduct—the experiencing oneself as opaque—that is
engendered in black existence as one encounters the dominant culture. The opaque, black
symbol, on Long’s account, functions in this way as both the mysterious silence engendering the
Western conversation and the self-stilling of one’s (black) voice from the quasi-moral weight of
this arrangement.
Yet, in the midst of this encounter of black life with the dominant culture, there is, by
virtue of the opaque symbol, a possibility for resistance and critique of Western logic and reason.
Here, arche is also an-archic: amidst “the opacities of black existence and black religion, …
[are] processes and practices of counter creative or improvisational way-making” when there is
no way.16 Reflecting on van der Leeuw, Long writes of the “soul-stuff” upon which black
religion draws in the face of slavery: “From this primordium of soul-stuff another order of
modernity has grown from the complex ambiguity of the Atlantic world. It expresses itself in
resistance, prayer, and the ability to survive. It opens the community to the appreciation of the
inviolable dignity of other persons and provides for an alternative meaning of the human as a
free person.”17 This overall dynamic is especially seen in the phenomenon of the cargo cult—that
is, mystical politico-economic movements characterized by non-Europeans engaging in spiritual
rites and ceremonies to try to take control of European goods and possessions—which Long
highlights not to describe primitive religion, but to designate it as arche, as “paradigmatic basis
for the ‘origin’ of a modern meaning of religion.”18 Opaque ways-of-being (communities and
theologies) arise out of the hardness of life, giving voice to those who were in fact always

16

Carter, “Anarchē,” 108.
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Charles Long, Ellipsis …: The Collected Writings of Charles H. Long (New York: Bloomsbury, 2018), 283.
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Long, Ellipsis, 290. For a more detailed explanation of this dynamic, see Long, Significations, 114-127.
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involved in the West’s body politic and memory, but only by marginalization: “The oppressed
long for or imagine the meaning of their existence as human beings prior to the definitions
imputed to them … through the hegemony of Western languages.”19 Long invites us to question
the construction of contemporary thought and modern rationality, pushing back, for example,
against Ricoeur’s notion of the West’s encounter-memory as a Greek-Jewish encounter that
grows according to a near/far, center/periphery logic.20 With Long we begin to awaken to the
discovery of the ways in which the near/far, center/periphery logic of Western thought has dealt
with opacity according to a symbolism of evil. Long invites us to examine Western thought and
its memory on a deeper level to discover other voices—not ones that are “far” or “peripheral,”
but the “other” within, those truly near though silenced. 21
On a Symbolism of Evil
In view of Long, by exploring a symbolism of color within a symbolism of evil, I mean
to show how whiteness was and is constructed by tying color to value and meaning in
theological discourse through a network of meaning-making symbols and myths concerned with
the role of evil in human subjectivity and community. Ricoeur specifically discusses defilement,

19

Long, Significations, 110.

See Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 20-23. On this point of Long’s critique of Ricoeur, see Pederson, “The
Symbol Gives Rise to Race,” 158-159.
20

Long, Significations, 99. I will draw on Long’s thoughts on opacity as racialized within a symbolism of evil but
also think beyond Long. For one, I am thinking primarily about whiteness, not blackness; but I also have in mind a
certain critique of Long by way of Carter, although I will not center this critique in the present work. Carter argues
Long gets opacity wrong in trying to contradistinguish it from an iconic or incarnational framework when Long
configures opacity as a kind of immanence of blackness to itself. Carter’s critique generally centers on how Long’s
project “unwittingly” continues to understand blackness problematically in terms of its interlocking with whiteness,
as Long’s opacity does not speak of genuine otherness but of the (Kantian) sublime “which triggers the reflexive
capacities of the self in the depths of the self’s own opacity.” Carter, Race, 198-199. There should be a kind of
otherness or uncapturable horizon to black subjectivity, Carter argues; and so the theme of divine transcendence is
fundamentally important as a way to describe how blackness can be constructed other than as “ontological
blackness.” In the end, there might be in Long, as Carter writes elsewhere, “a residual or faint obeisance to a
discourse of the human.” Carter, “Anarchē,” 108.
21
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guilt, and sin as the primary symbols of evil; Long especially focuses on the symbol of
defilement. This direction is not without merit. As early as the second-century Christian Epistle
of Barnabas, the devil was referred to as “the black one,” and soon in early Christian literature
“[t]he devil or demons begin to appear as black figures, sometimes with specific ethnic identities
that were seen to involve black skin.”22 As the modern age unfolds, this symbolism blossoms:
Racist accounts, widely accepted in the time of European colonization …, present the
African continent as the metaphor par excellence for physical ugliness and moral decay.
According to these accounts, ugliness and decay were particularly visible in the black
body, which was nothing more than a mass of organs lacking form and self-awareness. 23
Not without reason, then, writing in the late 1960s, the sociologist Roger Bastide argued that
Christianity “has been accompanied by a symbolism of color” that has pervaded society more
broadly beyond its religious roots, a symbolism which sees notions of sin through ideas of stain,
pollution, and contagion in terms of whiteness and blackness, a symbolism that would
consequentially shape and enforce a racial color line.24 Frantz Fanon, whose thought we will
explore in the next chapter, writes of what he hears under the white gaze: “‘Dirty nigger!’ or
simply ‘Look! A Negro!’”25 Darkness of his skin is intertwined with the notion of dirtiness; a
symbolism of evil riddles his racial being-in-the-world. Today this shows up in our everyday life
when we symbolize what is evil or dangerous as dark, black, or unclean. The mundaneness of
such symbolism perniciously hides the logic that perpetuates the power of racialization.

22

David Brakke, Demons and the Making of the Monk: Spiritual Combat in Early Christianity (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2006), 159.
Sarah Nuttall, “Introduction: Rethinking Beauty,” in Beautiful Ugly: African and Diaspora Aesthetics, ed. Sarah
Nuttall (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 9.
23
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Roger Bastide, “Color, Racism, and Christianity.” Daedalus 96, no. 2 (Spring, 1967), 313, 319-320.

25

Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 89.
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Ricoeur is centrally valuable for Long in not only putting the symbolism of evil at the
center of the human experience, but specifically in how he discusses the symbol of defilement.
What is at stake is a double intentionality engendered in the symbol’s opacity, where, for
example, a material stain indicates not a physical spot but an immaterial defilement. The idea
here is of “a quasi-material something which contaminates from the outside, which harms by
means of invisible properties.” Ricoeur even connects this to “contamination by … racism …
[wherein] we have not completely abandoned the symbolism of the pure and impure.” Such
symbolism of stain or spot is so fundamental and powerful because from the beginning it is
“already symbolic of something else. … Stain has never literally signified a spot, impurity has
never literally signified filth; it is located in the chiaroscuro of a quasi-physical infection and a
quasi-moral unworthiness.” 26 This is the matrix in which Long himself wants to think out the
dynamics of racialization: racial logics tap into how from the beginning darkness is symbolized.
While Long frames his broader project and symbology with reference to Ricoeur, another
interlocuter is Mircea Eliade, from whom Long finds a partner in critiquing Western logic. Long
argues that Ricoeur too quickly makes rationality “the tool that will unlock the enigma of the
symbol;” Eliade’s procedure, however, “is more radical” in that he allows for other ways besides
“Greek philosophical thought” to engage thought from the symbol. So Long appreciates in
Eliade the realization that the thought the symbols invite “must not be restricted to the categories
of the West. It may be that the symbols by their very nature invite different and varying types of
thought.”27 What is at stake here is how Long takes up the puzzle of the symbol’s double

26

Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretation: Essays in Hermeneutics, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1974), 427-428; also 291. For more detailed analysis, see Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 25-46.
27

Long, Significations, 50-51.

12
intentionality and points to the way in which, drawing on Eliade’s notion of the “imagination of
matter,” the production of race is the concurrence of ideational construct and material effect, the
“materializing” of moralized blackness upon black flesh. Long explains that for Eliade the
intuition of the (religious) mind is always “correlated with an a priori … universality of matter
itself in all of its several forms, rather than simply the inner working of the human
consciousness.”28 As Long explores the productive tension between matter and idea, nature and
technology, he particularly highlights Eliade’s work on connecting alchemy to archaic
understandings of metallurgy in The Forge and the Crucible: the notion of working within the
womb of Mother Earth to bring forth the precious ores, out from embryonic stage to maturity.29
Eliade speaks of how the alchemist works to pass matter through various stages of different
colors, where the color black represents a descent into matter and is symbolized as death, the
alchemist (as Eliade explains) working to bring matter into this death and suffering so that it can
be reborn as a new type of matter.30 Carter highlights how Eliade speaks of the alchemist himself
as partaking in a mysterious “transmutation” through “a descent into the death and resurrection
of matter, into and out of the Earth-Mother (terra mater).”31 This symbolization of blackened
matter as descent and death is significant, showing something of the premodern roots of racial
symbolism that we will continue to explore. But more generally, Long draws on Eliade on this
matter of alchemy to make a broader point of the “imagination of matter” of even historical and

28

Long, Ellipsis, 119.
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Long, Ellipsis 121-125.

30

Mircea Eliade, The Forge and the Crucible: The Origins and Structure of Alchemy, 2nd ed (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1979), 149-150, 153-157. See Carter, “Anarchē,” 119.
31

Carter “Anarchē,” 119
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technological humanity. So the symbol transcends the sign and “mere imitation” as it is
32

“granted the power to invoke and create the world, right before our eyes.”33 What is at stake in
light of Long is how this productive opacity of the symbol, promising to connect transcendent
idea and material reality in human meaning-making, is used—pathologized and transmogrified—
toward racialization.
Ricoeur and the Question of Evil
My task is to unfold this dynamic of thinking out race within a symbolics of evil that
symbolizes color through the racialization of opacity. My interest in the question of evil will not
be to explore in-depth the philosophy of evil or doctrine of sin as it relates to whiteness.
Considering evil on the level of its symbolism will not itself even be a matter of ethics, even
though it will prepare us for such a conversation. But as, in a sense, pre-rational, it will focus on
the dynamics of evil that give rise to the more constructive thought that shapes how we
understand evil as it pertains to racialization—specifically how evil intersects with a quasimateriality.34 Yet, I argue that this overall approach actually brings us to the heart of the matter
of evil, which is shrouded in the enigmatic.35 We can explore how racialization and racism hides
itself and garners power by working at this center or blind spot of rationality and subjectivity.
Indeed, I will be concerned with how whiteness shows up through hiding itself as it plays upon
logics of finitude and infinitude, visibility and invisibility. In Ricoeur’s words, this has to do with
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discovering the primary symbols of evil fundamentally in the “language of avowal.” This
phenomenon, Ricoeur writes, “has appeared more and more as one of the most astonishing
enigmas of self-consciousness.”36
What is ultimately at stake in the language of avowal is how evil is experienced both
negatively and positively. There is a certain radicality of evil that has to do with how our will is
encumbered by a fundamental incapability.37 Evil is fundamentally experienced in the “riddle of
the slave-will, that is, of a free will that is bound and always finds itself already bound.” In this
way, the experience of evil and the experience of freedom are initially thought closely together.
Even if evil comes from somewhere else, Ricoeur says, it is accessible as it affects us: “evil
manifests itself in man’s humanity.” Avowal, then, means we take responsibility for evil in some
way.38 But this means that, as Ricoeur writes, “avowal of fault is, at the same time, the discovery
of freedom.” In this regard, the language of avowal speaks of and calls for an ethical vision of
the world in which we take responsibility for evil to gain consciousness of our freedom.39 This is
the great ethical realization that evil is not a positive substance but a negative, engendered in my
action. We find ourselves a free agent as we confess: “I am the author of evil.”40
But this confession unfolds from itself its own enigma as the ethical vision of the world
which connects evil to freedom is challenged by a tragic aspect of evil: “reflection discovers, as
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a fact, that freedom has already chosen in an evil way. This evil is already there. It is in this
sense that it is radical, that is anterior (in a nontemporal way) to every evil intention, to every
evil action.” Herein is the nonpower of power, the nonfreedom of freedom.41 So evil embraces
notions as different as blame and lament, the one in which we are culprit and the other in which
we are victim. Even in guilt there can be a sense of passivity: “the feeling of having been
seduced by overwhelming powers and, consequently, our feeling of belonging to a history of
evil, which is always already there for everyone.”42 Ricoeur explains that even the myth of the
fall, which seems to sharpen the connection between freedom and evil, recognizes that “evil
comes into the world insofar as man posits it, but man posits it only because he yields to the
siege of the Adversary.”43 Overall, the ethical vision of the world is limited: we are in some way
both guilty and victim, entrapped in a situation of “the conflict of the good and the right” and
unable to fully reconcile moral conflicts.44
Ricoeur notes, though, that this intervening of the tragic upon the ethical vision of the
world has a key importance: “this failure of reflection … succeeds in giving a proper character to
a philosophy of limit and in distinguishing it from a philosophy of system, such as that of
Hegel.”45 This danger of false syntheses between finite/particular and infinite/universal will be
exactly my concern regarding the overall symbolization of race. Ricoeur discusses, indeed, the
evilest evil as an improper synthesis of this dialectic: “The true evil, the evil of evil, shows itself
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in false syntheses, i.e., in the contemporary falsifications of the great undertakings of totalization
of cultural experience.”46 This making “the tragic and the logical coincide at every stage”
overlooks the “scandal of suffering” as a cunning rationality disengages the question of human
flourishing from the question of history: “The more the system flourishes, the more its victims
are marginalized.”47 With a symbolism of evil, then, I will not only be concerned with the ways
that white sight deals with the quasi-materiality of defilement, but how in its symbolizing
function it (falsely) synthesizes material realities in view of the infinite.
Ricoeur’s answer to evil, especially his turn to superabundant logic of hope and love, will
be important in my concluding chapter. This is part of Ricoeur’s turn from theory to practice in
view of the failure of speculation on evil. Part of this work is lament and mourning: “The first
way of making the intellectual aporia productive is to integrate the ignorance it gives rise to, the
docta ignorantia, into the work of mourning.” This practical work of mourning and working
against evil is normed by the superabundant logic of “in spite of.”48 The notion of hope is key
here; but not a cheap hope. Still, there is the possibility that the “irrationality of hope” might be a
way to engage a different kind of rationality that answers the problem of evil.49 I will argue that
although we will have to hold back on a hopefulness that is too-quick, the logic of
superabundance promises to re-engage and re-use the symbol and its opacity for the good. If
opacity is at the center of human meaning-making and also the problem of racialization, this is
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an opportunity to see how opacity can remain a coherent concept even as it gives both productive
thought and great evil. In this way, opacity for me becomes the key to understanding the
complex dynamics of whiteness from a phenomenological, hermeneutical, and theological angle.
Toward a Hermeneutical Phenomenology of Whiteness
I bring these insights from this Ricoeurian-Longian conversation into a larger critical
philosophy of race focused on opacity as I enter the contemporary conversation of a
phenomenology of whiteness. Phenomenology, in the words of Martin Heidegger, “does not
characterize the “what” of the objects of philosophical research in terms of their content but the
“how” of that research.”50 As I will explain in the next chapter, there is potential in focusing on
this phenomenological “how” in order to unearth the hidden dimensions not readily apparent in
the phenomenon of white sight. Early on, a phenomenological approach was engaged this way
with the works of Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre.51 In a contemporary revival, Linda Martín
Alcoff (among others) proposes that a phenomenological approach is able to weave through the
modern paradox of race, between a nominalism (race as a purely flexible social construct) and an
essentialism (race as a fixed biological identity) in order to avoid reifying whiteness while still
speaking of the real effects of racialization in lived experience, thus taking seriously the
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materiality of race without re-enacting the ideological logic of race. Through a critical
“bracketing,” this approach attempts to discern how whiteness manifests as experience; as such,
phenomenology “can render our tacit knowledge about racial embodiment explicit.”53
I argue that the concept of opacity can hold together a growing tension in this
contemporary conversation: on the one hand, an insistence that whiteness is subjective and
habitual; and on the other, the insistence that whiteness is also an active, objective world horizon
or ontologizing force that shapes the subject. If currently in phenomenological thought on
whiteness, whiteness has been explained primarily as a subjective habit or orientation in the
world, I argue that for a broader and more accurate account of the construction and maintenance
of whiteness we must explore the ways in which it hides itself as benign through utilizing a
symbolism of evil within theological discourse. In this way, whiteness (now more objective,
taking on a life of its own) can come to function more concretely in the world as an evil force as
it is embodied through a network of moral and symbolic discourses.
And yet, to “see” how race functions vis-à-vis opacity, I need to take a hermeneutical
turn. I explain how the notion of opacity shapes a hermeneutical phenomenology of whiteness.
As hermeneutical, I move away from a mere eidetic phenomenology. Contemporary
phenomenological thought on whiteness has sought, similarly, to move forward a critique of
eidetic phenomenology in light of lived racial experience. In large part, this movement develops
out of reflection on Frantz Fanon’s claim in Black Skin, White Masks of the need to move
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phenomenologically from a mere “corporeal” or “bodily” schema to a “historico-racial” or
“racial epidermal” schema. My own hermeneutical trajectory examines the lived experience of
white racial being vis-a-vis a history of interpretation within various texts and symbols that
develops a color symbolism through a symbolism of evil upon theological discourse pertaining
to mystical darkness. Exploring how this happens is the very substance of my argument.
Before getting to this, allow me to make a final methodological point on my use of
Ricoeur as a key interlocutor alongside Long. I admit, with Davidson, that, especially in light of
the prolific writings of Ricoeur, “it is astonishing that Ricoeur only engages the issue of race in a
couple of brief and apparently reluctant remarks about the politics of multiculturalism.”54 Still,
there is a growing body of literature on Ricoeur and race which, despite the lacuna in Ricoeur’s
work, takes up his intellectual framework to think about race in key directions, especially
drawing on Ricoeur’s central and productive notion of the “capable human.”55 My use of
Ricoeur in this way is buttressed by a broader contemporary effort in the critical philosophy of
race toward “creolization” of traditional thinkers and topics in view of philosophizing about
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race. Ricoeur is important for me in several ways: he will guide us in systematically setting out
56

crucial points for the nature of opacity in its various dimensions in the hermeneutical tradition;
he will focus intently on opacity and a symbolism of evil at the very transition from
phenomenology to hermeneutics; he will open up our exploration toward a number of key
discourses. But Ricoeur does not get us to Long’s point about connecting a symbolism of evil to
logics of racialization. With the help of thinkers like Fanon, Long’s direct involvement with
Ricoeur presents a unique opportunity to carry forth this creolizing work in philosophy of race.
In the end, I show that reflection on opacity interrupts a “pure” phenomenology of race
and directs reflection on race towards a theological examination of the symbolism of evil.
Darkness in general is already a problem in phenomenology, but not immediately racial. Yet
phenomenology inherits an intellectual trajectory that constructs a symbol of perspective which
configures darkness within a symbol of color enmeshed in a symbolism of evil. To see this, we
must extend the phenomenological discussion on whiteness to a phenomenologicalhermeneutical discussion, which, through this hermeneutical route, also becomes a theological
discussion (which Ricoeurian and Longian thought prepares us for). Here we are called to
examine the development of perspective within theological texts and symbols that are interested
in the notion of mystical darkness as a mode of being or subjectivity normed by the tension
between the finite and the infinite as one wrestles with “darkness.” These important connections
between theology, phenomenology, and hermeneutics lead to an understanding of whiteness as
crafted in view of mystical darkness. This, as I will explain, leads us finally to the question of a
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psychoanalysis. Thinking with Ricoeur, we will not only be interested in the pathology of the
symbol’s opacity, but also whether such opacity still offers any ethical teleological thrust toward
a therapeutics which can decontaminate the symbol of race.
Theological Opacity: From Mystical Darkness to Modern Rationality
The lived experience of white racial seeing was constructed through a certain history of
interpretation within texts and symbols of mystical theology. Specifically, I argue that the
processes of racialization at stake in symbolizing color within a symbolism of evil are paths laid
through Christian discourse on mystical darkness as it wrestles with the question of evil amidst
the tension of finitude and the infinite. The notion of opacity continues to help me here,
becoming a way to hold together the different and sometimes conflicting ways in which
“darkness” is configured in this tangled process, both as positive and as negative. I argue,
specifically, that the connection between mystical darkness and modern racialization is the
development of modern perspective as a product of this symbolism.
The two main figures of my study, Gregory of Nyssa (335-394) and Nicholas of Cusa
(1401-1464), bring us to the heart of this question of seeing into divine darkness, and especially
Cusa focuses this matter directly on modern perspective. 58 In my approach to mystical
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subjectivity here, as hermeneutical and phenomenological, I try to discern the anthropogenetical
horizon in which we can unearth our own subjective archeology. I approach history as the shards
from the past that we can piece together to understand ourselves and the story we are weaving. In
taking such an approach, I must dismiss from the outset the accusation that mysticism or an
“apophatic” spirituality is a “self-absorbed, solitary, narcissistic, and world-renouncing” mode of
being—thinking paradigmatically of that Plotinian notion of the “flight of the alone to the
Alone.”59 If this were true, mysticism would have little to do with broader social and historical
patterns and formations. It is better, however, to think of such mystical “aloneness” as the claim
to a radical availability and universal intimacy that gives existence to and awakens the unique
identity of all things.60 Indeed, at its core, the tradition of Christian mystical darkness has sought
a sense of “solitary” identity that seeks a broader, cosmic unity.61
Engaging a phenomenology toward this direction of Christian mysticism and medieval
thought has historical precedent (for example, in Heidegger and Husserl), but also contemporary
promise in the work of Emmanuel Falque, among others. 62 While recognizing key
methodological challenges in such a conversation, Falque writes that both phenomenology and
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medieval philosophy are primarily concerned with the themes of God, the flesh, and the other.

63

By seeing “the same things in a new way” through this intertextual dialogue, phenomenology
itself “open[s] its horizon to kinds of experience that it has itself not yet described or even
suspected.”64 Falque writes of the need of deploying the “potentialities” of medieval philosophy
that are “not yet actualized (actualitas).” He writes: “Few fields are so replete with texts,
gestures and attitudes than medieval philosophy, which phenomenology would associate with
ways of being in the world,” indeed, such way of being that are “there to be rediscovered for our
time.”65 Directly relevant to this present work, Jean-Luc Marion claims Cusan perspective has a
certain phenomenological rigor that allows us “to take up the classic phenomenological aporias
not so much of the vision of God, but of the other in general. And perhaps to indicate the
conditions for their solution.”66 If I am correct that the symbolization of race takes root here
through the pathologization of opacity as a symbol of color within a symbolism of evil, then we
can in this view discover in these texts the sedimentation of our own understandings, to further
interrogate this problem of genuinely seeing the (racial) other. Phenomenology has a certain
fecundity in granting one to reconstruct from the shadows the inner life or intuitions of an
experience, to bring an experience to life.67 Now (surely), we do not want whiteness to “live
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again,” but want to become aware of its mode of life (that is, a claim regarding how to see the
other, which it continually obscures), and to make an ethical decision from there.
What I offer to the theological conversation is a unique account regarding a theological
construction of seeing that modernity inherits and is fundamentally shaped by—and which is key
to how modernity constructs race. To trace in this way how theological discourse intersects with
racialization is to think closely with J. Kameron Carter who, not unlike other scholars examining
the intersection of theology and race, argues that theology “aided and abetted” the racialization
of the modern self and traces how race develops from the effort to mark and banish otherness
from Christian identity.68 But while Carter attempts to recover genuinely Black theological
discourse, I approach the question of race from the side of explaining the symbolic and lived
reality of whiteness.69 While my work could be thought alongside other ventures that focus on
the intersection of race and theology, especially those that attempt to sketch the whiteness of
theology itself (for example, James W. Perkinson’s White Theology), my argument is unique in
showing the essential connections between theology, phenomenology, and hermeneutics in the
construction of whiteness within a symbolism of evil.70 Such a focused account is yet to be given
and could strengthen critical reflection on whiteness by providing broader philosophical and
theological explanatory power. Indeed, a central claim of my work is that a theological
exploration shows how modern rationality is fascinated with but hides the (eventually racialized)
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darkness upon which it crafts itself. This reveals the way in which modern reason is committed
to racialization. Here, the facticity of the racialization of opacity questions more anteriorly the
ways in which the phenomenological—and theological—project might already be caught up in
the logics of racialization that poison otherwise potentially productive projects therein.
Because the theological phenomenology of whiteness I take up explores a visual
problem—like a cataract—at the very heart of seeing itself, such an exploration must involve a
hermeneutical-historical detour around the immediacy of sight, which explores the historical
development of the symbol of perspective. The core chapters of my argument on the development
of the notion of mystical darkness and its place in the development of modern reason (Chapters
2-4) represent such an hermeneutical-historical detour in order to understand how modern
perspective develops as white sight. In these chapters, I will examine the development of modern
perspective and its implication for racial logics as I compare and contrast the notion of seeing
within the “darkness of God” as it shows up first within Nyssa’s concept of epektasis and then
within Cusa’s visio Dei, especially noticing continuities and discontinuities in the treatment and
use of opacity in these apophatic thinkers. This doctrinal locus gives me an opportunity to
explore how, as Long argues, opacity itself was racialized through a symbolism of evil as
embodied “darkness” interrupts and is captured by the desire to see God, world, and self clearly
within perceptual “darkness.” An examination of Nyssa’s epektasis in Chapter Two will
establish the ambiguous way in which darkness is treated at the beginning of this Christian
trajectory, both in symbolizing darkness of skin as evil (setting into motion the symbolization of
race toward historical manifestation) and as symbolizing darkness as hopeful symbol of how our
finite bodies can be transformed toward the infinite. In Chapter Three, I will focus on how Cusa
(especially in On the Vision of God), on the threshold of modernity, rethinks perspective—both
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positively and negatively—and I will explain how perspective develops as a symbol that shapes
whiteness. We will come to see, after our work with Cusa, how modern perspective, obsessed
with its own origin and universal extension, comes to have so much power to form a colonial
world. The modern shift in thinking opacity as depth in terms of perspective in this way opens up
the transition from discourses on the symbolic-enigmatic to discourses on opaque racial
identities; in and through this very transition opacity obtains as the darkness of the other that is
rejected for the clarity of one’s perspective which manifests in the colonial project of whiteness.
In Chapter Four, particularly in view of Kant’s thought, I will conclude that modern perspective
is a symbol that “created” the Atlantic as point of origin of new humanity, fashioning upon the
mirror/water/black flesh an edifice—or abyss—of a “free” and “rational” society. While still a
part of the hermeneutical detour, this chapter moves out from the close analysis of perspective
and toward the question of desire in modern perspective. It also explores the way in which
modern thought is indebted to a mystical foundation.
Through this overall historical-hermeneutical detour, I will center the theological motif of
the icon. Marion argues that Cusa’s text brings an iconic phenomenology to life, arguing that
“every real icon puts into play an all-seeing gaze … [and so] Nicholas of Cusa here describes the
very essence of every icon.”71 Focusing on a phenomenology and theology of sight in terms of
the icon will allow us both to examine Cusa’s thought and reach the contemporary conversation
about gazes and otherness that will lead us coherently to the problem of the contemporary
discourse of opaque identity. Through tracing notions such as the changing way in which the
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mirror functions in theological sight and the different ways theological vision relates to
sensibility and materiality, I will specifically be interested in how an iconic framework
transmogrifies into a fetishizing framework.
Exploring this, I consider issues of filiation and spatialization, specifically how filiation
shapes a moral geography. In terms of filiation, this is for me the question of how the body is
included by exclusion in a subjective regime of (transcendent) seeing (to infinity), and how this
migrates from mysticism to modern racial logics.72 This process, this reaching toward the
immaterial and infinite, affects the spatiality of the world. In the end I will explore this notion
through thirdspatiality as developed by Ed Soja in light of the work of Henry Lefebvre. Lefebvre
stressed the spatiality of life, often missed in emphasizing social or historical dimensions of
life.73 Soja extends this project with the notion of thirdspace: “There are no aspatial social
processes. Even in the realm of pure abstraction, ideology, and representation, there is a
pervasive and pertinent, if often hidden, spatial dimension.”74 But there is the need to distinguish
various spaces: 1) perceived space or spatial practice (Firstspace); 2) conceived space or
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representations of space (Secondspace); and 3) spaces of representation (Thirdspace). This
schematic will help me think about how the icon as a figure of representation focused on opacity
comes to shape concrete materiality through spatialization. Thirdspatiality, indeed, will be a way
to theorize the kind of space at stake in what the icon (and mystical darkness) gives. We can
imagine here the thirdspatiality of the icon released from its fetishization by returning to the
radical alterity at stake in the project of mystical darkness.
Before commencing my hermeneutical exploration, in Chapter One I want to give an
initial, broad account of white sight and how it seeks to hide itself by escaping detection. I ask
how the experience of white sight shaped the notion and use of opacity, including its
metaphysical or ontological status and function, and its historical status in the theological desire
to see God, world, and self clearly as Christian mystical discourse wrestles with the relation
between finitude and the question of evil. I hope to bring clarity to the several contexts at play
here—theological, phenomenological, and hermeneutical—as I seek to develop a heuristic
framework for understanding opacity that will guide the ensuing exploration through Nyssen and
Cusan thought. I will explore how a contemporary phenomenology of whiteness moves toward a
hermeneutical phenomenology of whiteness. I will also explore some preliminary thoughts about
connecting mystical subjectivity to the construction of perspective. This chapter, in a sense,
centers opacity and perspective in a way that opens up the need for and direction of the “long
route” of a hermeneutical critique of white sight.
After this long route of my hermeneutical-historical detour (Chapters 2-4), I will
conclude by explaining the ways in which it is accurate to speak of a certain retrieval of
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theological sight—even in view of its pathologization—as I hope to point toward an ethical way
forward for white people. Such a new way of seeing and constructing the world would have to
re-orient perspective. This process first will involve a kind of psychoanalysis, trying to forge
proper comportment to the opaque by, so to speak, removing the opacified cataract from the eye.
And I will offer a certain theological tool of a theological reading of scripture to properly reengage mystical subjectivity and productive symbolic opacity. Such a healing would engender a
new kind of spatiality that can engender new ways of seeing for white people. Inhabiting a new
mode of spatiality (“zones of opacity”) can enable white people to embrace a “mysticism” for
today that is focused on the theological problem of sight and race. But a certain tragedy is at
stake here, as an ethical re-symbolization only occurs after exiting from its theological
symbolism of perspective, color, and evil that define its very constitution. Embracing a kind of
tragic-critical thought then opens up the expectation for the gift of mutual recognition.

CHAPTER ONE
OPACITY, MYSTICISM, AND THE QUESTION OF EVIL
If the linear perspective experiment of Filippo Brunelleschi in fifteenth century Florence
provided the origin point of modern vision (as I will argue), around the same time Nicholas of
Cusa invites a group of monks in Tegernsee, Germany to discover the hidden foundation of this
modern vision: sending to them, along with his De visione Dei, an image of an all-seeing face, he
invites them into a theological sight which grasps at perspicuity from within the cloud of
mystical darkness. Cusa asks the monks to semi-circularly walk around the image and testify to
each other to the simultaneous moving and fixing of divine vision; out of such a mystical
experience they would grasp both the perspectival nature of their vision—a radically new way to
see!—and also the transcending of their particular vision through a leaping toward an absolute
divine sight. Characteristic of modern vision more broadly, this synthetic grasping (upon the
opaque mystical center) of the particularity of perspective into a whole, continuous perspective
reveals how the racialization of vision through modern perspective is built upon a symbolic
dealing with darkness.
As we explore how it matters for us that we see “in a mirror darkly,” I argue that we are
set on a path to discover the theological construction of white sight which centers us on the
notion of opacity. White sight is the racialization of vision that combines color and value on the
basis of a modern process of perceptual understanding, forged within the apparatus of modern
perspective upon the logic of mystical darkness and its symbolism of evil. The notion of opacity
30
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in the history of thought and human experience first becomes a way to symbolically connect
darkness-as-depth to meaning-making, which prepares the way for giving value and meaning to
the darkness of color. The result is that “depth-perception” is made a tool of human control
capable of being utilized by other modern configurations like colonialism, specifically as white
sight connects depth to race by projecting depth and a new understanding of infinity upon the
black body to control the “darkness” experienced by the infinite expansion of space.
I argue that the processes of racialization at stake in such symbolizations of modern sight
are paths constructed through various texts and symbols of mystical theology that develop a
color symbolism through a symbolism of evil; particularly I focus on how mystical darkness
inherited from Gregory of Nyssa in early Christianity is handled and passed on to modernity in
the medieval thought of Cusanus. The Christian theological notion of mystical darkness, being a
key place of wrestling with the question of evil and the good amidst the tension of finitude and
infinitude, is engaged by modern thought through marking and banishing its notion of darkness.
But this mystical darkness also functions to disrupt and deny possessive knowledge and
cognitive dominion, subverting the modern project—even as this resistance seems only to add
fuel to the modern drive for clarity of vision and absolute perspective. Thus, the notion of
opacity—folded into this doctrinal center so as to be unfolded toward symbolizing race—for me
becomes a way to hold together the different and sometimes conflicting ways in which
“darkness” is configured in this tangled process. Untangling the notion of opacity at this
intersection, then, allows us to see with fresh eyes the ways of being that construct our own
sedimented subjectivity and understanding.
I will explain how the experience of white sight shaped the notion and use of opacity in
the theological desire to see God, world, and self clearly. The symbolic meaning that constitutes
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whiteness in this way bonds itself with larger social structures and actions and thus gains a kind
of agency and intentionality. What is most significant in my argument is how whiteness seizes
upon opaqueness in such a way as to paradoxically utilize logics of transparency to hide how it
uses a symbolics of color to build a racialized world through perspective. Opacity comes to be
the topos whereupon the “cultural production of evil” perpetuated by and giving life to the
western colonial institutions and practices developed out of white sight obscures and conceals its
own intentionality and, thus, the investment of whiteness in a broader symbolics of evil.1 In view
of this, while it is true that a phenomenological examination of whiteness promises to “bracket”
whiteness so as to “see” its mode of experience that often goes unthought, we can only
interrogate the phenomenon of white sight with a critical hermeneutics. By this I mean an
ideology critique and psychoanalysis that regards the hermeneutical center as a place that not
only is productive of meaning making but also one that provides for the covering-up of such
meaning through pathologization and the power of domination.2 The structural ways in which the
logic of opacity is put to use in white sight ultimately evade phenomenological analysis because
they anteriorly shape modern perception and sight. A critical hermeneutics recognizes the
ambiguity of opacity and can interrogate how the fuel of the meaningfulness of the symbol is also
the fuel for its deep pathologization, particularly as centered around the problem of evil. This is
why, in fact, an examination of white sight must involve a hermeneutical-historical detour
around the immediacy of sight. Critically thinking about whiteness under the notion of opacity is
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not simply to say that whiteness perpetuates itself by hiding itself (a rather ubiquitous claim), but
that an examination of opacity helps us understand how mystical darkness connects to racial
darkness through a symbolism of evil and exposes the labyrinthine process of modern
racialization with the hope of pointing out the specific path forward.
In this first chapter, which functions to center the matter of white sight, I explain how to
shape a contemporary theological phenomenology of whiteness around opacity and how this
moves us toward the question of mystical subjectivity and perspective. I will first show that the
contemporary phenomenological conversation on whiteness opens up toward a hermeneutical
phenomenology, even one that focuses on opacity. Second, I explain how this move toward a
robust hermeneutical phenomenology of whiteness focused on opacity decisively comes to focus
on the question of evil and its symbolism, and thus meets up with the thought of Long. Here I dig
deeply into the Ricoeurian claim of opacity and the symbolism of evil. These first and second
points establish the importance of opacity for a contemporary phenomenology of whiteness.
Third, I set out touchpoints for how logics of race are rooted in how Christian mystical discourse
on darkness navigates questions of images, subjectivity, and identity. Tracing how darkness is
navigated in this theological discourse opens the way, fourth, for how modern perspective
develops upon the locus of mystical darkness as a transcendental claim to sight forged upon
logics of negating finitude. This leads me to the concern of my broader study: a theologicallyconscious hermeneutical phenomenology of whiteness is one that fundamentally interrogates
perspective as shaped by a color symbolism forged within mystical discourse, which represents
the “long route” necessary to understand how white racial formation and subjectivity shapes
white sight in the world as it brings from symbol to rational thought its reflections on evil.

34
Phenomenology of Whiteness: toward a Hermeneutics
Phenomenology seeks to get to the “thing itself” through its critical focus on lived
experience, making visible what might not otherwise be in a given phenomenon. This critical
function is so radical that phenomenology itself yields to the power of this clearing away. Such
has been the case in phenomenological consideration of whiteness with the transition from a
more “classical” or eidetic phenomenology to a hermeneutical phenomenology which can pay
better attention to the dynamics of racialization. In large part, this develops out of reflection on
Frantz Fanon’s claim in Black Skin, White Masks of the need to move phenomenological
reflection from a mere “corporeal” or “bodily” schema to a “historico-racial” or “racial
epidermal” schema. The conversation today seeks to move forward his critique. I argue that the
trajectory of contemporary reflection focuses on the matter of opacity, and even a symbolism of
evil. This conversation shows how we can hold together, through the lens of opacity, a growing
tension in the contemporary conversation on race: on the one hand, an insistence that whiteness
is subjective and habitual; and on the other, the insistence that whiteness is an active, objective
world horizon or ontologizing force that shapes the subject.
Initial Points on Classical Phenomenology and Color
My phenomenological approach by way of the matter of perspective is not without
warrant. As I will show, modern perspective from its origin was concerned with how things
appear, how we see and experience the world—so much so that Karsten Harries writes: “the
theory of perspective is phenomenology.”3 More specifically, Marion and Falque both argue that
in De visione Dei Cusa anticipates phenomenology in how he describes the experience of the all-
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seeing image. Indeed, Cusa’s experiment of understanding sight through the varying of
4

perspectives around a central object resonates with a key passage of Husserl’s Ideas as he
discusses “the real nature of perception and its transcendent object” (§41). Husserl is arguing that
perception is not of the “physical thing” which is “radically transcendent;” phenomenology is
concerned with “a deeper insight into the relation of the transcendent to the Consciousness that
knows it, and to see how this mutual connexion, which has its own riddles, is to be understood.”5
Here, intuition and that which is intuited, perception and that which is perceived “though
essentially related to each other, are in principle and of necessity not really (reell) and essentially
one and united.”6 To illustrate, Husserl describes perceiving a table as one walks around it:
Keeping this table steadily in view as I go round it, changing my position in space all the
time, I have continually the consciousness of the bodily presence out there of this one and
self-same table, which in itself remains unchanged throughout. But the perception of the
table is one that changes continuously, it is a continuum of changing perceptions. … The
perceived thing in general, and all its parts, aspects, and phases, whether the quality be
primary or secondary, are necessarily transcendent to the perception, and on the same
grounds everywhere.7
Husserl specifically discusses the matter of the color of the table: just as with every sensory
quality, the color of the thing seen “is not in principle a real phase of the consciousness of
colour; it appears, but even while it is appearing the appearance can and must be continually
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changing, as experience shows. The same colour appears ‘in’ continuously varying patterns of
perspective colour-variations.”8 Husserl sums up the key takeaway:
An empirical consciousness of a self-same thing that looks ‘all-round’ its object, and in
so doing is continually confirming the unity of its own nature, essentially and necessarily
possesses a manifold system of continuous patterns of appearances and perspective
variations, in and through which all objective phases of the bodily self-given which
appear in perception manifest themselves perspectively in definite continua. Every
determinate feature has its own system of perspective variations; and for each of these
features, as for the thing as a whole, the following holds good, namely, that it remains
one and the same for the consciousness that in grasping it unites recollection and fresh
perception synthetically together, despite interruption in the continuity of the course of
actual perception.9
The perception of a thing includes “the continuously ordered flow of perceptual patterns as they
pass off the one into the other,” or what Husserl refers to as “perspective variations” of various
sensory data that reflect the “definite descriptive nature” we perceive; the perspective variations
of the sense data derived from the things descriptive nature is correlated with the unity of that
self-identical thing we intend in our consciousness.
The key point for us is that there is a split or distance between the “perspective variation”
and the “perspected variable.” Through the process of “apprehension” we perceive things as they
exhibit themselves in their unified appearing, a synthetic process of perception in which our
consciousness of a thing is grounded in “the essential Being of the apprehensions unified.”10 So
Husserl clarifies the relation between perspective variation and perspected variables:
the sensory data which exercise the function of presenting colour, smoothness, shape, and
so forth perspectivally (the function of ‘exhibiting’) differ wholly and in principle from
colour, smoothness, shape simpliciter, in short from all the generic aspect which a thing
can show. The perspective variation (the ‘Abschattung’), though verbally similar to the
perspected variable (the ‘Abgeschattetes’), differs from it generically and in principle.
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The perspective variation is an experience. But experience is possible only as experience,
and not something spatial. The perspected variable, however, is in principle possible only
as spatial (it is indeed spatial in its essence), but not possible as experience. 11
This is an astonishing statement considering our path ahead. For one, Cusa inextricably linked
experience and spatiality in the phenomenality of perspective. More immediately, Fanon argued
directly against the separating of experience and spatiality in view of racial experience. Because
of the hermeneutical sedimentation of race, focused as it is on the materiality of skin color
brought to life (we might say) by an “imagination of matter,” experience and consciousness is
spatial. In any case, Husserl’s argument here centers the issue of perspective around how color
and particularity are symbolized in the synthetic, transcendental grasping of a unified viewpoint.
Before examining Fanon’s claim in detail, I briefly want to argue that this type of
constitutional problem does not entirely disqualify phenomenology as a method to understand
racialization and whiteness. Similar to Husserl, Heidegger faces a problem of reckoning with the
experience of color and darkness in racialization, as he emphasizes that phenomenology focuses
on a making visible or manifest, a bringing in the light. Phenomenology is “to let that which
shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself”—but
darkness, by definition, cannot be brought to light.12 Still, Heidegger allows for consideration of
darkness and hiddenness as he intently focuses on how there is an element in the explicit
showing of something that indicates yet a hidden part. Things can be hidden in several ways:
egregiously or intentionally, or by, in the course of time, “gett[ing] covered up again” and
forgotten, or that something shows itself only “in disguise.” This last kind of hiding of things is
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particularly interesting for our own study of whiteness; Heidegger notes that this “disguising”
kind of covering up of phenomenon is “the most frequent and the most dangerous, for here the
possibilities of deceiving and misleading are especially stubborn.” In this case, a kind of veiling
happens where a phenomenon, placed into a “system,” claims a kind of clarity and transparency.
Phenomenology, then, can put us on guard for this covering up. It can even prepare us for the
possibility that “what has been primordially ‘within our grasp’ may become hardened so that we
can no longer grasp it.”13 For us, whiteness may be a thing so hardened we can no longer see
what it actually is, hidden by virtue of the very constitution of our perception, thought, and sight.
Phenomenology can be put to use, then, especially as hermeneutical, in trying to see “the thing”
of whiteness which often disappears as it functions.
For Heidegger, getting “back to the things themselves” is never naïve or haphazard, but a
critical digging. Emphasizing such things, Heidegger links phenomenology to a hermeneutics,
not merely as a process of interpretation but the possibility of opening up “the horizon for any
further ontological study of those entities which do not have the character of Dasein, … [thus]
working out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends.” 14
In this way, though a more eidetic phenomenology within the very process of synthesizing
perspective variations can transcendentalize past—and therefore fail to see—the intricacies of
the symbolizing of color (and thus the matter of race as an existential experience), still the
phenomenological method can work beyond the strictures of its historical employment. To
wrestle with whiteness as a fundamental problem, a problem that concerns being itself, we will
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have to move deeper into the power of a hermeneutics, willing to suspend the structural
limitations of traditional phenomenology and move forward into the phenomenality of whiteness.
Fanon and Critique of Classical Phenomenology
For Fanon, conscious experience is explicitly spatial, realized in the hermeneutics of
racialization. As Fanon reflects on the lived experience of racialization, he uncovers the “already
racialized” nature of classical phenomenology and its body schema as “race does not just
interrupt such a schema but structures its mode of operation.”15 Reflecting on his experience as
he reaches across the table for cigarettes, Fanon writes:
And then we were given the occasion to confront the white gaze. An unusual weight
descended on us. The real world robbed us of our share. In the white world, the man of
color encounters difficulties in elaborating his body schema. The image of one’s body is
solely negating. It’s an image in the third person. All around the body reigns an
atmosphere of certain uncertainty. I know that if I want to smoke, I shall have to stretch
out my right arm and grab the pack of cigarettes lying at the other end of the table. As for
the matches, they are in the left drawer, and I shall have to move back a little. And I make
all these moves, not out of habit, but by implicit knowledge. A slow construction of my
self as a body in a spatial and temporal world—such seems to be the schema. It is not
imposed on me; it is rather a definitive structuring of my self and the world—definitive
because it creates a genuine dialectic between my body and the world.16
Fanon continues: “Beneath the body schema I had created a historical-racial schema”—a schema
developed not out of the integrity of bodily perception but “by the Other, the white man, who
had woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, and stories.” Assailed at various points by
“legends, stories, history, and especially … historicity,” Fanon writes, “the body schema,
attacked in several places, collapsed, giving way to an epidermal racial schema.” In the white
gaze he became aware of his body “in triple [person].” Besides occupying physical space and
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being in relation (“approach[ing]”) the other, the third space is a kind of modal or relational
space, one of “nausea” in the wake of “the Other, evasive, hostile, but not opaque, transparent
and absent, vanished.” The “discovery” of Fanon’s blackness came with a sense of responsibility
for his body, race, and ancestors and as he “cast an objective gaze over [himself].”17
This hermeneutical racial epidermal schema is key to understanding the objectifying gaze
of whiteness upon racial blackness, one of the more significant themes in phenomenology of
whiteness (and one that we ourselves will explore). According to Fanon’s testimony, this gaze is
built on the logics of a symbolism of evil. Throughout Fanon’s testimony, he mentions notions of
stain, defilement and disgrace. Referencing the white gaze—“‘Dirty nigger!’ Or simply ‘Look! A
Negro!’” (thus, in intertwining dirt and darkness of skin, a gaze already and fundamentally
symbolizing color as evil)—Fanon writes that he was “an object among other objects.” He
continues: “Locked in this suffocating reification, I appealed to the Other. … But … I stumble,
and the Other fixes me with his gaze, his gestures and attitude, the same way you fix a
preparation with a dye.”18 The gaze creates ontological problems as blackness is defined against
whiteness, and so the look of the white man dislocates Fanon and imprisons him: “I transported
myself on that particular day far, very far, from my self, and gave myself up as an object. What
did this mean to me? Peeling, stripping my skin, causing a hemorrhage that left congealed black
blood all over my body.” While wanting to be “a man among men” instead he is fit away in a
pre-determined system.19 Fanon sums up his racial experience as not one of a feeling of
inferiority but “a feeling of not existing” as, in Fanon’s words, “Sin is black as virtue is white.
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All those white men, fingering their guns, can’t be wrong. I am guilty. I don’t know what of, but
I know I’m a wretch.”20 Getting in the way of authentic identity is a gaze built out of a
hermeneutical layer of a symbolism of color woven into a symbolism of evil.
It is specifically in reflecting on this symbolics of evil, in fact, that Fanon critiques JeanPaul Sartre’s classical phenomenology. Sartre had written Orphée Noir as the preface to Léopold
Sédar Senghor’s Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre et malgache, a work of the Negritude
movement. Here, Sartre had described blackness as a “moment of negativity” in a Hegelian
dialectic that works to transcend race in the interest of the greater economic struggle. Sartre had
written that the negritude movement was only transitionary and not an end in itself. Fanon could
not be stronger in his critique, writing that he felt as if he had been “robbed” of his “last chance”
as an apparent “friend of the colored peoples” had found “nothing better to do than demonstrate
the relativity of their action.” The Hegelian, as Fanon puts it, “had forgotten that consciousness
needs to get lost in the night of the absolute, the only condition for attaining selfconsciousness.”21 Thus, testifies Fanon: Sartre “reminded me that my negritude was nothing but
a weak stage.” He continues:
Without a black past, without a black future, it was impossible for me to live my
blackness. Not yet white, no longer completely black, I was damned. Jean-Paul Sartre
forgets that the black man suffers in his body quite differently from the white man.
Between the white man and me there is irremediably a relationship of transcendence.22
In making blackness of race relative and non-essential to existential being, to take its
consciousness as only a moment in a broader transcendental struggle for freedom, Fanon writes
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that Sartre’s mistake was to downplay the source of black racial being. Sartre symbolized
Fanon’s blackness such that his racial particularity was dense and weighing him down; Fanon
was not freed but immobilized by the transcendental approach.23
Toward a contemporary hermeneutical phenomenology of whiteness
Fanon’s testimony remains central to contemporary phenomenological reflection on
whiteness. Even as contemporary phenomenology seeks to rediscover the body (especially
through a retrieval of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work on habit, perception, and the body),
Fanon’s testimony urges the conversation evermore beyond the superficial to reflect on the
hermeneutical schema present “below” the typical, eidetic schema of the body, thereby putting
into question an entire paradigm traditionally focused on ability and intentionality.24 I argue that
as the contemporary phenomenology of whiteness has developed from and beyond Fanon, we
can summarize some of its key conclusions and themes around the notion of opacity.
I am greatly indebted to the thought of George Yancy, who focuses his phenomenology
of whiteness explicitly on the matter of opacity as he discusses the “opaque white racist self.”
Yancy writes: “white racism is embedded within one’s embodied perceptual engagement with
the social world and … is woven into, etched into, the white psyche, forming an opaque white
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racist self that influences (and often overshadows) everyday mundane transactions.” The
25

opacity of the white self takes on several interrelated meanings. Fundamentally, Yancy argues
that white people undergo a formation of social racial bonding which they cannot easily see.
Yancy argues that for whites “bodily orientations are unreflected expressions of the background
lived orientations of whiteness, white ways of being, white modes of racial and racist practice.”
White racial formation is unconscious because the white body is unmarked, blending into the
racial background, while in the white gaze that develops from this racialization “black people are
always already marked as different/deviant/dangerous.”26 A second aspect of this opacity is that
the white self is constructed with the belief it is autonomous, epistemologically-secured, and
transparent to itself, thus refusing to admit self-opacity. Recognizing this, Yancy engages in the
project of trying to “flip the script” by emboldening a “black counter-graze” to “perhaps create a
moment of uptake that induces a form of white identity crisis, a jolt that awakens a sudden and
startling sense of having been seen.”27 Such a project seeks to break-up the transcendent
synthesis of perception, to disrupt the logics of the white gaze. Yancy writes:
The act of marking whiteness, then, is itself an act of historicizing whiteness, an act of
situating whiteness within the context of material forces and raced interest-laden values
that reinforce whiteness as a site of privilege and hegemony. Marking whiteness is about
exposing the ways in which whites have created a form of ‘humanism’ that obfuscates
their hegemonic efforts to treat their experiences as universal and representative.28
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Whiteness gives a self that claims to know itself and be in charge of itself; to see the social and
racial formation it undergoes would be to undercut the stability of the white psyche. In this sense,
the white self is opaque not only because it is unmarked, (passively) blending into the
background, but because it takes upon itself (actively) a sense of universality. Whiteness hides
itself in obscurity by claiming a transparency, transcendence, and openness to inspection.29
Moreover—and this is especially key for us—when the white self is marked and looked
at, it resists, doubling down on logics transparency by claiming a transcendental purity.
Whiteness evades being seen by claiming a kind of epistemic purity wherein one is at a remove
from the messy racial problem. Much of this is at stake in the so-called “good-white.”30 This also
has to do with the way in which white racial privilege protects the inability of whiteness to see
itself by reinforcing a sense of transparency and freedom through a deeper moral symbolism.
Applebaum writes that in addition to the spatial freedom it grants, white privilege “also consists
in the presumption of white moral integrity that is, in the larger picture, contingent upon the coconstruction of Black as morally suspect. … White privilege protects and supports white moral
standing and this proactive shield depends on there being an ‘abject other’ that constitutes white
as ‘good.’”31 Indeed, bell hooks, drawing on Richard Dryer’s essay “White,” notes that there is a
fantasy and myth constructed that “makes whiteness synonymous with goodness.” 32 Yancy is
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pushing back against this insipient moral symbolism: “there is no ahistorical material ‘white’
vulnerable body that is the starting point of the white self.”33
Yancy insists that for a white person to receive the counter-gaze is to experience the
racial state of whiteness not as a kind of possession but as a kind of dispossession. Drawing on
Judith Butler’s work on opacity in Giving an Account of Oneself, Yancy writes that the “white
embodied self is always already constituted through its connectivity to discursive and material
practices that are fundamentally racist … [and] has already been given over, as it were, to
embedded and embodied white others.”34 It is not extraordinary that the self—any self—is
constituted in the opacity of relationality and interdependence; but the white self (intentionally)
fails to see this. The kind of dispossessive opacity at stake in selfhood is covered up by the white
self as it utilizes primordial logics of opacity to obscure its own particular and raced origins, to
weaponize opacity through a façade of universality and introspective omnipotence. Yet, Yancy
argues, one is unable to give a full account of one’s racism: “Rather, the reality of the sheer
depth of white racialization is far too opaque.” Self-reflection is impeded for white people as it is
not about what one might know “to be true through self-reflection … [but rather] about
formative racist dynamics that exceed the site of an epistemic subject possessed of so-called full
self-knowledge.”35 The white person experiences themselves as an enigma, unable to see the
nature and depth of their whiteness.36
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In light of this dispossession in the wake of the self’s opacity, properly understood,
Yancy speaks of the need to indefinitely tarry with one’s whiteness and recognize one can never
escape their whiteness and the privilege and power it brings. He calls white people to “dwell” in
places of uncomfortabilty, to “delay,” and “postpone” the quick rush past the uncomfortability.
Yancy writes: “The unfinished present is where I want whites to tarry (though not permanently
remain), to listen, to recognize the complexity and weight of the current existence of white
racism.” Rushing too quickly out of this space can itself be a form of obfuscation of “the specific
power and privilege of the historical uniqueness of white racism.”37 There is an element of the
embrace of tragedy here. I will return to Yancy’s thought on this matter in my conclusion.
From Yancy’s most helpful orientation, I want to highlight three points that flesh out this
theme of the opacity of the white self as I interact with the fuller conversation.38 First, a
phenomenology of whiteness moves toward a hermeneutics focused on opacity because the
perceiving body is enmeshed in a milieu of symbolic, under-the-surface discourses. This quality
whiteness has of hiding itself relates to a key dialectic: though perception of race operates by
making visible, just how such perception makes race visible is itself hidden from view, nestled in
a learned process. Racial logic fundamentally makes visible that which can otherwise create
“fear and consternation.” Moreover, the process of connecting race to specific markings or
features of the body is an effort to naturalize or solidify racial identity. Alcoff writes: “This is
why race must work through the visible markers on the body, even if those markers are made
visible through learned processes. Visible difference, which is materially present even if its
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meanings are not, can be used to signify or provide purported access to a subjectivity through
observable, ‘natural’ attributes, to provide a window on the interiority of the self.” 39 Marking an
apparent invisible as a visible, a secret knowledge of (inner) essences is divined and naturalized.
But such visible markers only gain signification or meaning through an anterior
formation or habituation: the perceptive mode that sees and marks race is itself “a learned
ability.”40 On this point, Alcoff and others have stressed the importance of thinking with
Merleau-Ponty about the importance of “habit” and the “habit body,” which indicates how our
perception is “attenuated” as it “skip[s] the stage of conscious interpretation and intent.”41 What
at first is experienced as a kind of bareness or immediacy of perceiving is, upon reflection, the
product of an interpretive or hermeneutical process occurring beneath the consciously
experienced body. Alcoff writes that the habit body is “a default position the body assumes in
various commonly experienced circumstances that integrates and unifies our movements.”42 This
habitual perception happens in the background or behind the scenes and thus remains unreflected
in our experience. Merleau-Ponty writes in this regard: “Perception is not … an act, a deliberate
taking up of a position; it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by
them.”43 Thus perception is habitual, a kind of milieu out of which one is formed to see. This
accounts for the difficulty of discerning, let alone changing, racializing patterns.44 Yet it can also
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be a way forward, as through recognizing this hermeneutical intervention in our phenomenology
one can begin to uncover one’s own hidden perceptual interpretation.
Second, a phenomenology of whiteness moves toward a hermeneutics of opacity because
the intentionality of habituated perception builds a world, a habit world, but one in which
“whiteness as a category of experience … disappears as a category through experience” by
becoming “worldly.”45 Drawing on Husserl’s illustration of perceiving the table, Ahmed argues
that perception happens as nestled in an orientation from which the world “unfolds” through this
perception and its gaze.46 Public spaces and places come to be shaped by habituated bodies
which—now become habit worlds—can then reinforce the shaping of habituated bodies.47 This
ultimately speaks of a certain “at-homeness” the body obtains in perception in classical
phenomenology. Consider Merleau-Ponty’s illustration in Phenomenology of Perception:
my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or possible task.
And indeed its spatiality is not, like that of external objects or like that of ‘spatial
sensations’, a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation. If I stand in front of my
desk and lean on it with both hands, only my hands are stressed and my whole body trails
behind them like the tail of a comet. It is not that I am unaware of the whereabouts of my
shoulders or back, but these are simply swallowed up in the position of my hands, and my
whole posture can be read so to speak in the pressure they exert on the table.48
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Perception happens when the body disappears as the world appears. Agency, motility and ability
in this schema are less about capacity and habits and more about “the ways in which the world is
available as a space for action, a space where things ‘have a certain place’ or are ‘in place.’”49
Ahmed argues that the at-homeness of the body in this schema has to do with
transparency and not commanding attention as the habitual body “does not pose ‘a problem’ or
an obstacle to the action, or is not ‘stressed’ by ‘what’ the action encounters” because the habit
world matches up with the body for which it has been constructed. 50 Ahmed, in fact, argues that
it is a white body that is “at-home” in the world, which “trails behind,” having created a concrete
social and physical space (a world) so as not to experience itself as stressed on any surface or
materiality; to be, in a sense, transparent, not opaque. In this regard whiteness “is an orientation
that puts certain things within reach” and “‘holds’ through habits.”51 The white subject’s gaze
builds a world (now more objective and substantial) around one’s perception (already in this way
racialized), and seeks to further socialize reality into that world.52 The legacy of colonialism,
which is not just a historical fact but a present world-shaping force makes the world “ready” for
certain bodies in this way. This means, Ahmed argues, that it is “moments when the body
appears ‘out of place’ [that] are moments of political and personal trouble.”53
Third—and crucial to my own argument—a phenomenology of whiteness moves toward
a hermeneutics to try to understand how whiteness, utilizing opacity, constructs itself and hides
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itself through a symbolics of evil. Yancy writes, “The importance of whiteness as a structural evil
should not be reduced to a set of troublesome habits.”54 We need to seriously examine whiteness
as a phenomenon that intentionality hides itself through subversion and redirection upon
examination. Nathan Eckstrand particularly highlights how whiteness is complicit in a symbolics
of evil in this way. Arguing the need to focus less on the subjective habitual body and more on
how whiteness congeals into the world and beckons to the subject, Eckstrand draws on MerleauPonty’s thought regarding the function of the world horizon to complete perception.55 Eckstrand
argues that whiteness is not just an orientation of the subjective body but also pertains to
“congealed habits” as a construction within the world that meets up with the habit body in
producing perceptions.56 This world horizon is just as important in the phenomenological
experience as the subjective habit body: “there must be schemas of whiteness implicit in the
world that compare with the body schemas found in the subject, and the experience of whiteness
must be a collaborative encounter between the two of them.”57 Thus whiteness has an ontological
quality to it, as a kind of force congealing into a world that “beckons to the subject.”58
This objective-like aspect of whiteness particularly brings “a wickedness to whiteness.”59
Part of the maliciousness of whiteness is in how it “normally completes the world such that it
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does not appear to itself.” Eckstrand explains its “occlusive” and “subverting” nature which
defines its resiliency:
Whiteness does not just lag behind, remaining just out of view, but leaps ahead too; it
actively subverts attempts to grasp it, recognize it, or name it. There is a whole machinery
at work in whiteness dedicated to the production of elisions, subversions, and
inoculations to prevent the discovery of whiteness.60
There is an “autoimmunity” at work here as whiteness attacks and deconstructs that which works
toward making it visible. This is what is at stake in the horizon of the white world, seeking to
remain out of view, and yet functioning with a malevolency “that strives for control and
oppression.”61 Whiteness here is more objective, taking on a life of its own through a symbolism
of evil, hiding itself even as it beckons the subject toward a way of being in the world.
Opacity and Evil: Phenomenology and Hermeneutics at the Intersection
In view of the contemporary phenomenology of whiteness opening toward an exploration
of opacity, I further interrogate the significance of opacity. We come to examine more closely
how the notion of opacity specifically moves phenomenology toward hermeneutics. Opacity, in
fact, is key in transitioning from an eidetic to a hermeneutical phenomenology. Ricoeur is
especially helpful here (seeing as how he focuses on the nature of this very transition). I will
exegete how he employs the notion of opacity and how it is crucial to moving toward a
hermeneutics on the very basis of discovering a symbolism of evil it must wrestle with. Pressing
into Ricoeur’s work in this way is a wager that will pay off in understanding Long. At this point,
indeed, we will find ourselves meeting back up with Long’s assertion that opacity has to do with
a symbolism of evil that can deal with race. I will begin to think out toward the broader ways in
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which opacity is caught in these processes of racialization and colonialism. This will indicate for
us a key consideration moving forward: an aesthetics that uses opacity to construct a colonial
world through perspective.
Moving from an eidetic to a hermeneutic phenomenology
Opacity is itself constitutive of, as Paul Ricoeur puts it, the “mutual belonging” of
phenomenology and hermeneutics. Before any use of it toward evil or any pathologization
toward racialization, opacity is a potentiality that indicates a “surplus of meaning.” That any
phenomenon is opaque means that lived experience deepens and thickens, both exposing
sedimented layers of enfolded meanings and possible horizons of unfolding meanings.
Understanding always surpasses itself toward a greater plurality of discourses and new horizons
(such that, for example, to understand the phenomenon of white sight we will have to traverse
theories of vision and of color, different conceptions of perspective, understandings of space and
form, aesthetic theories, and so on). In this way, opacity enters into our experience first and
originally through the enigma and symbol. Opacity is the very structure of the tension of the
symbol or enigma: the fact that, as essentially representative, a symbol both is “like” and
“unlike” at the same time, it hints and it hides what it indicates.62 As such, opacity is the
condition for the possibility of symbolic meaning, the logic upon which reflection and
interpretation reckon with the materiality and hereness of the sign (its first intentionality) and
how it connects to the thereness of its transcendent meaning (or second intentionality). Ricoeur
specifically connects this hermeneutical aspect of phenomenology to Auslegung or explication.63
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The opaque, enigmatic symbol, then, connects to an immediacy of experience and yet
invites interpretation. So Ricoeur clarifies that hermeneutics does not so much conflict with
phenomenology itself (interested, as it is, in our conscious experience) but more so ruins its
idealistic interpretation, like Husserl’s goal to seek an ultimate foundation of knowledge in
phenomenology.64 But Ricoeur writes that while “phenomenology remains the unsurpassable
presupposition of hermeneutics … phenomenology cannot constitute itself without a
hermeneutical presupposition.”65 This mutual belonging, this space of opacity is, as Ricoeur puts
it, a kind of “virtual event” or virtual space of negativity and criticism out of which meaning
emerges; in hermeneutics this is spoken of as distanciation and in phenomenology as the
epoché.66 Moreover, argues Ricoeur, the explication (Auslegung) at stake here calls for the “long
route” of grafting hermeneutics onto phenomenology, as opposed to a “short route” directly
toward ontology. This means understanding is achieved by preceding little by little, traversing
numerous linguistic genres of explanation (like exegesis or psychoanalysis) and their
methodologies. The “short route” (like with Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein) claims
understanding by “a sudden reversal of the question” from a method of knowledge to a mode of
being.67 The long route, clarifies Ricoeur, is also interested in ontology, but by degrees: he
doubts the possibility of a direct ontology “free at the outset from any methodological
requirements and consequently outside the circle of interpretation whose theory this ontology
formulates.” Still, there is the desire and horizon of such an ontology which “animates” the long
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route, revealing an ever-vaster horizon of the world and life antecedent to knowledge, in which
being exists.68 Insofar as opacity, then, is turned out toward the vastness of being and
understanding, in its hermeneutical thickness it is also turned toward the materiality,
particularity, and contingency—the finitude—of language itself.69 All understanding, as Ricoeur
argues, “places the interpreter in medias res and never at the beginning or the end. We suddenly
arrive, as it were, in the middle of a conversation which has already begun and in which we try to
orientate ourselves in order to be able to contribute to it.”70 In this light, eidetic phenomenology
must claim some kind of Hegelian absolute knowledge.71 Instead, hermeneutics prohibits
appropriation of knowledge in which is “the secret return of the sovereign subject”72—that
subject which is able to hide its particularity and function as a universal or transcendental seer.
This point of opacity and the “long route” is crucial for my own argument and approach,
and it means something for the kind of phenomenology I am taking up. Falque, however,
disagrees with Ricoeur’s argument on this point, which is significant since he takes up a (related)
project that focuses on phenomenologically encountering medieval theology and mysticism.
Falque, one could say, emphasizes the phenomenologization of hermeneutics because in the
mysticism of the Middle Ages “the spiritual aim is always the source of its texts, writings, and
dictations.” Reading (of the self and of the world) is a “mode of spiritual life” in medieval life
and thought. As such, the “grafting” of hermeneutics onto phenomenology makes possible a
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textual struggle, but one, Falque argues, which “finds its first source in a conflict of lived
experiences.”73 The lived experience at the heart of mystical subjectivity, indeed, overflows
language and sometimes includes silence—thus the lived life has primacy over the signs and
readings of texts. So Falque explicitly calls for the “short route” over the “long route:”
one does not pass to the world except through the self, albeit in and through a community
of lived experiences out of which is born a conflict of interpretations, and never the
inverse. The “grafting” of hermeneutics and analytic philosophy, occurs only on the
“living body” of phenomenology, not in the sense that the latter wields supreme power
over the others, but rather in the sense that the unspeakable aspect of the carnal
dimension of man (descriptive phenomenology) always has primacy over the verbal
interpretation of its meaning (hermeneutics) and over the grammatical formulation of its
propositions (logic).74
Ricoeur’s point, however, is that that the depths of lived experience are themselves not
immediately given, not given to consciousness without interpretation.
The long route to understanding means that this opaque place of hermeneutical
distanciation or phenomenological bracketing should engender a dispossession or apophasis of
the immediate self. Such an approach, which (as indirect) respects the enigma of understanding,
allows for the critique of immediate consciousness, which proves, in fact, to be a false
consciousness, a false cogito. Such a cogito, such a claim to immediate consciousness, does not
merely eschew the moment of opacity in the process of understanding—more strongly, it must
obscure or hide the way in which its own understanding is brought to life through the detours of
language and symbol. Ricoeur’s reflection on such a false consciousness in light of Marx,
Nietzsche, and Freud shows the ways in which this hiding of opacity can take place in the
economic, psychic, and cultural realms. As we engage, for example, in critique of ideology and
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in psychoanalysis, Ricoeur argues that we reveal how the self empties itself and then finds itself
through the detour of its construction in symbols, language, and cultural artifacts. Thus the
cogito is both, in Ricoeur’s words, “exploded” and “deepened” as “the cogito can be recovered
only by the detour of a decipherment of the documents of its life.”75 Hermeneutics, in this way,
shifts “the axis of interpretation from the problem of subjectivity to that of the world” to counter
the perennial danger for phenomenology of “reducing itself to a transcendental subjectivism.”76
Any understanding or mode of being, in view of this indirect procession by degrees, can only be
“a horizon, an aim rather than a given fact. A separate ontology is beyond our grasp: it is only
within the movement of interpretation that we apperceive the being we interpret.”77 Through
archeological work, especially of psychoanalysis, a pathology can be untangled; an
understanding can still be recovered, even out of the same depths from which misunderstanding
is forged.78 So Ricoeur writes: “Subjectivity must be lost as radical origin if it is to be recovered
in a more modest role.”79
Lastly, this potentiality of opacity that is the condition for the possibility of meaningmaking is, when transposed to a subjective plane, also the condition for the possibility of selfreflection amidst the tension of self and otherness. Selves are constructed through the
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interpretative strategies engendered by the symbol’s poetic surplus. On this subjective level, the
very limit of transcendental phenomenology is met: “the status of the alter ego and, through it, of
the very otherness of the world become entirely problematic.”80 This raises the stakes for how
opacity is configured in meaning-making and self-understanding: opacity does not just mark the
“otherness” called for in the surplus of a textual-linguistic symbol, but it marks the “otherness”
that encroaches upon our own immediate understanding of self and world, found in the mirror of
the ego to itself. Herein is the problem, phenomenologically:
on the one hand, the reduction of all meaning to the intentional life of the concrete ego
implies that the other is constituted ‘in me’ and ‘from me’; on the other hand,
phenomenology must account for the originality of the other’s experience, precisely
insofar as it is the experience of someone other than me.81
The enigma or opacity on this level is how others in the world (and the world itself) can have
their own transcendent life (and, when it comes to other egos, their own intentionality) if I
discover the other primarily through my own intentional experience. Ricoeur notes that it is “this
enigma, this paradox, indeed this latent conflict between two projects—a project of describing
transcendence and a project of constituting in immanence—that the recourse to Auslegung may
be able to resolve.”82 How can it be the case that I discover the world through intentional, critical
consciousness and yet the other as truly other is transcendental to my consciousness? If we
connect Ricoeur’s thought on explication or Auslegung to this matter of opacity, clues are given
for how this subjective tension becomes productive instead of merely problematic. Here, as
Ricoeur argues, “The other is included, not in my existence as given, but in the latter insofar as it
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is characterized by an ‘open and infinite horizon’ … a potentiality of meaning that I cannot
master in a glance.”83 The potentiality of the symbol opens up the self for the other; symbol
constitutes the self in relation to the other, not by immediacy but by the long interpretive detour.
Ricoeur on Opacity and the Symbolism of Evil
I have already surfaced how a key conversation between Ricoeur and Long on opacity
brings specificity and facticity to our understanding of opacity, presenting it in a particular lens
to show the eventual racialization of opacity as we reflect on a symbolism of evil. As we have
seen, Long connects Ricoeur’s thought on the symbol of defilement to blackness. Exploring in
detail how Ricoeur himself discusses opacity and then connects it to the hermeneutical heart of a
symbolism of evil will be key to moving Long’s own insights forward. Moreover, here we can
see how opacity can remain a coherent concept even as it can be both what gives productive
thought and what produces great evil—key to understanding how race is constructed through the
pathologization or use of opacity, even as racial logic is troubled by opacity (as we will see).
For Ricoeur, opacity first has to do with a tension inherent in the meaning of a textuallinguistic symbol that then gives thought. He especially focuses on cosmic, oneiric, and poetic
symbols, and how these are connected to a second level symbolism of myth.84 Ricoeur
understands what is at stake here by opting for a narrower definition of the symbol than, for
example, Cassirer: for Ricoeur, the symbol is “a region of language that presents itself as the
locus of complex significations where another meaning is both given and hidden in an immediate
meaning.”85 In this giving-and-hiding is the symbol’s opacity, not merely as one of its qualities,
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but essential to its very composition: “[C]ontrary to perfectly transparent technical signs, which
say only what they want to say in positing that which they signify,” writes Ricoeur, “symbolic
signs are opaque, because the first, literal, obvious meaning itself points analogically to a
second meaning which is not given otherwise than in it.”86 Holding in tension its irreducible
double discourse, the symbol is a type of enigma which “does not block understanding but
provokes it” through an “architecture of meaning” that “mov[es] toward interpretation by virtue
of that transgression of meaning by meaning.”87 To affect this, in fact, symbols invite a
participation in their reality, through which they lead to another intentionality; Ricoeur describes
this as “an existential assimilation, according to the movement of analogy, of my being to
being.”88 In this way, the symbol is ultimately normed by a double binding as a nodule point
between finitude and infinitude:
On the one hand, the sacred is bound to its primary, literal, sensible meanings; this is
what constitutes the opacity of symbols. On the other hand, the literal meaning is bound
by the symbolic meaning that resides in it; this is what I have called the revealing power
of symbols, which gives them their force in spite of their opacity.89
Significantly, then, the symbol’s opacity is not only about its representative nature, but is
weighted toward the issue of the symbol’s link to finitude and materiality. Ricoeur writes:
the sensible sign is bound by the symbolic meaning that dwells in it and gives it
transparency and lightness; the symbolic meaning is in turn bound to its sensible vehicle,
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which gives it weight and opacity. One might add that this is also the way symbols bind
us, viz. by giving thought a content, a flesh, a density.90
In this way, symbols “give what they say.”91 Fundamentally for Ricoeur a symbol’s opaqueness
“is the symbol’s very profundity, an inexhaustible depth.”92
But—and this is key—opacity goes yet further, beyond a textual-linguistic tension to a
more primordial, immediate tension in the understanding and making of the self. This tension
inherent in the symbol reflects a more existential “pathétique of misery,” a tension or fault
inherent in the holding together of infinity and finitude in the human experience. This pathos,
this experiential realization that humans are “intermediatory” beings, found first through the
transcendental reduction, necessarily includes a precomprehensive, prephilosophical
understanding of the totality of the human, a totality which recognizes the mediation of the finite
and infinite in the human experience.93 Ricoeur forefronts the nature of the soul’s journey (as
“aporia” and “quest”) in this regard, describing the soul as neither Idea nor as perishable thing
but “the very movement from the sensible toward the intelligible; it is anabasis, the rising toward
being; its misery is shown in that it is at first perplexed and searches.” This pathos is told of,
writes Ricoeur, not “in the language of Science, i.e., in the immutable discourse on immutable
Being,” but in “the language of allegory, and then in the language of myth.”94 Thus this pathos, a
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“strange becoming” without a “place” in philosophy, shows up in our thought only after it feeds
on the “substantial richness” of our symbols, allegory, and myths.95
A transcendental method is not adequate to uncover these depths of the symbol which
testify most fully to human fallibility: “[t]he transcendental stage furnishes only the first stage of
a philosophical anthropology,” only revealing the pathos. But, writes Ricoeur, “[t]here is a
surplus that a merely transcendental reflection does not allow us to elevate to the plane of
reason.”96 This residue, a “wealth of meaning” unavailable to transcendental reflection, is found
best in and philosophically recovered through “an exegesis of the fundamental symbols in which
man avows the servitude of his free will.”97 Thus the price of being able to talk about evil in a
philosophical framework is that of taking the “long route,” changing to the method of
hermeneutics, “that is, to rules of deciphering applied to a world of symbols,” specifically the
symbolics of evil. In this transition to hermeneutics, Ricoeur comes to focus on the “language of
avowal” (as I have mentioned in the previous chapter) which, through its mythics such as fall,
chaos, and divine blinding, speaks of being bound yet free (the “servile will”).98 The language of
avowal yields primary symbols of evil such as stain, sin, and guilt; but because these are
symbolic language, and thus bear a double intentionality (as I have just explained), there needs to
be a hermeneutics of deciphering. So the philosophy of evil gives way to a pathos which yields a
language of avowal with primary symbols that must be approached hermeneutically.
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In the end, the symbolism of evil furnishes thought with that which cannot be bound by
thought. While the transcendental stage is the necessary foundation of all human knowing, what
is at stake here is to move beyond the subject-object synthesis found in the transcendental
reduction toward the deeper reality of incarnate freedom.99 It is only through the further
mediatory syntheses of the “practical” and “affective” that the symbolic is able to deal with life’s
actual difficulties: in the practical through the ethical dilemmas in the realm of human
responsibility to the other (which centers on the fragility of the notion of respect),100 and in the
affective the truest revelation of human fragility, the mediatory nature of the “heart” or Feeling
(Gemüt).101 Thus, while it is “upon the thing” that disproportion and the “power of synthesis” is
first discovered, there is a certain inherent blind spot in the “luminous vision” that is the
transcendental imagination: “this mediating term,” writes Ricoeur, “has no intelligibility of its
own.”102 This synthesis “between understanding and sensibility” achieved in the transcendental
imagination “is consciousness but … it is not self-consciousness” as the “I” of transcendental
thinking is a no one.103 Thus, a symbolism of evil with its language of avowal also functions as a
critique of thought itself:
All symbols invite thought, but the symbols of evil demonstrate in an exemplary manner
that there is always something more in myths and symbols than in all of our philosophy
and that, hence, a philosophical interpretation of symbols will never become absolute
knowledge. The symbols of evil, in which we can read the limits of our own existence,
announce at the very same time the limits of all systems of thought which would try to
incorporate these symbols in an absolute knowledge.104
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A symbolism of evil is able to explore these processes of synthesis that a transcendentalizing
mode of thought only presupposes as foundational and thus cannot see into.
For Ricoeur, notions of testimony and confession open the final frontier to which opacity
speaks, the tension between history and memory. In Memory, History, and Forgetting, Ricoeur
connects opacity to Freud’s Unheimlichkeit (the uncanny) which inhabits the dialectic between
memory and history.105 The question for Ricoeur is how memory or history can do justice to the
opacity of a limit event like the Shoah. Auschwitz, Ricoeur notes, is unspeakable,
unrepresentable, unreasonable.106 So Ricoeur writes, “The event ‘at the limits’ brings its own
opacity along with its morally ‘unacceptable’ character … [and thus] reveals and denounces that
[opacity] of language.”107 He surfaces the uncanny at this point of his work in order to discuss
the way in which history and memory may reach their limit because they come up against the
question and matter of evil, and the place that testimony or critical attestation might have here as
such is able to situate itself productively within the tenuous place of representation that is “the
enigma of a present representation of the absent past.”108
Beyond Long: Opacity, Aesthetics and Postcoloniality
While Ricoeur points to the fact that opacity has do with the formation of subjectivity and
the building of the world, he does not go far enough in tracing out how it “goes wrong”—indeed

104

Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretation, 332.

105

Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2004), 393.
106

Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 255-257.

107

Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 255.

108

Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 392-3. On testimony, see also 260, 278. I will return to this discussion of
Ricoeur on this type of opacity in Ch. 4.

64
the ways in which evil utilizes logics of opacity toward its perpetuation in modern logics of race.
I want to take up the main thrust of Long’s argument and connect a symbolism of evil to logics
of racialization; but I also want to think beyond him because I am specifically thinking about
whiteness and the deeper theological conditions for its emergence in mystical darkness and
perspective. While opacity (as connected to the symbol and enigma) fundamentally has to do
with the nature of representation, it also has to do with ideology—in which we see the broader
(perhaps insidious) ways in which opacity comes to shape discourses of subjectivity and identity.
Here, opacity does not engender productive meaning-making but is used to hide finitude within
logics of the infinite in building internal and external worlds; this is the result of a certain
collapsing of the logic of representation, a banishment of the materiality and “hereness” of
symbolic understanding that the enigma originally represents. This asks questions about the
“hardening” of symbolic opacity. Such is manifested in the transition, as Yancy discusses, from
“blackness as evil” to “blackness is evil.”109 Tracing the pathologization of opacity in this
trajectory brings us toward the plane of multiple discourses that show how blackness is perceived
in relation to the good and the beautiful and how symbolic meaning bonds itself to larger social
structures and actions in building a world. Thus we come to the vistas of aesthetics and
colonialism, especially coming to focus on the sublime and the fetish.
By connecting color to aesthetics, I am concerned less with the fine details of art history
(say, with tracing shifts in how blackness or Black people are depicted in art), though my
argument will touch upon such things in part. More broadly, I am interested in how aesthetic
formation manifests in aesthetic judgment: that is, how we reckon our taste with the beautiful or
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the good in building a culture. Often this kind of judgment is spoken of as bridging a great
divide; we have seen this already in Ricoeur’s pathos, and this is also clear in Immanuel Kant’s
Critique of Judgment, where the “here” to “there” that aesthetic judgement bridges is the divide
between nature and freedom.110 The tension here is that, while we can recognize a beautiful
object, such is not something we can fully grasp. Elaine Scarry, in her On Beauty and Being
Just, explains it this way: “beautiful things … always carry greetings from other worlds within
them.”111 There is a sacredness and aliveness that beauty holds for us; when we come to perceive
beauty, it is as if we are being greeted or welcomed.112 And in this greeting and welcoming there
is something that “incites deliberation”: “Something beautiful fills the mind yet invites the search
for something beyond itself, something larger or something of the same scale with which it needs
to be brought into relation.”113 In this welcoming of distance and deliberation of genuine
otherness, we come to see the essence of aesthetics.
But often the question of beauty and the good has been worked out in tension with the
otherness and foreignness of the sublime. Some theorists have argued that sublimity can free
beauty from taste, “opening it to new ways of thinking about itself and in understanding the
limits of beauty.”114 But there is a history of thinking about blackness through the sublime,
evoking notions of terror and horror and ugliness.115 This is part of a larger discourse in which
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“the hermeneutic machine of the West has long relied on Africa’s otherness to stage its grandest
and most exclusive theatres of the self.”116 In the sublime, the opacity (of beauty) that should be
welcomed and should open up the self to the other is used to mark otherness and reject it.
Consider Copeland’s critique: “within a white supremacist horizon, depictions of beauty erase
different and dark bodies; such bodies cannot be beautiful. In this horizon, different and dark
bodies are repulsive, hideous; these bodies encode negativity, even evil.”117 If aesthetic
judgment—in view of Kant—involves a kind of sensus communis or an abstracted logic that can
be generalized,118 Copeland asks the key question: Whose “common sense”? Whose taste?
Aesthetics, as it extends itself through colonial reach, comes to present a claim about beauty and
the good that twists and distorts blackness through a symbolics of color as a symbolics of evil.
A key claim in my argument is that the “common sense” or general aesthetic frame is in
fact the white, male particular perspective functioning—no, masquerading—as a universal
perspective. Citing Walter Mignolo, Crenshaw discusses the construction of “humanitas”
through Renaissance thought, a model of “the bourgeois Western subject—the self-possessed
individual uniquely capable of logic, rationality, and contemplation.” This “universal man,”
incubated and constructed out of Renaissance Europe, is set against “anthropos,” defined against
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those “embodied in the range of colonized peoples alleged to stand outside of modern history
and whose labor, land, and bodies become resources for the advancement of civilization itself.”
In this way, Crenshaw points out the inability of Western thought to see race or to see itself as
racialized.119 Africa, in particular, is set against Western identity through notions of negativity,
strangeness, difference, and “absolute otherness.”120 In this hermeneutical process, opacity as
sublime is marked as a kind of solidity, density, or refuse against which a self forges a
transcendentality through a claim of immediacy to itself.121 We must explore how this happens
specifically upon theological discourses, how theology “aided and abetted” the racialization of
the self (in the words of Carter). The development of perspective upon the discourse of mystical
darkness helps to explain just how opacity becomes racialized in white sight. Tracing out this
historically constructed and socially inculcated genealogy through a hermeneutics can yield
suggestions for possible retrieval of opacity as a concept for understanding modern subjectivity.
Opacity and Theology: Mystical Subjectivity and the Question of Evil
To open up the “long route” of exploring the pathologization of opacity toward the rise of
modern perspective, I first must establish the formation of mystical subjectivity as the horizon
which engenders it. A phenomenological account of the mystical self takes up everything we
have explored concerning opacity and places it on a historical and subjective plane. Mystical
subjectivity, anxious about perspective in view of the infinite—is given over to the question of
opacity as a question of evil. Moreover, mystical subjectivity helps in part to shape modern
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subjectivity through this focus on perspective and the way in which perspective can build worlds
by spatializing or externalizing conceptions of opaque depth (or infinity). In this way, mysticism
not only engendered the modern subject but the modern world. Just how this is the case (that is,
ultimately, how infinity is graphed upon black skin) is the substance of my overall inquiry.
In approaching mysticism and medieval philosophy phenomenologically, I am centering
on “texts, gestures and attitudes” or “ways of being” that can be “rediscovered for our time.”122
This rediscovering is less about looking back to see “what they say (quid) than the way they say
it (quomodo)—the elucidation of ‘meaning’ through the exposition of ‘acts.’”123 By reading
anew these texts, we are able to see things in a new way as various “kinds of experience” are
unearthed: particularly for me, just how racial logics came to have subjective and objective
power. Denise Buell’s work on race and ethnicity in early Christianity cautions us in connecting
too quickly the modern concept of race with early Christian conceptions, as skin color was not
decisive in organizing identity so much as other aspects like language or geography.124 My
approach is not to force the authors to respond to our question of race, but “to see how and with
what they have responded to their own [questions as it relates to this matter], in order to learn
from them how to respond to ours;” to explore how questions of vision and aesthetic formation
were configured (especially as upon the question of evil) in order to understand our own modern
racial logics.125 I intend, as I have mentioned, to closely examine a particular trajectory of
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mystical darkness from Nyssa at the dawn of the Middle Ages to Cusa at the dawn of the Modern
Age. In this trajectory, the mystical self engenders a symbology of color within a symbolism of
evil, which is the condition for the possibility of modern perspective as racialized sight. Before
approaching this study, I want to orientate us to key aspects of this experience of wrestling with
mystical darkness. In mystical reflection on darkness, opacity is brought from notions of enigma
toward self-reflection and constitution of subjectivity and then, eventually, toward ideology or
cultural-aesthetic formation. In this last aspect, as perspective develops out of and upon mystical
discourse, the mystical self is transposed, transformed, and transmogrified into the modern self.
Opacity and Seeing the Image: Apophasis and the Icon
At a fundamental level, mystical theology is focused on vision, seeing the divine, but as
understood within a productive tension between the created and uncreated, the particular and the
universal. Thus, as McGinn writes, we might say about the mystical (as theology and as a form
of life), that it is concerned with “how contact between God and human transforms the awareness
of the human subject—from the data of external and internal perception, through the subject’s
attempt to understand and evaluate what these mean in terms of affirmation of truth and
commitment to action.” Mysticism thus is not restricted to experientialism but “a total
commitment to contemplating and loving the supreme and unknowable mystery that is God.”126
In this way, one could say, “[t]hough God’s connection to the soul is transhistorical, the soul’s
connection to God is temporal or historical in so far as history … is the affair between the finite

126

McGinn, The Harvest of Mysticism, 432.

and the infinite.”

127

70
There is a sense of holding together (and yet apart) the soul and communion

with God, and to insist on this as somehow timeless and foundational.128
This happens within the “apophatic gesture.” It is not a matter of what one can see visibly
and substantially, but a matter of the invisible and unknown which is “beyond being;” it is a
matter of the “inner eyes” as contradistinguished from the eyes of the flesh. In this view,
mysticism is not primarily about an experience, but about a posture or gesture described as a
“negation of negation.” Denys Turner explains that we must “make out clearly the distinction
between two levels at which the negativity of the apophatic dialectic operates – that is to say,
between the cataphatic employment of conflicting negative-and-affirmative images at the firstorder level and the apophatic negation of the negation between those first-order descriptions at
the second-order level.”129 The negation of negation is about removing experience of the divine
from the realm of concepts and being. Yet this is externalized through language and speech-acts,
which comes to a head focusing on the nature of signs and symbols. This is the tension between
a meaningful speech-act and the silent face of the infinite deep to which it is supposed to testify:
the drive to see and experience God from out of our particular, creaturely reality and its material
and bodily sensuality.130
The imagistic concern at the heart of the mystical self is not subdued by the infinite
intentionality or pursuit of God: images, bodies, and materiality must be included. What is
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decisive is the necessarily apophatic nature of imagistic representation. The productive tension
between the material and the immaterial sets a kind of theological framework for the notion
(already seen in Ricoeur) of the importance of opacity and the image with its power of revealing
through the enigma of a concealed-revealed dialectic. The mystic at their heart wrestles with this
symbolic tension and its problematics. The finite and the infinite are admitted into experience
only as they are bound up in a certain relation of tension. In the apophatic gesture, there is a
double intentionality, two levels of discourse. The first-level discourse (the symbol’s “sign”
aspect) is bound to a literal, obvious, sign-to-signified meaning; but a second-level discourse
occurs, vectoring out from the rigor of the first-level discourse but following it so as to surpass it
to that which is not not-literal, not not-obvious, not not-analogical. The negative language at this
second-level discourse works back to critique the distinction(s) made by the negative in the firstorder discourse, therefore betraying language’s own self-subverting, self-overcoming nature.
This hinges on a relation of opacity between the first- and second-level discourses in the symbol.
Within this inner void, analogy surpasses itself only as it forms within one the comportment to
make meaning out of this passing over. Decisive, then, to the mystical question is how opacity is
dealt with, that human knowing happens within the inexhaustible profundity of the symbol and
not the obvious reading of the sign.
This is just what is at stake in the question of the icon and the idol—that is, the way in
which the finite should properly relate to the infinite. The enigmatic nature of the icon lies in the
fact that it opens up to the transcendent even while being anchored to the material; though here
there is always the possibility that materiality can close in upon itself as an idol. In mystical
unknowing, this tension between the icon/idol and the resistance to concepts often is anchored to
an aesthetics (even ontology) of light in which, all too easily, light represents a final solution to
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shadow of the immaterial, disconnected from eternal absolutes. So Dionysius writes that in this
life: “We use whatever appropriate symbols we can for the things of God. With these analogies
we are raised upward toward the truth of the mind’s vision, a truth which is simple and one.”132
Still, the ineffable God beyond being can yet be spoken of and represented through “mysterious
language of divine symbols” that not only point to God but through “anagogic power” lift us up
to divine contemplation.133 Thus the symbolic, mystical wager is that human- and meaningmaking happens as one is tau(gh)t by a pedagogy of opacity. This lived consciousness of the
double intentionality of materiality, of the image, of the word, is what gives birth to the “self” in
pursuit of the other, and, in my view, begets the mystical journey.
Opacity and the Self: Transcendence, Immanence, and Freedom
If one theological vista of opacity that relates to evil in the mystical self is the more
ontological question of the representative nature of images as an expression of the tension
between finitude/created and the infinite/uncreated, the second vista transforms the question of
representation into the existential question about freedom and agency. Here, the negation at the
heart of imagistic representation is transposed into the discourse of the making of the self, and
the question of the ontological tension between the particular and the universal now becomes a
moral tension between the goodness or the evilness of one’s moral trajectory. Moreover, the
concern over the word in its opaque relation (as symbol with its double intentionality of material
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and immaterial) now becomes a concern over finding oneself situated as a free agent in the face
(or abyss) of the transcendent. Whereas in the last point anxiety over darkness is key to opening
up one to the unknown, here it becomes a question whether (historico-social) anxiety over
darkness is the threshold of openness or of closure of the self to the other. The opacity of the
word is now materialized in the discourse that weaves into and interrupts the self.134
The mystic forms the self through “speech as performance”—which is to say, when the
opacity of language is put on display by claiming for particular words and experiences a
representation of the divine. Such linguistic performance or textuality is the generative power
and posture of mysticism, the mechanism it has to keep its abyssal tension as productive and not
as ruptured—and, when it is ruptured, to restore the tension (even by extreme performances of
speech-acts, those epiphenomenal stereotypes of mystical behavior). As such, mysticism is the
making-meaning of a particular experience, the infusing of immanent experience with
transcendence; it is “the search for a common language, after language has been shattered.”135
And in this grasping or synthesizing posture (apophatic, though it is) the very making of the self
is engaged. Michel de Certeau notes that in mystical texts there is “the necessary relation
between the subject and the messages.”136 Both early in Augustine’s Confessions and later in
Marguerite Porete’s thirteenth century The Mirror of Simple Souls, speech served a performative,
creational purpose.137 What does speech perform? Somehow, the self. For example, in the case of
This intimately connects to the point above from Ricoeur about “a project of describing transcendence and a
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Marguerite: “instead of reaching the inside of God through a silent withdrawal, the de-selfed
subject plunges into the most daring of performances, as if the unutterable one somehow needed
to be uttered through it.”138 In view of this, I argue that the mystical self/text/speech just is the
creation of the space in which the “I” can be (re)established as a performer and speaker within a
broader—indeed, infinite—discourse. The mystical self continually constructs and reconstructs
the tension between unity/relationality (thing and word) as the very phenomenality of its
appearance. This very focus on the nature of language and its power in creating the self is
mysticism’s secret for surviving (what will become) its apparent dissolution in modernity. In the
mystical posture, language is oriented towards its self-bursting, toward its generative potency.
Thus, what mysticism holds out is both a recognition of language’s self-limiting, selfovercoming, abyssal quality, and yet its productive potency to re-make the self when it is
threatened and thinned as an economic subject, de-moored from its transcendent orientation. As
such, the mystical self is a sharpened expression of the human pathos, this enigma of being
caught between the particular and the universal. At the same time, the mystical self in this very
quality anticipates (even shapes) a trajectory toward modern subjectivity.
Indeed, historically, the mystic seeks a unity of language when such a unity has been
shattered. Discussing the general socio-political context of many mystics, de Certeau notes how
mysticism often grew out of “areas of particular instability or forms of social disinheritance.”139
This kind of marginalization and separation from authority left a kind of wound or agony and a
“turn to the exegesis of ‘wild’ voices.”140 Thus: “The project of constructing an order amid the
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contingencies of history … and the quest to discern in our earthly, fallen language the now
inaudible Word of God … arose simultaneously from the dissociation of cosmic language and
the Divine Speaker.”141 The mystical particularly flowers not just within the productive angst of
the pathos of the human situation generally, but also in the specific historical sense of the
loosening of the tension between the particular and the universal; amidst the pain and lack of the
growing division, one all the more seeks eros. At this precipice there is a flourishing of the
mystical right on the edge of its threatening.
This is particularly the case at the dawn of the modern age when—I follow Michel de
Certeau here—the mystical tension that keeps unity and relation together eventually bursts,
giving way to the making of the modern self as “[t]he economic subject replaces the mystic
subject.”142 The economic or modern self seeks to separate and suture back together the finite
and the infinite on a merely economic basis.143 This, as we will see, has much to do with
nominalism, and this slackening of the tension is reflected in Cusa’s thought. In the eventual
severing of the productive tension between the finite and the infinite in modernity, opacity no
longer represents the tension itself between finitude and infinitude but becomes associated with
finitude and qualities of finitude (like the body). Having severed the construct that made the
mystical self possible by removing the opaque relation between the finite and infinite, modern
subjectivity then objectified this opacity and set it over against the finite-economic in the place
of the infinite. In the making of the modern self, opacity is treated as an obstacle to overcome.
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The birth of the modern subject is a desire for certainty that is threatened by opacity and
“otherizes” it. This coincides with the emergence of racial blackness and whiteness.
At stake here is the very shape of modern rationality as it relates to mystical darkness.
Mysticism and modern rationality are not opposed; we must interrogate their connection. Falque
argues that mysticism “nourishes [rationality] and is nourished by it in a criss-crossing of
intuition and concept.” Mystical excess “not only indicates the negation of the concept, but also
the entrance into a new type of rationality” as the human being is “elevated beyond himself in
being penetrated by God.”144 In this vein, Jean Baruzi speaks of “a mystical intuition” (l’intuition
mystique) which reveals “that which, interior to metaphysical systems, evades scientific
verification and yet exists for us in the world of thought in the form of a vivifying element.”145
But in this interaction between mysticism and rationality, what is decisive for us is just how the
body, the letter, or materiality—that is, finitude—is dealt with, even hidden, in the transcendence
toward the infinite ideal. This becomes a question of whether the self achieves modern freedom
only as the body is eschewed. What is at stake in this apparent crafting of the self’s identity and
of its transformation upon the face of the immaterial abyss? Such a concern moves us from being
interested merely in how ideality writes transcendence over our finitude in crafting subjectivity,
to being interested in the “facticity” of how such claims to transcendence build a colonial world.
Opacity and the Other: (Auto-)poetic Production and the Ethiopian Demon
Let me fold back one more layer of this complicated transition between the mystical and
the modern self. If we have followed how the question of mystical darkness traverses through
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challenges in representation and in self-formation, we now come to the question of praxis and
the material world. This is the question of how mystical contemplation seeks to impact and shape
the world through action (even if in the mode of negation) from out of its wrestling with the
enigma. My concern is how an ontology built on opaque images is thickened through its
intersection with the subjective plane—and thus with ideas of morality, of intentionality, of
agency—as an ontologizing force now objectively in the world which acts back upon
subjectivity. What I want to explore is how the matter of mystical darkness becomes the matter
of racial blackness amidst the passing over of the mystical self to the modern self: now it is
darkness of skin that is limit-threshold to a broader, patri-religious, identity. Modern perspective
racializes the world as a kind of ontologizing force, but only because it is rooted in a deeper
symbolism of evil which, taken up by actors and their pathologies, takes hold of opacity and
utilizes it in its colonial reach.
To explore this, I follow David Brakke’s thought about the construction of the early
Christian monastic self in the face of spiritual combat. Though for the most part “the monk’s
conflict with the demons was invisible, for it was an internal struggle with thoughts and
inclinations,” at times the demon or devil would appear visibly and would do so “as Ethiopians
or with black skin”—something that would continue for Christian ascetics even into the Middle
Ages.146 Exploring this in detail, Brakke highlights an overall threefold pattern in the
construction of the monastic self which will be crucial for us: “(1) disruption or crisis in a
monastic relationship (caused by temptation); (2) encounter with an Ethiopian; and (3)
reconstitution of the relationship on a more advanced basis.”147 I argue that mystical darkness
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can be seen as an analogue of this process of subjectivity, one that theorizes it more generally for
Christian identity beyond the earliest monks. In this pattern, darkness of skin color is constructed
as an ambivalent image, one which is negated and rendered inoperative and yet one which works
on the deepest level to secure the identity of the self—and, as such, affects a conflictual process
of subjectification.148 With this in mind, Brakke asserts that stories of monks wrestling with
demons in early Christian literature “invite a cultural analysis that does not eschew
psychoanalytic concepts such as repression and projection.”149 I, too, will finally connect
mystical subjectivity to psychoanalysis.
The Ethiopian demon is interesting indeed. Brakke writes: “The Ethiopian demon
originated in the notion that the Ethiopian’s black skin symbolized evil, a seemingly obvious
corollary to the use of light or whiteness to symbolize the good.” It was easy, from there, to
identity the devil itself as black in Christian discourse. This symbolism went beyond Christian
theology and was more broadly understood. Beyond monastic literature, Christian discussion of
Ethiopians is exegetical, especially focusing on the bride figure in Song of Solomon (as we will
see with Gregory of Nyssa), where “black skin symbolized the sin that Christian grace
removed.”150 But the assertion, by Brakke and others (reminiscent of Buell), is that this was not
yet racial but had to do with “the Romans’ more general ethnocentric reactions to foreignness in
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bodies and cultures.”

151

More particularly, the Ethiopian body quite visually deviated from the

Roman ideal of somatic norm which included roughly being between dark and light in skin, eyes,
and hair (with a midway texture between soft and coarse), and average in size of nose, lips and
overall stature.152 Thus the claim is made that this was not racial but was “purely and simply a
matter of the observer’s optical registration of somatic distance or of the somatic norm,
uninfluenced by the facts of the observed person’s biological descent, and uncomplicated by any
ideologically operative link with social role or social distance.”153 Undoubtedly this assertion
obscures what is at stake here: the moral symbolism of dark skin, the visible marking of it within
some kind of moral geography. Indeed, Brakke asserts that while it might be the case that there
was not an ideological link with social distance this
is not uncomplicated by an ideologically operative link with moral distance. The ancient
pseudoscience of physiognomy claimed to be able to read quality of character from the
appearance of the body. Not surprisingly, physical characteristics associated with the
somatic norm were evaluated positively, while the attributes of the deviant Aethiops
indicated moral flaws.154
It is just this aspect of a moral symbolism at stake in black skin that is utilized in the monastic
accounts of the Ethiopian demon. Indeed, in several cases the demon is black so as to “mark as
clearly demonic an otherwise ambiguous or puzzling action or problem.”155
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What I want to focus on particularly is the connection between the Ethiopian and the
issue of sexuality and filiation. In “the earliest datable appearance of a black or Ethiopian demon
in extant monastic literature (ca. 357),” the devil appears in the Life of Antony as a feminized
Black boy with erotic power: “It is I who am fornication’s lover,” the demon states, “and I am
called the spirit of fornication.” Brakke comments: “The black demon externalizes the monk’s
experience of a seemingly irresistible desire within himself.” Often eros was understood as a
kind of demonic lure.156 In the account of Antony, the black demon is not yet the Ethiopian, but
the symbolism was there and forming as “the black demon embodied an eroticized power.”
Brakke writes that “[w]hen the visual form of the black demon gained more precise definition as
Ethiopian, it acquired the stereotypical traits associated with the Ethiopian body type that
circulated through Greco-Roman culture, especially hypersexuality. Because of this stereotypical
hypersexuality, the Ethiopian demon was an effective way to represent erotic desire as something
that could be renounced.”157 In this way the Ethiopian demon symbolized specifically sexual
evil. At times, this included “reduc[ing] the Ethiopian form to the penis.”158 This was often
thought alongside “Roman male anxieties about the legitimacy of their sons and thus about
Roman identity, understood in patrilineal terms.” In this way, the issue of filiation crosses with
that of blackness of skin: “The disturbing sexual power of the Ethiopian, located and visually
marked in him or her as a body rather than as a member of a social group, threatened to disrupt
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genealogical order and yet had (anti-) demonic force.”

159

Such themes of concern over

“eroticized power and filial identity” show up clearly in the monastic Ethiopian demon.160
All of this comes to a head in the matter of “the resolution of anxieties both sexual and
genealogical” upon the site of the Ethiopian.161 The Ethiopian encounter provides an opportunity
to work out homosocial male bonding and filiation as communal, cultural and patri-religio
generation is moored in overcoming darkness/blackness/alterity/woman. I quote Brakke at length
here:
Several accounts of Ethiopian demons deploy the stereotypical hypersexuality and
fleshliness of the Ethiopian in order to bring stability to a monastic identity in flux. The
encounter with the Ethiopian demon, simultaneously attractive and frightening in its
condensed visual representation of the self’s erotic desire, drives the monk to solidify his
position as a monk, especially as a good father or son. By its disturbing yet therapeutic
embodiment of alterity within the self, the Ethiopian demon provides some traction, as it
were, for the monk in crisis to move to an improved ascetic state. Like all stereotypes,
this deployment of the Ethiopian depends on the presumption of a fixed nature in that
which is being stereotyped, the Ethiopian: he or she is always body—hypersexual,
powerful, and/or macrophallic—while the monk is transformable into spirit, able to
renounce the eroticism that sticks to the Ethiopian as closely as his or her skin.162
The Ethiopian brings clarity to identity and relationship when it is ambivalent, and especially
when it is threatened by the erotic. In one account, the monk is pulling away from his monastic
father, is encountered by the Ethiopian demon, and, frightened, says, “I need you, Father”—this
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being the first time the monk designates as father the elder monk. Here “the unnerving alterity of
the Ethiopian demon … effects the construction of the proper monastic identity.”163 The anxiety
over fornication threatens monastic sonship so deeply that it is psychically externalized in the
image of the Ethiopian.
This configuring of monastic identity (like the alchemist’s identity, according to Eliade)
upon the site of the black-body-symbolized-as-evil invites us to understand how the center of
mystical darkness in the apophatic gesture becomes, for modern thought, the engine for
racializing anthropogenesis. This leads us back to opacity in its anterior possibility of productive
enigma. In its most ideal possibility, the mystical posture is that which empowers one to engage
in a kind of self-formation intently focused on both the danger of finitude-closed-upon-itself and
the possibility of the opening of the self toward a transcendent horizon; it seeks to orient the
body specifically in view of the challenges that evil presents. (This shows the difficult balance of
this monastic-cum-modern identity, crafted as it is upon an enigmatic center and thus given fuel
by the very potentiality for the subversion of the modern self, always operating under the
surface.) Still, we must consider the way in which mystical theology shapes the racialized world
we in the modern age are thrown into. For it could be, in its determined effort to transform the
body, the self, and society, that the mystical posture in its reflection on darkness comes to
obscure the logics it enacts. In seeking to transform finitude in the face of the infinite, what is
done to finitude slips out of view. And—this is key—once this operation of surpassingsuppressing finitude has been seized upon in modernity, it becomes impossible to see what has
become of opacity, for now thought matures just as it claims a kind of transparency or
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enlightenment. Darkness is now not primarily the ontological thickness of materiality, so much
as the vast horizon conquered by the light of the intellect. We come, then, to the matter of
perspective as racial: enmeshed in a symbolics of color, vision builds a racialized world.
Perspective as Symbolization of Opacity
This brings me to my ultimate interest: the historical development of a symbolism of
color through the development of the symbol of perspective. Not merely a particular technique of
artistic representation, perspective as phenomenological or symbolic is fundamentally that which
shapes perception through the organization of space. Traversing the development of perspective
upon discourses of mystical reflection on darkness represents the long route of hermeneutics
necessary to understanding how white racial formation and subjectivity shapes white sight. The
“negation of negation” that roots mystical subjectivity catalyzes a new mode of negation at the
heart of modern perspective and the subjectivity it engenders: modern perspective constructs
itself through anxiety over opacity, organizing spatiality through constructing a virtual depth by
negation of darkness. In linear perspective “a single network of lines can create an effect of
depth that implies the negation, or—as the phenomenologists would put it—the ‘néantization,’ of
the plane onto which it is projected, to the gain of the image inscribed there.”164 Perspective now
becomes the condition for the possibility of seeing depth and engendering a virtual spatiality just
through this negation, this artifice of depth and the regime of subjectivity that arises from it.
Modern perspective is wrapped up in the “crossing of gazes,” as we will see. Upon the
theological discourse of mystical darkness, opacity traverses enigma toward self-reflection in the
making of the self (especially as upon the logic of the mirror), issuing forth in a perspective
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which crafts ideology upon the logic of the darkness of opacity. In this way, perspective
functions itself as a symbol constitutive of the modern age, one fundamental to the genesis and
maintenance of whiteness. Opacity here is useful in that it is utilized now as a kind of
intentionally (in a moral gesture) set on disguising what is being done with opacity through a
logic of transparency, as particular vision masquerading as a universal vision. If eventually the
notion of perspective particularly manifests as a central aspect in art history, Damisch argues, it
is that in painting “perspective … provides a means of staging this capture [of the crossing of the
gazes] and of playing it out in a reflective mode.”165 And now our task is a critical reflection of
the operation at play here as a racial operation. Here I set in more general, conceptual terms
what I will soon unpack historically.
Jean-Luc Marion: Perspective, Icon, Idol
Theologically, the matter of perspective, for Marion, is discussed in terms of the
difference between the icon and the idol, spoken of in terms of two different ways the mirror
functions. Initially heuristically helpful, in this frame, the divine vision granted through the icon
is separated from the operation of modern perspective. Marion notes that the difference between
an icon and an idol is the matter of how “beings” signal differently, that is, “two manners of
being for beings” or “two modes of apprehension of the divine in visibility.”166 The idol is a
matter of gazing or seeing, whereas the icon is a matter of the crossing of the gazes or seeing
being seen. An idol fills up the whole of the gaze; it stops the gaze and allows it to rest on a
particular being. As such, an idol, argues Marion, is an “invisible mirror” in that it mirrors back
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As

such, the idol “allows no invisible”: the advent of the divine here is measured by what the gaze
can take in.168 The icon, on the other hand, represents the gaze of the infinite which provokes our
vision and allows the visible to be rendered as truly visible; particularly, it is a face in which the
viewer sees infinity gazing back. The visible mirror of the icon opens to a “face where the human
gaze is engulfed, invited to see the invisible.”169 Thus, for Marion, what is decisive is the
difference between the “invisible mirror” of the idol and the “visible mirror of the invisible” that
is the face in the icon—a face which “allows itself to be traversed by an infinite depth.”170
Importantly, Marion distances what is at stake in the icon from what is at stake in modern
perspective, discussing how the icon offers a kind of “counter” or “inverted” perspective.171 The
icon is not caught up in the gaze and perspective but represents a being-gazed-at. I will make
clear, however, that this notion of being-gazed-at is also at the heart of linear perspective. I find,
therefore, his thought on perspective instructive to the whole of the matter of visibility.
Thinking about perspective fleshes out the dynamics of sight in terms of depth and
surface, invisibility and visibility. For Marion, perspective “exercises a paradox” as an
“intervention of the invisible in the visible” which shocks the gaze. 172 It gives to the gaze the
ability to “pierce through the visible”:
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in perspective, the gaze pierces through what one would call, for lack of a better term, a
middle ground [milieu], a milieu so transparent that it neither stops nor slows down the
gaze but allows it to rush through, without any resistance, as if it were a vacuum [vide].
In the case of perspective, the gaze pierces the void [le vide], without any obstacle or
limit other than its own exhaustion.173
This “piercing” through a transparent milieu is the essence of perspective for Marion, and it is
how perspective builds a world, “open[ing] up the space of things.”174 Piercing through the
visible, the gaze of perspective “instills the invisible in the visible, not indeed to render it less
visible but, on the contrary, to render it more visible: instead of experiencing chaotically
informed impressions, we see there the very visibility of things.” Reflecting on this, Marion
argues that perspective is not firstly a “historically situated pictorial theory” but should be
understood “as a fundamental role of the gaze, without which we would never see a world.”
Perspective organizes what we see, making the visible seen as such through the invisible.175 In
this way, perspective is correlated with interpretation as it “arrang[es] and display[s] the chaos of
the visible as harmonious phenomena.”176
Perspective creates the world through the negation of (superficial) visibility, creating an
artificial depth and virtual spatiality through the opacity of the gaze. Perspective here does not
create or add to any real space but opens up an abstract space that makes things appear in our
perception.177 Through the gaze of perspective, then, “depth will always remain in front of me as
that which I will never be able to traverse.”178 In this way, perspective provokes “depth” as
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darkness is overcome, conquered through ideality. This provides a kind of “relief” of the abyss
and organization of the unknown:
The relief of the visible comes to it from the invisible, which lifts it by deepening and
crossing it, to the point of uprooting it from the humus of flatness where one encounters
only unidimensional perception. The invisible pierces in transparency the visible only in
order to raise it, moreover to rehabilitate it, rather than to replace it (as in military
“relief”) or appease it (“relief” in English). Perspective’s gaze ennobles the visible by the
invisible and, thus, lifts it up.179
Perspectival interpretation—the granting of artificial depth and therein a virtual world—comes
on the scene to rescue the visible from its uncanny humility.
In view of this operation, Marion notes two paradoxes of perspective. The first is that
“the visible increases in direct proportion to the invisible. The more the invisible is increased, the
more the visible is deepened.” Marion puts this in terms of the painting, where through
perspective the “first” visible is only a flat surface, which then through perspective
“nevertheless, deepens itself to a bottomless depth.”180 To this first paradox, Marion adds a
second: “the space that places the visible on stage or in view is not, in itself, real, in such a way
that the real visible increases in direct proportion to a space of emptiness.”181 Again, Marion
turns to the painting: consider that the spatiality that opens and organizes a painting
will never be able to be physically traversed itself, because it remains first and uniquely
ideal: the flatness of the painting physically allows for only length and breadth, not depth;
with my finger … I am able to actually run across the contours of the work, but I will
never be able to initiate myself into the depths of the third dimension, which nevertheless,
phenomenologically, I perceive first of all.182
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In painting, perspective does not open a real dimension, as Marion puts it, but “removes a real
dimension (the depth where I advance my steps) in order to … reinforce by the same gesture
both the closure of its surface and the indefinite staging of its levels.”183 In all of this, an ideal
depth has been virtually and artificially created through the clearing away of the first visible.
Now, it is the case that for Marion perspective is not merely a confirmation of “the gaze.”
Perspective dislodges the gaze which makes the painting a flat color-covered surface, a mere
“spatial object among others.” Perspective here resists tangible objectity of materiality in order to
see meaning (“a world within the world, a world sometimes more visible than the real world”) as
it opens up “the flatness of the art-object onto and into a world: the invisible, in perspective,
mundanizes a real visible by an infinite number of irreal visible, and thereby renders the visible
all the more apparent.”184 However, therein lies not only the potency of the gaze of perspective,
but its very problem. When we move out from a mere eidetic phenomenology of perspective to a
more hermeneutical one, we see the problem as that of how the dealing of perspective with the
opacity of finitude by its negation through virtual depth becomes a matter of racializing logics.
Then the following statement can be seen in its problematic dimensions:
the real given and actually perceived has no form so long as the gaze does not find the
conditions and the point of view from which it takes shape for the first time. The
anamorphosis—this complicated perspective, this simplified anamorphosis—attests to the
fact that only the invisible makes possible the visible, by informing it: crossing over
[traverser] the flatness of the real painting, though without ever exiting, in view of the
spectacle aimed by the invisible gaze.185
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While perspective has the transcendental function of organizing a world, the problem occurs
when the relief and “raising up” of flatness short-circuits reflection on ethics and a history of
power. In this case, perspective, through its gaze, is complicit in building a racialized world.
This concern, in my opinion, troubles Marion’s overall project of setting iconic vision on
a different plane from perspective. Marion argues that the icon is the undoing of perspective, as
the icon surpasses objectity. Since perspective with its objectity “organize[s] the gaze of the
visible ordered according to the depth of the invisible,” the icon, escaping this, “implies the
possibility of a new relation [jeu] between the visible and the invisible, where no longer is one or
the other placed on stage, but both are placed there permanently. Or, we suggest, the invisible in
the visible.”186 Fundamentally, for Marion, the icon is more a matter of being seen than of seeing
(I will explore this in-depth in Chapter Three). In the icon “we have not exited from perspective
because we still have not entered there;” perspective is “a particular case” of relating the visible
and the invisible “and, despite its overabundant richness, has become otherwise exhausted.” 187
But is the liberation of vision only possible as a kind of radical vision that escapes perspective,
contingency, and finitude? Marion is partially correct in claiming that the interplay between the
visible and the invisible in the icon gives depth differently than (modern) perspective—the icon
should give a “reverse” perspective. However, if we bypass the problems of human seeing
through latching onto a pure theological sight, we will not be able to critically interrogate sight
itself. A claim to an “immediate” vision cannot properly deal with the hermeneutical layers that
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have historically constructed the racial way we see. We need to go through the symbol and its
opacity instead of a “leaping over” to some ultimate foundation or mode of being.
The rise of a Symbol: the historizing of perspective toward linearity
Decisively at stake, then, in the matter of perspective, I argue, is its historical
development, that is, the nature of the relationship (and perhaps the historical progression, as we
will trace with Erwin Panofsky) between reverse perspective and linear or modern perspective. I
am not here interested in a mere history but how the development of perspective in its symbolic
function reflects changes in subjective seeing and constructing of the world and its depth. What
is significant is how modern perspective was constructed to correlate “right viewpoint” with
truth and what this means for an entirely new regime of human knowing. Thus Damisch writes:
“Perspective designates it in the art of painting. But who designates it in truth and ethics?”188
The question is crucial for us. Who gives form to the visible through their gaze? Who organizes
the world’s depth, and how? Whose perspective counts to build a world? These questions shape
our own pivotal inquiry as we wrestle with how the perspective apparatus shapes a moral
geography rooted in color symbolism. This fundamentally has to do with the social production of
space as it comes to be marked by racial logics through perspective.
Damisch discusses certain difficulties to trying to uncover an exact history of perspective
and also notes how much perspective was always wrapped up in broader questions of infinity,
mathematization, and the nature of space. By discussing modern perspective as “paradigm,”
Damisch better helps us to bridge the phenomenological and symbolic aspects of perspective
with the historical, ethical, and political aspects, tracing out how the specifics of linear
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perspective construction gives birth to a certain legacy.

189

As paradigm, perspective is not so

important as a product but as something that is “productive of effects, insofar as its capacity, its
power to inform extends well beyond the limits of the era in which it was born.” Indeed, in terms
of modern perspective, Damisch notes how its “informing” much more shapes our own age
“thanks to photography, film, and now video, than … the fifteenth century, which could boast of
very few ‘correct’ perspective constructions.”190 This indicates the “heuristic power of the
perspective configuration, and the value of it as a model for thought.”191 So I give here two
paradigms of perspective, which stand in some historical relationship, though I am ultimately
interested in how they produce subjectivity differently.
A large part of our hermeneutical-historical detour to follow will be to trace how the
development of linear perspective relates to “reverse” perspective, a perspective paradigm that is
“a defining feature of the icon” (as we have begun to see with Marion).192 I will avoid discussing
reverse perspective in a way that assumes linear perspective as normative, but focus on reverse
perspective as the viewing of simultaneous planes in light of the “spiritual-synthetic nature of
visual images.”193 As Clemena Antonova points out, Pavel Florensky is key to contemporary
thinking about reverse or iconic perspective, and especially is useful not because we need to
accept his fundamental claim that reverse perspective matches more accurately the phenomenon
of physical vision, but because his work puts into question the scientific and natural basis
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apparently at stake in linear perspective.

194

Indeed, one of Florensky’s main contentions is that

“human vision does not operate in accordance with a geometrical, Euclidean construction of
space,” the kind of space operating in linear perspective. He argues against notions of the
exclusive point of view of the beholder, monocularity, and the fixed position of the seer; he
stresses the world is in constant movement, thus no view of the world can be fixed or centered
around the beholder. He also points out how linear perspective excludes other processes involved
in sight, such as memory. Instead of being fixed and perceiving a fixed world, “The viewer
observes different sides of the objects and never only one.” Whether through memory or other
affective processes, sight involves “the need to successively translate” the object onto the retina.
Ultimately, there is a hermeneutical putting-together of vision for Florensky.195
Just what is at stake in reverse perspective is mired by a history that tries to explain
reverse perspective through the normativity and “accuracy” of linear perspective, especially
focusing on various explanations of technical methods. Antonova dismisses these various
technical claims about reverse perspective. She notes the general truth that in reverse perspective
there is a kind of multiplicity or simultaneity of various viewpoints—and certainly a dislodging
of a kind of viewpoint which grasps vision in a fixed manner. Thus a dynamic viewing position
is at stake: “the form of reverse perspective is the result of the summarizing of the viewer’s
perception under the conditions of a multiplicity of viewpoints, that are themselves the result of
the dynamics of the viewing position.”196 The stress here is that objects are not configured
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according to an abstract continuum of space, but images viewed in reverse perspective are
composed according to a multiplicity of viewpoints at stake in the “dynamic view” or multiple
viewpoints of any beholder of any given object.197
Arising most prominently among the artists of Renaissance Italy, the new artistic
technique of linear perspective was developed out of scientific discourses on optics, or
perspectiva (including that of Islamic scientist and philosopher Alhasen),198 especially out of the
theory and use of the mirror in ancient optical theory (or catoptrics) and its concern with the
similarity between the eye and the mirror regarding light and the dynamics of accuracy and
distortion in representation.199 As we will see, Brunelleschi is a key figure to understand
regarding his experiments as the origin point of linear perspective. Another important figure is
Leon Battista Alberti, who in his De Pictura (1435) codified and circulated this new perspective
more broadly in Europe. Alberti discussed the “pyramid of sight” being intersected with a planar
cross section, where then various visual “rays” are represented on this surface organized around
the primacy of the “centric ray” perpendicular to the plane.200 In this way, what one saw from a
particular viewpoint was translated to its pictorial representation on the coordinates of the
painting’s surface; Alberti discussed this in terms of a plane of “transparent glass” or a
“window” into nature meant to frame a world perfected and mastered by geometry.201 Thus, in
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what becomes a new way of seeing the world as a whole, Renaissance perspective ultimately
sought to represent space as ruled by mathematics, “a fully rational – that is, infinite, unchanging
and homogeneous – space”202—one which “human beings attempt to master by projecting onto
or into it poles and lines of their own construction.”203 This technique engendered a “new kind of
picture [which] simulated a three-dimensional space that viewers then appropriated for
themselves with their gaze.”204 The full force of this new technique was such that, as a kind of
“disembodied eye,” the viewer “standing in front of a picture painted in linear perspective could
feel—and wanted to feel—the same dominance toward it that people attributed to God’s
relationship with the world.”205 Belting explains that in this way Alberti was attempting to usurp
the theological symbol of the singular eye for his own vision instead of God’s. There is,
markedly, a kind of “artificiality” here that elides the motion and shifting involved in everyday
vision and also assumes this disembodied, monocular vision and a flat earth.206 Thus with its
construction of homogenous space and task of mastery and human measure, many scholars argue
Alberti prefigures Descartes.207
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Our own inquiry, then, will have to examine how perspective was constructed (the gritty
historical details), and keep this in tension with its legacy—how it shapes thought and especially
early modern racial logics. But, as I have argued intently so far, the difficulty of interrogating the
nature of perspective lies in the way perspective is always already interpretive and shapes
perception itself. Damisch writes how modern perspective has informed perception “so
completely that it shed its polymorphic character to become ‘euclidean.’” In this way, linear or
modern perspective paradigm has “shaped, informed, and programmed [our culture] at bedrock
level … by [having] a bearing on the conditions determinant of all objectivity, of the perception
of objects, from whatever angle or point view they might be considered.”208 Through this,
modern perspective seeks to rule the question of perspective on objectivity and truth, Damisch
argues, as well as the question of the “subject” itself. In this way “perspective is given to our
thought not only as a ‘form’ bound up with an entire epistemological constellation, but … as a
singular paradigmatic structure.” As such, the linear perspective paradigm escapes “historical
contingency” and the specificity of Renaissance, humanist culture: “For it is a structural fact, if
not a structural effect, that when man comes to terms with the symbolic order, his being is, from
the very start, entirely absorbed in it, and produced by it, not as ‘man,’ but as subject.”209 If, as I
will show, the very logic of modern perspective construction was crafted to negate darkness and
depth in building a universal and infinite virtual world around a particular vantage point, then
the problem of race is at the very center of the problem of modern subjectivity.
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Through perspective, I will show, upon the theological discourse of mystical darkness
opacity becomes solidified through its ontologization and reification. The one who was dark or
unknown to the one whose viewpoint was authorized is now marked as visibly dark, the visible
naturalization of this ideal viewpoint. This is a kind of doubling of opacity from a symbolic
dimension to an ontic dimension; and it represents a certain psychological moment in the making
of the modern subject, but one that, as pathological spins out tangible worlds of the fantastic.
Now whiteness and blackness take on moral dimensions as boundaries which, when crossed or
transgressed, betray their fundamentally moral archaeology. In the culmination of its
pathologization, as ideology, opacity is utilized through the apparatus of perspective as a force
for obscuring, for making or keeping unknown—through a kind of universal surveillance.

In this chapter, I have explained the complexity of seeing darkly and indicated the philosophical
and theological route needing to be traversed if we are to take our Corinthian passage seriously.
We must engage in a hermeneutics of discovering just how modern perspective was constructed
as it dealt with existential questions of finitude and evil, how this actually happened within
Christian mystical discourse on darkness. Akin to Ricoeur’s point about the need to lose and find
the self in detour in the archeology of the subject by route of culture artifacts, Damisch writes:
Perspective has become so completely integrated into our knowledge, at the most implicit
or unconscious level, that today we must turn to another kind of knowledge, erudite
knowledge, and embark on an anamnestic project designed to recover it from the
technological oblivion into which it has been plunged by ideology.210
Indeed, this will not merely be an anamnestic project but a psychoanalytic one for white people.
Reaching back into our past, we might be able to unearth horizons for our future. As we re-trace
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our steps and unwind the pathologization of opacity, we discover, in its hidden recesses and
folds, that potency (and indeterminacy) that—put to use to construct one kind of world—can be
re-used to construct anew.
In this way, a hermeneutical phenomenology is able to “implant (new) eyes” in us, to see
things covered over and disguised. In view of this, white sight—that historically developed and
socially inculcated symbolic intentional activity that depends on the self-concealing, learned
ability to associate moral and ontological meaning with color through a deeper symbolism of
evil—is marked as the script is flipped, according to Yancy. The opacity of whiteness is gazed
upon and interrogated, exposing the way in which it uses logics of opacity and transparency to
obscure how it is built upon the rejection of opacity. What is at stake here is to expose the
“opaque transparency” of whiteness, its particular evil. The way forward in shedding light on this
background process of habituated perception is “to make visible the practices of visibility itself,
to outline the background from which our knowledge of others and of ourselves appear in relief.
From there we may be able to alter the associated meanings ascribed to visible difference.” 211
This process will involve a kind of critical therapeutics after I diagnose the problem. Part of this
healing will be not only an internal journey but an ability to open up one’s senses in a new
posture of genuinely listening to and seeing the other, engendering a new kind of spatiality.
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CHAPTER TWO
GREGORY OF NYSSA, EPEKTASIS, AND EARLY CHRISTIAN THOUGHT
ON PERSPECTIVE AND AESTHETIC FORMATION
Gregory of Nyssa’s notion of epektasis is the first part of our hermeneutical-historical
detour examining perspective forged within the mystical notion of the darkness of God.
Generally, we can understand Nyssa’s epektasis as the perpetual yet finite journey of growing in
purifying virtue toward the horizon of the infinite divine, spoken of under the figure of the
“darkness of God.” Nyssa will be important for our study because the epektatic framework
establishes the trajectory I will follow to Nicholas of Cusa and into modernity: darkness or
opacity is limit-threshold that marks the divide between creator and creature; yet the finite human
being is transformed upon the darkness-figured-as-mirror to come into relation with and
perhaps transcend to the infinite. Thus, Nyssa will open our study on several fronts: darkness in
the mystical experience is a threshold experience, but ambivalently configured such that it could
be either positively or negatively symbolized; this experience with darkness can transform the
self in the face of the infinite; and the importance of the mirror (and one’s vision upon it) as it
functions to relate finitude and infinitude, and transform the body in so doing. The uniqueness of
Nyssa’s thought will allow us to see the complex dynamics in which the body can be
transformed in the interest of divine sight. Nyssa insists we seek after the “divine Nature” and
the good and beautiful only through an intervening hermeneutical sieve crafted by the markings
of materiality—because we are not merely immaterial and intelligible beings but also corporeal
98
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and perceptible beings. The density of one’s creatureliness and the rigor of its sense-perceptive
1

nature is embraced as the point from which one journeys into divine darkness—so long as one
“uses” the body and finitude to “anagogically” connect (as we will see) to its truest
intentionality, the infinite “beyond being.”
In the larger scope of my task, I approach Nyssa in pursuit of a theologically-conscious
hermeneutical phenomenology of whiteness focused on opacity, and I do so especially in view of
Carter’s effort to connect blackness of race positively to opacity within a generally Nyssen
framework. I argue that Nyssa does, in fact, explore a mystical darkness or opacity that grants a
critical subjectivity that sees in such a way that subverts modern racial logics—one in which
opacity or darkness guards alterity, defines the horizon as unconquerable, and positively
catalyzes free human growth toward the good. However, while Nyssa shows the possibility of
going another way with opacity in Christian vision, at the same time he explicitly develops a
negative symbolism of darkness from out of this mystical center that reveals the symbolic
substructure operating in the earliest Christian mystical discourse that symbolizes darkness of
skin within a wider symbolism of evil, a symbolism that supports the historical turn toward
racialization. This ambiguity of mystical darkness as both positive and negative is key to the
eventual utilization of and pathologization of opacity in modern racial logics.
We will observe in Nyssa the importance of vision in the face of the infinite. We will see
that for Nyssa, vision is interwoven with one’s aesthetic and spiritual formation and can
fundamentally direct a person toward ultimate ends.2 Human nature is fundamentally malleable,
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driven by the free will to direct that nature toward whatever end one desires (Nyssa will argue),
whether the good or the bad; within this frame, human nature is understood as a kind of “lifeendued and choice-endowed mirror” which, having undergone a process of beautification
through purification from “every material defilement,” can turn to the good and take its shape.3 I
will argue not only that the mirror is decisive in Gregory’s account of vision and self-formation,
but just how it operates—how it affects a transformation that is not merely spiritual but bodily.
Fundamentally, I will argue how in this bodily transformation toward the infinite through the
mirror’s operation both the body and color become situated in an overall symbolics that excludes
and includes finitude in a tangled web—an entanglement that all too easily becomes unraveled in
the path toward modernity that we will explore. We can take from Nyssa the hope of including
the body in spiritual formation, but we cannot escape his symbolizing darkness as evil.
In what follows, especially looking at Nyssa’s Homilies on the Song of Songs, Life of
Moses, and On the Making of Man, I will seek clarity regarding this juxtaposition of darkness as
a symbol of evil with darkness as a hopeful symbol of God in Nyssa’s epektatic frame. Darkness
or opacity here represents how the openness of the infinite and the rigor of materiality are meant
to coincide in a dance of spiritual-aesthetic formation. This speaks of the very material and
bodily transformation at stake here; I begin to make sense of this as I reflect on the importance of
the mirror and enigma in Nyssen thought for transformation of the material towards the infinite. I
argue that Nyssa’s configuration of the mirror’s operation and power of the enigma at the heart
of human change and choice roots the spiritual senses deeply into the physical senses and

Discussing vision, Nyssa notes that the eyes are “located above all the other organs of perception (Gk: aesthesis),
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genuine transformation of the body. But I also argue that the malleability and plasticity of human
nature, and the way in which the body and materiality is configured within the ideal change
toward the infinite, highlights significant problems with how opacity is handled in Nyssa’s
anagogical aesthetics upon the logic of the mirror. To bring this to a contemporary and critical
frame, I begin to develop a theology and phenomenology of the icon that respects opacity. We
will have to continue to examine whether we can think a phenomenology of the icon—and thus
get at the possible liberative potential of opacity—outside of the framework of the mirror. I argue
that this has to do with what is fundamentally at stake in a detailed understanding of “reverse
perspective.” This will be the basis for retrieving darkness or opacity as a positive concept.
Finally, a certain ethics comes with epektasis, one which has to do with acceptance of one’s
creatureliness and embracing of darkness.
Nyssa on Darkness and a Symbolics of Evil
Nyssa bequeaths to early Christian discourse two apparently diverging understandings of
darkness. Often darkness in Nyssa means “the darkness of sin or ignorance that gives way to
light.” Yet Nyssa also refers to a more positive, mystical darkness (especially in the notion of
epektasis) where “darkness not only serves to safeguard the unknowability of the divine essence,
but also indicates a divine encounter of considerable depth.”4 A puzzle, then, is before us. We
must see how the general framework of epektasis is a conceptual map for how darkness is
configured as a threshold concept that, in representing the difference between created and
uncreated, marks the limit of the finite even as it opens up to the infinite. We can initially call
this a “positive” understanding of darkness. But we also must observe a “negative”
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understanding of darkness as a symbol of moral decay or evil. We can see this especially in how
Nyssa interprets the black skin of the Bride in his Homilies. This negative symbolization of black
skin is not disconnected from the broader more “positive” way in which Nyssa symbolizes
darkness in epektasis; even the epektatic journey is symbolized through themes of original
beauty being defiled and needing purification, spoken of in terms of darkness as “bad coloring”
and purity in terms of good coloring (as I will discuss). I will argue that the positive and negative
ideas of darkness work together in Nyssa’s thought to show just how darkness of skin is
interpreted negatively within a symbolism of color enmeshed within a symbolism of evil in the
earliest Christian mystical discourse. Exploring what Nyssa is doing here reveals how the motif
of darkness configures the relationship between ideas of finitude and materiality and ideas of
infinitude and immateriality. Starting with Nyssa’s treatment of black skin will lead to the
broader problem of the symbolization of darkness in epektasis.
Darkness within a Symbolics of Evil
Without anachronistically ascribing modern racial logics to Nyssa’s thought on darkness,
we can observe how Nyssa in his Homilies discusses the dark color of the Bride’s skin in such a
way that he symbolizes black skin as a symbol of evil, through his spiritual reading forging this
very symbolization from literal skin color to moral symbol.5 Nyssa begins his second homily by
discussing concepts of light and darkness alongside a discussion of the tension between outer
appearance or adornment and inward beauty or an interior brightness. This is Nyssa’s way of
likening the approach to the Song as modeled after the tent of witness of the book of Exodus.
The Song of Songs is adorned with “erotic words and expressions that evince an orientation to an
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object of desire” but this points to a greater interior reality: a Person, Nyssa argues, connected to
Light. In this way, what one encounters in the Song is that which is hidden in material-linguistic
“figures” (ainigmaton) or enigmas whose ideas point to the heavenly and incorporeal (asomaton)
way of life (Cant 2, p. 47-49). The condition, Nyssa states, for discerning how to move from the
figures to the incorporeal ideas is that we take care
to prepare ourselves for entrance upon the holy of holies by washing off in the bath of
reason all the filth of shameful thinking, lest as persons blinded we be excluded from the
wonders within the tent because we have violated the law’s injunction by coming into
contact with a corpse-like idea or by teaching some unclean notion. (Cant 2, p. 49)
At the outset of Nyssa’s approach to the “darkness” of materiality, finitude, and the body, we
find that an overall light-dark aesthetic frames things according to a moral symbolism of evil.
Following this line of thinking, Nyssa specifically discusses the darkness of skin of the
Bride as he comments on the Bride’s words, “I am dark but beautiful” (Melaina eimi kai kale,
Song 1:5). Nyssa re-phrases the words of the Bride in view of his interpretation:
Do not marvel that Righteousness has loved me. Marvel rather that when I was dark with
sin and at home in the dark [melainan ousan ex hamartias kai prosokeiomenen to zopho]
because of my deeds, he by his love made me beautiful, exchanging his own beauty for
my ugliness. For having transferred to himself the filth of my sins, he shared his own
purity with me and constituted me a participant in his own beauty—he who first made
something desirable out of one who had been repulsive and in this way acted lovingly.
(Cant 2, p. 51)
Darkness of skin (melainan) in the letter of the text is an enigma that leads to a set of incorporeal
ideas framed around a certain moral symbolism. Black skin is linked to physical, spiritual, and
moral darkness (that is, to sin). Discussing how the Bride is beautiful now but used to be “not
gleaming but dark [melainan],” Nyssa again ventriloquizes the Bride: “This dark and gloomy
aspect [to skoteinon kai zophodes] that I bear is the work of my earlier life. … For the likeness of
darkness [to homoioma tou skotous] was changed into the form of beauty” (Cant 2, p. 53).
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Physical darkness of skin is symbolized as the gloom of night, again given spiritual and moral
meaning—it is even connected to the “power of darkness.” Physical darkness of skin is
“ugliness” which, in order to become beautiful, must be transformed, cleansed, and purged.
Nyssa strengthens and expands his thinking through a reading of the theology of the Apostle
Paul that focuses on the spiritual transformation or beautification from blackness of night to the
salvific light of day where “there remains no trace of darkness in things that had before been
obscured by the night” (Cant 2, p. 53). While we were first sinners in error and darkness, God
transforms us into beings full of light and beauty.
As Nyssa continues his exegesis, he continues to ground this overall moral symbolism in
reference to literal blackness of skin. Drawing on the image of the Ethiopian as black-skinned
foreigner (which I explored in the previous chapter), Nyssa connects the idea of black skin not
only to notions of sin and darkness but also the idea of foreignness. But as this dark foreigner is
accepted into the “heavenly city,” the Ethiopian becomes “bright” (Cant 2, p. 55). Gregory
pivots, exegeting the text, noting how the Bride was not dark by nature, but made dark by the
“look” of the Sun. Specifically, Nyssa writes that the Bride, because of the look of this sun, is
rendered “dark” (of skin, melan) through disobedience (Cant 2, p. 57).6 Nyssa eventually moves
the conversation toward a larger point about the origin of evil and about moral formation within
matters of darkness and finitude as it concerns freewill and choice toward good or evil (Cant 2,
p. 61-63). Ultimately, notes Nyssa, the Bride fails to take care of her own vineyard, and thus is
overcome by the weeds of the adversary—vices which defile the soul. This “cloth[ing] with
darkness” is eventually connected to an “ignorance” which causes one to miss the mark and stray
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(Cant 2, p. 65-67). Later in his Homilies, Nyssa again discusses the blackness of the Bride to
explain how God, like a goldsmith working to clean and purify gold from “the treacherous
admixture of some base material” which “obscures” its beauty, must “get rid of the bad coloring
[duschroian] by smelting it down in fire.” Through this purification, the gold becomes
“unadulterated” and “fair” (or “good colored” [euchrooteros]). God is restoring to original
beauty and so purifying human nature which was originally “golden and gleaming because of its
likeness to the undefiled Good” but then “by reason of the admixture of evil, it became
discolored and dark,” being “darkened by vice” (Cant 4, p. 111).
This moral symbolization of darkness within a broader symbolics of evil (even when it
comes to black skin) is not unique to Nyssa.7 I argue, though, that Nyssa takes up, transforms,
and passes on this symbolism more widely through his important and influential notion of
epektasis—perpetual desire for the infinite God framed in terms of entering into mystical
darkness, which decisively shapes Christian mystical thought. Through exploring epektasis we
can observe the broader symbolic structures that give meaning to the notion of darkness in
Nyssa’s thought.
Darkness within the Epektatic Framework
Epektasis is “arguably Gregory’s most important contribution to Christian thought;”8 and
it is “intimately tied to the essence of Gregory’s thought,” such that, as Jean Daniélou puts it, it is
Origen exegetes the bride figure in a similar way. See Mark S. M. Scott, “Shades of Grace: Origen and Gregory of
Nyssa’s Soteriological Exegesis of the ‘Black and Beautiful’ Bride in Song of Songs 1:5.” Harvard Theological
Review 99, no. 1 (2006): 65-83. Consider, too, Clement of Alexandria, the teacher of Origen (upon whom Nyssa and
the other Cappadocian Fathers would often draw): “Ignorance is darkness, for it makes us fall into sin and lose the
ability to see the truth clearly. But knowledge is light, for it dispels the darkness of ignorance and endows us with
keenness of vision.” From his Paedagogus 1.6.29; see Emily Cain, “Medically Modified Eyes: A Baptismal Cataract
Surgery in Clement of Alexandria.” Studies in Late Antiquity 2, no. 4 (2018): 495. Regarding possible Platonic,
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the very “synthesis of Gregorian spirituality in its central theme.” Generally epektasis is the
9

Nyssen claim of a person’s unending transformation in virtue through the beatific vision as one
progresses deeper toward the good and knowledge of God.10 Such a journey is perpetual because
God in God’s “nature” is inaccessible and our impurity is an obstacle; yet we can have a vision
of God that is a non-seeing, and, having entered the path of purification, we can participate in
God and the divine goodness through God’s “energies” and can come to see God in ourselves –
though in a mirror.11 To examine the full extent of Nyssa’s thought here is beyond the scope of
my study: I want to specifically explore the shape of the epektatic framework in order to show
the ways in which concept of darkness is utilized to relate the finite and the infinite, whether
positively or negatively.12 The relation between epektasis and mystical darkness is forged by
Nyssa himself in the centering of the Moses narrative. And from our current vantage point,
Daniélou’s interpretation is influential, which places darkness as the third and final point of
Nyssa’s mystical ascent, a mystical and contemplative experience in which even then God is
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incomprehensible. To navigate the conversation, I highlight Nyssa’s unique notion of human
13

mutability and how epektasis holds together this mutability alongside the infinity of God.
Nyssa’s thought on the absolute infinity of God is part of a broader tradition of diverse
religious and philosophical thinkers—Ilaria Ramelli notes a wide range such as Philo (Jewish),
Plotinus (“pagan”), and Origen (Christian)—who share a Platonic notion of God as “inaccessible
object of knowledge.”14 Though God is approached “apophatically” and thus unknowable in the
divine “essence,” the divine could still be known through activities or energies. Thinkers like
Philo, Origen and Nyssa believed that one cognitive path to God amidst this apophatic
unknowability of the infinite is through allegoresis.15 And, developing as early as Philo, the life
of Moses and particularly Exodus 33.20-23 served a core textual tradition on God’s
unknowability cast in the sense of a “non-seeing” and thus in the theme of darkness.16 Gregory
represents a tradition where God as infinite, incomprehensible, and ungraspable cannot be
discursively known, yet is experienced and spoken of as manifest externally in the world.17
Nyssa’s thought on infinity is particularly marked by a radical distinction between creator
and creature and not primarily the Platonic distinction between matter and spirit.18 Yet, this
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radical difference does not leave creator and creature at odds but instead in an intimate
relationship. In this frame, Nyssa specifically discusses the distinction and relation between the
“perceptible and material” (things we can perceive with the senses and which are, by definition,
limited), and the “intelligible and nonmaterial” (things which are beyond observation and senses
and which are, by definition, unlimited). The intelligible itself is divided into the uncreated and
the created. The created intelligible
looks eternally upon the First Cause of the things that are and is preserved in every
respect in the good by its participation in what transcends it. It is also, in a certain
fashion, always being created as it is changed for the better by being enhanced in
goodness. For this reason, no end point can be conceived for it either, and its growth
toward the better is not confined by any limit, but the good that is given at any particular
time is always a starting point for something more and better, even though it already
appears to be as great and as complete as possible. (Cant 6, p.185-187).
Because of the radical distinction, a certain unknowing or darkness is at stake; not one that repels
but one that cultivates the relation in the only way possible, through a productive and perpetual
dialectic. In this way, the finite human being “searches for God and through her/his ignorance;
through the darkness of mind concerning God, she/he can discover the divine truth.”19
On the notion of perpetual spiritual progress itself, this too was a shared belief in this
apophatic tradition, and so Nyssa’s own thought can be connected in certain ways to Platonic and
Plotinian ideas.20 The uniqueness, however, of Nyssa’s epektasis lies in just how he configured
the relationship of finite experience in the face of infinite darkness: the idea of human mutability
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as positive. Platonic (and Origenist) thought had considered human mutability and change as
negative and evil, a sign of the degeneration of human finitude; but Nyssa “postulates instead a
positive form of changeability, a perpetual choice of the Good leading to an eternal
transformation of the person in assimilation to God.”21 As Richard Norris Jr. writes, Gregory is
perhaps “the first Christian teacher to state a positive view of the mutability that was taken to be
proper to human beings in virtue of their createdness.”22 In this radically unique dissociating of
change from the notion of evil, Nyssa argues that human mutability is essential to human nature,
the freedom of choice, and “potential to experience unceasing advance.” 23 Change here itself
takes on a kind of stability, since it was a change toward deeper depths of virtue—and thus, as
Nyssa argued, would paradoxically secure “true ontological and eschatological stability” by
being on this path of eternal moral transformation toward God.24 Even so, while human
changeability and transformation was cased in a positive and redemptive light, there still was a
tension between “divine transcendence and creaturely self-realization.”25 The figure of divine
darkness, then, speaks all at once of the limit point of human creaturely reaching which is also
the threshold for transformation toward the infinite.
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I want to flesh this out by examining the important motif of the life of Moses recounted
in Exodus, a crucial influence on the tradition of mystical darkness. In Nyssa’s The Life of Moses
the soul’s unending progression into the infinite is specifically discussed under the image of
mystical darkness. Darkness is first negative and moralized (and so epiphany first happens in
light), but as the mind progresses “to enter into the darkness where God is” and as such enters
into a purification, including of the senses and sensual emotion, there is, as it were, a “luminous
darkness.”26 The soul as it pursues virtue is “released from its earthly attachment” and becomes
“light” and thus “rises ever higher” (Vit Moys 2.224-225, p. 113). So Moses, notes Nyssa,
although lifted up through such lofty experiences, … is still unsatisfied in his desire for
more. He still thirsts for that with which he constantly filled himself to capacity, and he
asks to attain as if he had never partaken, beseeching God to appear to him, not according
to his capacity to partake, but according to God’s true being. (Vit Moys 2.230, p. 114)
This is framed, importantly, in terms of unending desire toward the good. Against more fleshly
desire which can move the body down by force, Nyssa argues, a spiritual desire ceaselessly
beckons the soul upward toward the good.27 Nyssa writes:
Such an experience seems to me to belong to the soul which loves what is beautiful.
Hope always draws the soul from the beauty which is seen to what is beyond, always
kindles the desire for the hidden through what is constantly perceived. Therefore, the
ardent lover of beauty, although receiving what is always visible as an image of what he
desires, yet longs to be filled with the very stamp of the archetype. (Vit Moys 2.231, p.
114)
The desirous path of virtue does not stop but stretches out with the limitless since “the one limit
of virtue is the absence of a limit” and so the soul’s “desire itself necessarily has no stopping
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place but stretches out with the limitless” (Vit Moys 1.5-7, p. 30-31). This participation in the
limitlessness of virtue is a participation in God’s infinity.
In this way Nyssa stretches out human desire alongside God’s infinity.28 Nyssa writes:
“Certainly whoever pursues true virtue participates in nothing other than God, because he is
himself absolute virtue” (Vit Moys 1.7, p. 31). This desire and pursuit carries one past “mirrors
and reflections, but face to face” (Vit Moys 2.232, p. 114-115). And yet, to desire God in this
way, to have “true sight of God” is to not stop desiring (Vit Moys 2.233, p 115). Though the
divine itself has no boundary, one can see the good and the beautiful truly here and now:
This truly is the vision of God: never to be satisfied in the desire to see him. But one must
always, by looking at what he can see, rekindle his desire to see more. Thus, no limit
would interrupt growth in the ascent to God, since no limit to the Good can be found nor
is the increasing of desire of the Good brought to an end because it is satisfied. (Vit Moys
2.239, p. 116).
Desire for the infinite is possible in our creaturehood, and everlastingly so. In our finite
existence, one perceives the image before one’s eyes, and then moves to the hidden significance
beyond.
There is thus a certain paradox at stake in epektasis. In one’s finitude, one may “discover
their unlimited potential to become more like God” when they realize God is ungraspable in
God’s infinity.29 While Daniélou has received criticism for “westernizing” Nyssa’s mystical
darkness, I believe he describes well this paradox and the struggle in transformation it entails:
After learning all that can be known of God, the soul discovers the limits of this
knowledge; and this discovery is an advance, because now there is an awareness of the
divine transcendence and incomprehensibility. … For we have now an authentic
experience, a true vision. And the darkness is a positive reality that helps us to know
God—that is why it is called luminous. For it implies an awareness of God that
28
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transcends all determination, and thus it is far truer than any determined categorical
knowledge. For here in this obscurity the soul experiences the transcendence of the divine
nature, that infinite distance by which God surpasses all creation. Thus the soul finds
itself as it were elevated above all created things and at the same time lost in an infinite
darkness wherein it loses its contact with things, though it is aware of God despite the
total incapacity of its knowledge.30
In this experience, one can see God through faith, and only in obscurity grasp God in God’s
transcendence. 31 And this, argues Daniélou, is not a merely negative experience but “truly an
experience of the presence of God as He is in Himself, in such wise that this awareness is
completely blinding for the mind, and all the more so, the closer it is to Him.”32 From out of this
place of darkness comes a certain ecstasy and experience of eros as one is overcome and
overpowered in the senses by the divine presence of transcendence.33 In this way, the overall
shape of the epektatic journey is that darkness is both a limit point and threshold that opens up
positively and transformatively the finite unto the infinite. So Nyssa writes how in this journey of
ascent “the outer limit of what has been discovered becomes the starting point of a search after
more exalted things. … [M]ounting upwards by way of one greater desire toward another that
surpasses it, that soul is always journeying toward the infinite by way of higher things.” Tasting
becomes an invitation to feast (Cant 8, p. 260-261). One embraces the hereness of one’s horizon
of finitude just as it intersects with an infinite horizon. Epektatic darkness here represents the
tension between the limit of our creaturely density and the openness of the unknown upon which
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it indicates its significance. Darkness is embraced and traversed, though never overcome, as a
quality of our creaturely depths as they intersect with the infinite.
Let me return to emphasize for the trajectory of my own argument, following Nyssa’s
unique contribution, how human mutability in the face of mystical darkness is key. Kathryn
Tanner gives helpful language to what is at stake here for our thought, as she discusses the
essential plasticity of human nature. Humans, being in the image of God, have the unique
capacity (even in a “weaker” sense) for “the opening for the divine image itself to become their
own, present within them, in a way that reforms their humanity according to and in strong
imitation of itself.”34 Tanner indicates that what is at stake here is the kind of mystical openness
that epektasis calls for: “human nature must be characterized by an expansive openness that
allows for the presence of God within it. It must be the sort of nature that has or makes room for
the divine within its basic operations.”35 The will (which, as we will see, has to do with the
operation of the soul as mirror) is important here because the exercise of our free will determines
how our change in virtue toward the good can be acquired, lost, or transform our nature in its
faculties and orientation.36 That which forms us toward virtue is not proper to us, but something
we are not; our will directs us toward something different than our nature in which we must
participate.37 The fundamental mutability of human nature is a good which represents an
openness allowing for human transformation through reason and will toward the universal good
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and participation in God. This is the most fundamental thing about human nature, this
“unusually plastic” and “unusually impressionable” nature setting them apart from other created
beings. Plasticity, in fact, is so radically the case that human beings have the innate capability to
be some other thing “beyond the limits of their own – or any – created nature.”39 For Tanner, this
holds great hope because it says much about human potential and possibility for change. In this
understanding, the threshold of mystical darkness catalyzes growth in virtue as one’s
creatureliness and finitude endlessly advances into the ever-fleeting horizon of the infinitude.
A critical view: relation of finitude to infinitude in mystical darkness
Yet, there is still a tension here, I argue, in that the passageway this mystical darkness
affords does mark the limit our finitude faces; thus it speaks of how the transformation
engendered in mystical darkness includes and at the same time excludes material reality even as
materiality and the body leave their enduring mark. Let me, then, begin to show how this kind of
mutability and transformation in the face of darkness might become problematic, a critical
analysis I will continue to open in various directions until bringing it to a focus near the close of
this chapter. The first problematic aspect I want to highlight is that part of the epektatic journey
consists of being deterred by the “animalization” of the soul. Commenting on a passage in the
Song about the dangers of leopards and lions, Nyssa writes:
For humanity, once it had put off its divine aspect was brutalized and approached
likeness to the irrational nature and through its evil habits became a leopard and a lion. …
[T]he good Bride groom effects intensity and superabundance of joy over good things in
the soul that is climbing toward him, not only by showing the Bride her own beauty but
also by recalling to her mind the awful image of wild beasts, so that she may the more
exult in her present blessedness as she learns from the contrast what good things have
taken the place of those evils. (Cant 8, p. 260-265)
38
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Nyssa continues: “For the Word wishes us, mutable as we are by nature, not to decline into evil
by our changing, but through unending growth for the better to make change cooperate in our
ascent toward higher things.” This is the path toward “an incapacity for evil” and is spurred on
by keeping in our memory “the wild beasts that once controlled us” as an aversion to evil (Cant
8, p. 264-267). The matter of human mutability is already enmeshed in a complex symbolism of
evil: the greatest human possibility stares into the face of the potential of the greatest human
monstrosity.
A second problematic aspect relates more directly to our overall inquire about a
symbolism of color enmeshed in a symbolism of evil. While I have already pointed out how
Nyssa deals with darkness of skin, we can notice a deeper, less startling (and, for that reason,
perhaps more insidious) way in which color more generally is dealt with in an epektatic
framework. In De hominis opificio, Nyssa discusses the tension (at the heart of epektasis)
between created and uncreated, specifically how the created emerges in relation to the uncreated.
Nyssa writes: “we suppose the power of the Divine will to be a sufficient cause to the things that
are, for their coming into existence out of nothing.”40 He describes what material or finite reality
must be then if it “has its existence from Him Who is intelligible and immaterial;” he continues:
“For we shall find all matter to be composed of certain qualities, of which if it is divested it can,
in itself, be by no means grasped by idea. Moreover, in idea each kind of quality is separated
from the substratum; but idea is an intellectual and not a corporeal method of examination” (De
hom 24.1). In other words, materiality as we know it is fundamentally known through its ideal
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examination that gives it meaning or being. As we understand through our “mental discussion”
the things “concerning the substratum,” our ideas are “clearly distinguished from the object we
contemplate.” In fact, these ideas are neither connected with each other nor “with the body” but
upon the material substratum they are occasioned to be thought together in various particular
ways (De hom 24.1). Nyssa gives the implications of this:
If, then, colour is a thing intelligible … and so with quantity and the rest of the like
properties, while if each of these should be withdrawn from the substratum, the whole
idea of the body is dissolved; it would seem to follow that we may suppose the
concurrence of those things, the absence of which we found to be a cause of the
dissolution of the body, to produce the material nature: for as that is not a body which has
not colour, and figure, and resistance, and extension, and weight, and the other properties,
while each of these in its proper existence is found to be not the body but something else
besides the body, so conversely, whenever the specified attributes concur they produce
bodily existence. Yet if the perception of these properties is a matter of intellect, and the
Divinity is also intellectual in nature, there is no incongruity in supposing that these
intellectual occasions for the genesis of bodies have their existence from the incorporeal
nature, the intellectual nature on the one hand giving being to the intellectual
potentialities, and the mutual concurrence of these bringing to its genesis the material
nature. (De hom 24.2)
Materiality and finitude “is” insofar as it comes into being through the “mutual concurrence” of
intellectual ideas like color, quantity, extension, weight, and so on. Color, then, is first and
finally an intellectual idea, and only then a specific material property (which is vacuous and
“non-existent” apart from its transcendental dimension).41 As with how Nyssa configures color
in the symbolization of black skin in his Homilies, here the way in which color is configured as a
material property that comes into existence and gains meaning only as it is caught up in

See Philip Thibodeau, “Ancient Optics: Theories and Problems of Vision,” in A Companion to Science,
Technology, and Medicine in Ancient Greece and Rome, vol 1, ed. Georgia L. Irby (Oxford: John Wiley & Sons,
2016), 136-138 for how this relates to how color was understood in ancient thought. Color was often connected to
various qualities of matter as they impact the one who senses the object. Connecting color to the realm of ideas
instead of primarily as it relates to an atomic quality of the body seems to set apart Nyssa. It is interesting to
observe, too, in certain ancient accounts the fundamental black-white system, connecting white to smoothness and
easiness of shape/transfer of sensation and blackness to roughness of shape, contraction of atoms, muddledness of
sensation.
41

117
transcendent, intellectual dimension foreshadows how modern racial logics will also interpret
(skin) color within a transcendentalizing framework.
In Nyssa’s thought, darkness represents a complex operation: it describes the enigmatic
topos upon which the relation between finitude and the infinite is configured because darkness
can represent both the density and limitedness of creaturely reality that must be transcended
(even if it is the genuine starting point of such an ascent) and the unknown openness of the
desired mystical intentionality toward the divine. Gregory’s notion of epektasis is such that
opacity is the place of fissure in humanity’s most fleshy finitude, represented by soul as mirror,
where the openness of the infinite and the rigor of materiality are meant to coincide in a dance of
spiritual-aesthetic formation. However, in light of the negative way in which darkness
(especially darkness of skin) is configured toward a symbolics of evil, we will have to discern the
way in which this aim towards the infinite makes a claim about the surpassing of the body. I will
shortly explain the importance of the mirror and the enigma-symbol here: such a conceptuality
will allow us to see how the opaque surface of creaturely existence both reveals and conceals the
greater mirrored reality, in which one must look at the infinite through the finite, discerning the
relation. This broadening of the epektatic framework we can refer to as the overall “anagogical”
shape of Nyssa’s thought. Anagogy for Nyssa has to do with the intersecting of the
eschatological in one’s finitude, both vertically in seeing in the letter of scripture higher realities
and horizontally in seeing higher realties transform one’s material life. This centers us on
spiritual process that focuses on the development of virtue. We can go “upward” and “forward”
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in life (in both text and body) through participating in God through virtue. So an anagogical
42

aesthetics that relates materiality to immateriality becomes increasingly key.
Nyssa on the Symbol
To understand fully what Gregory is doing with darkness within an epektatic or
anagogical framework, we need to examine what Nyssa does with the mirror and enigma as it
relates to his understanding of vision. It is ultimately upon the logic of the mirror that epektasis
can be simultaneously this openness to the divine and rigor of one’s finitude; so what is at stake
in the mirror is at stake in Nyssa’s ambiguous handling of darkness. There are two key points
here: first, the connection of vision and the mirror as central human choice to freely relate the
finite to the infinite; second, how Gregory uses the conceptuality of the mirror to explain his
Stoic understanding of vision and aesthetics which is able to hold together the tension between
passivity and activity in perception. As human vision is understood as it faces mystical darkness,
an anagogical perspective is both a receptive comportment to the infinite depth represented in the
inexhaustible surplus of enigmatic opacity and the active pursuit of seeking from the freedom of
one’s creatureliness the “higher meaning” indicated in our finitude.
Nyssa On Vision and the Stoic influence
Vision and the eyes for Nyssa are of central importance. In his Homilies, Nyssa refers to
the eyes as our “noblest members” whose “location above the other sense organs manifests the
fact that their usefulness to us for the conduct of life is of the greatest worth.” He continues:
“Through them we receive light, with their help we recognize friend and foe, by their means we
distinguish what is native from what is alien.” It is leaders in the Church, themselves “eyes,”
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who “look undeviatingly upon the Sun or Righteousness and never dim their sight with the
works of darkness” and who are able to distinguish and discern truth and light from the
ephemeral and alien (Cant 7, p. 229). In this framework, vision is not merely a physical power of
the senses but is already and always a spiritual and moral matter. Nyssa fundamentally
configures vision as both physical and moral through connecting vision to the conceptuality of
the mirror, specifically (as I will explain) in the framework of a Stoic aesthetics and perception
of holding together the tension of reception and activity.
Noting how the mirror is important within his overall theory of vision, Nyssa writes in his
seventh homily:
for since the images of all visible things, when they make contact with a pure pupil <of
the eye>, bring about vision, it is necessary that one assume the form of that toward
which one looks, receiving through the eye, in the fashion of a mirror, the form of the
visible thing. (Cant 7, p. 229-231)43
The mirror makes sense of how Nyssa’s understanding of vision is built on an aesthetic space of
both reception and activity, of impression and interpretation. Seeing is not merely about physical
vision and the senses, but about the free choice to see from the material to the transcendent and
to transform the material in the direction of its transcendence. In this way, perception and vision
connect the broader matter of the relation between the material and the immaterial. So the eyes,
Gregory writes, are praised as a pair so that “the entire human being may be included in the
praise—the phenomenal as well as the noumenal” (Cant 7, p. 231). With the conceptuality of the
mirror norming his understanding of vision and perception, Nyssa wrestles with the tension of
recognizing the importance of both the sensuous and the immaterial.
Nyssa continues: “When therefore one who has received this eyelike authority over the church gazes upon nothing
material and corporeal, the spiritual and immaterial life is established within him. Hence the most perfect praise of
eyes is that the form of their life is shaped in conformity with the grace of the Holy Spirit, of the Holy Spirit is a
dove.” For commentary on this text see Karfíková, “The Metaphor of the Mirror,” 278.
43
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To understand the mirror in this way, we must place Nyssa’s understanding of vision in
its larger context. I argue that Nyssa’s understanding of vision was contrasted with two of the
major basic theories of vision in ancient thought. Extramissionist theories held to some kind of
ray or substance “which was released from the eye in the direction of the visual object” in order
to discern what one saw. Intromissionist theories, largely atomistic, “held that a stream of
material travels in the other direction, from the surface of each visible object toward the eye.”44
In the intromissionist theory, for example, “every object emits tiny films”—as Epicurus called
them, eidola—“that fly through the air and impress upon a person’s eyes.”45 A fusion theory
tried to bring these two approaches together. Now, it is true that in his fourth homily Nyssa
seems to advocate for an atomist or intromissionist account of vision, as he notes that certain
“experts in physiology” discuss how “images [eidolon] fall[ing] into [the pupil of the eye]
emanated from visible objects” (Cant 4, p. 117).46 Yet elsewhere Nyssa writes that in sight “the
mind apprehends those things which are external to the body, and draws to itself the images of
phenomena, marking in itself the impressions of the things which are seen” (De hom 10). In this
we see how Nyssa specifically drew on the Stoic view of vision (and other Stoic thought on
aesthetic perception) to shape key aspects of his theory. The Stoic view did not technically
include transfer of material. In the Stoic theory of vision, the pneuma in the eye “was said to
‘prick’ and ‘tense’ a section of the surrounding air which was shaped like a cone, with its apex at
the eye and its base on the surface of the visible object. The air within this cone united with the
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soul-pneuma in such a way that it became a sensitive extension of the soul into the
environment.”47 Nyssa’s Stoic understanding of vision was unique, though, in how the
conceptuality of the mirror plays a decisive role to stress free will. In this way, Nyssa utilizes this
Stoic framework of vision and aesthetics as a mix of reception and activity, and is able to build
off of it (as a Christian thinker) to accept the immaterial dimensions of human subjectivity.
The mix of receptivity and activity was key to the Stoic model of vision.48 Indeed, this
speaks not of passivity of perception (as in the atomist model) but, as Susan Wessel puts it, “an
activity in which the mind participated in order to apprehend the object before it.” 49 Arguing that
Gregory was at least “partly dependent” upon the Stoic view, Wessel argues that he may have
specifically been influenced by Galen’s reception of it “whereby a transformation of the outside
pneuma was thought to take place especially in the ventricles of the brain and then extend from
the eye as cerebral pnuema in order to bring about vision.”50 Generally in De hominis opificio,
Nyssa engages in a theological anthropology which shows a key interest in Greek medical
literature of his time. Nyssa’s concern is how a human functions in the image of God as an
intelligible mind circumscribed in a physical body.51 Wessel argues that, by “carv[ing] out a
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middle position between the Platonism that he knew from reading Plotinus and Origen, and the
materialism that he acquired from his acquaintance with Galen and the medical writers,” Nyssa
was able to unifying the person as intelligible mind that necessarily interacted in the world
through the corporeal body. Specifically in his text, Nyssa separates out certain states and
conditions of the mind from the intelligible mind by linking them to physical conditions, all
while insisting on the more-than-material unified person as the image of God.52 Nyssa is able to
craft this position by insisting that the activity of apprehension took place in the body as the
mind inscribes upon itself images through a “certain wax-like form,” as Nyssa puts it, which was
soft in order to receive and perceive images (De hom 30). Nyssa perhaps relates this to a cerebral
membrane of sorts as the foundation for the sense organs, related to Galen’s theory.53
Placing Nyssa within this medical and Stoic context highlights the active nature of the
mind in the apprehension of objects, which Nyssa builds from to both accept the material reality
of the body while opening toward its immaterial trajectory. For the Stoics and for Gregory,
aesthesis (generally, “aesthetics”) was both perception, or receiving sense data, and
apprehension, interpretation and acceptance of sense data as “the implicit mental consequence of
the physical process.”54 The Stoics indeed understood aesthesis in a number of ways; Rubarth
summarizes how to hold these meanings together as “(1) the sensory apparatus; (2) the activity
of the apparatus; (3) the culminating (successful) cognitive event identified as the assent” to a
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certain impression (phantasia). This complex framework “emphasizes the structure and
55

readiness of the part of the sensory apparatus that interfaces with the external world.” 56 In
speaking in aesthesis of both the sensory apparatus in its potentiality and also its activity
(energeia), the “Stoics compared the perceptual acquisition to a king who sends out messengers
who report back after receiving information.”57 The ability of the sense apparatuses to both
receive and actively interpret is often spoken of in terms of an imprinting of the sense data in the
commanding faculty (like a wax imprinting, as with Nyssa regarding the brain).58 This
fundamental Stoic relation between passivity and activity in aesthesis allows Nyssa to weave
into this materialist framework his immaterialist commitments, granting a tension between
deriving knowledge from the material senses and deriving knowledge with intelligible mind.
Human nature functioned, as imaging God, according to the exercise of its intelligibility, and in
this way the human mind and its ability to intuitively apprehend the non-sensory was a reflection
of the divine mind. But still, it was through the portals of sense perception and its organs that
such activity happened. The mind could not actually perceive reality in an incorporeal mode, and
so knowledge was connected intimately with aesthetic reception, receiving through the operation
of the body the operation of its incorporeal, intelligible mind and its rationality.59 It is with the
figure of the mirror that Nyssa can integrate into his overall theology certain Stoic commitments
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to accept the rigor, materiality, and sensuousness of the physical senses alongside the more
Platonic elements, such as the drive for intelligible, synthetic meaning and interpretation.
Nyssa and the Importance of the Mirror to Vision
The operation of the mirror, lying at this complex intersection of the place of vision in
forging the relation between finitude and infinitude, focusses the materiality of the body (in its
plasticity) toward the question of the free will and the choice to turn toward the good. Once
purified or polished, the soul as “life-endued and choice-endowed mirror” is key to genuine
bodily transformation. Nyssa uniquely discusses the mirror as being connected to the
transformation of the whole person which turns on the direction of the free will of the soul. 60
It is as the human person is like a mirror, that Gregory can speak of the person’s free
choice to turn toward the good so that it takes the shape of the good on the epektatic journey.
Having lost its original beauty through “voluntary turning” to sensual things, the soul is “at the
border” between spiritual and physical and can turn to both: in order to reclaim its participation
in the divine beauty, it must turn to the good through its own free will. The soul as mirror
illustrates this.61 Nyssa writes: “Human nature came into being as something capable of
becoming whatever it determines upon, and to whatever goal the thrust of its choice leads it, it
undergoes alteration in accord with what it seeks.” He continues: “Since, then, our choice is so
constituted that we are disposed to take on the shape of whatever we want,
the Word rightly says to the Bride in her new glory, “You have drawn near to me as you
have rejected the fellowship of evil, and in drawing near to the archetypal Beauty, you
too have become beautiful, informed like a mirror by my appearance. … For in that it is
transformed in accordance with the reflections of its choices, the human person is rightly
Karfíková notes that some of Nyssa’s thought here can be connected to Plato and Plotinus, but not in the way that
Nyssa emphasizes the turning of the soul through free choice. “The Metaphor of the Mirror,” 271, 280.
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likened to a mirror. If it looks upon gold, gold it appears, and by way of reflection it
gives off the beams of that substance; … Having, then, put evil behind it, the soul
purified by the Word has taken the sun’s orb within itself and has been gleaming in
company with the light that appears within it. (Cant 4, p. 115)
In a similar passage, Nyssa moves from likening human nature to the mirror to discussing more
explicitly “the mirror that is human nature” which “does not become beautiful until it has drawn
close to the Beautiful and has been formed by its image” (Cant 5, p. 163). As with the sun,
though, we can never gaze directly at the good and the beautiful; still, the soul “sees the sun
within [itself] as in a mirror” as the “rays” of virtue, writes Nyssa, shine upon the purified life
and “make the Invisible visible for us and the Incomprehensible comprehensible, because they
portray the Sun in the mirror that we are” (Cant 3, p. 101). The point here, I argue, is less
ontological and more ethical: emphasized is the choice to turn away from evil and to the good.
Although we cannot gaze directly on the good, we are able to do so as much as possible because
of the conceptuality of the mirror.
In this way, Nyssa’s thought on the mirror stands out against the wider context. For
Platonic, Neo-Platonic, and Plotinian thought, the mirror illustrates less the productive,
transformative relationship between the intelligible and the material and more so the distinction
between the two. Matter is like a mirror in that, while it collects reflections of reality, it is itself
illusory and not connected to the reality it passively reflects.62 In this way, the mirror also came
to illustrate a key piece of the mythical understanding of the descent or fall of the soul into the
body or, more generally, the drawing forth or even erotic relationship between light and
darkness.63 In this vein, when connected to self-reflection and self-formation, the mirror was
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connected to a certain danger of the soul becoming attracted less to the good itself and more to
its own reflection.64 Along these lines, the mirror was explicitly a part of the discourse on the
symbolism of evil and sin.65 However, the mirror (and water in its mirroring quality) was also
important to myths of creation along different models of emanation or transmission. In fact,
“Plato explicitly mentions the mirror as a tool of the creation in the hands of the one turning it
and therewith, in a sense, recreating what the mirror reflects.” Like a mirror receiving an image,
the “clear and smooth surface” of the watery world was able to illustrate the openness of the
universe to “receiving enlightenment from the Intellect and the soul.”66 Plotinus specifically
moves from the Platonic emphasis on illusory imitation at stake in the mirror to an idea of
transmission of images as the universe reflects the intelligible world. In this way, matter is able
to participate in the intelligible reality, and darkness able to be illumined.67 Finally, in key mirror
myths (such as that of Narcissus, Dionysius, and Hermaphroditus), the capture of the soul in the
body can describe “violent and cunning merging,” through the deception of transparency or the
passion of eros.68 So the mirror had a triple role: “to provide cognizance of the world, of God and
of oneself”—and often “its cognitive and cosmological role could not always be separated.”69
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Nyssa’s notion of images being reflected in the pupil of the eye-as-mirror has a certain
resonance with a passage in the Platonic Alcibiades, but Nyssa does not merely discuss the pupil
of the other being reflected in one’s own eye, but “anything to which it is turned at that
moment.”70 Lenka Karfíková explains that this is “a kind of key to Gregory’s theological use of
the metaphor of the mirror” as the mirror is less about ontological difference (as in Plato and
Plotinus) and more about that “what is reflected is always that to which it is turned (just as an
object that is looked at is reflected in the pupil of the eye).”71 Again, for Nyssa the mirror
represents the possibility to turn, in one’s free choice, toward any desired end for holistic
transformation.72 This does not preclude—in fact, it requires—some of the other themes at stake
in the mirror in the thinking of the time: “ontological dependence” of the material on the
immaterial, the “continuing distance between the mirror and what is reflected” which draws the
soul continually to its transcendence, and the incomprehensibility of the divine and divine
beauty. And yet, amidst the difference, distance, and incomprehensibility, for Nyssa the mirror
fundamentally points out the translation of the incomprehensible “into a form that is accessible
to created beings.” 73 As “living mirror endowed with free choice” one was engaged not in mere
reflection but animated attachment and direction, a kind of subjectivity with a focus on
transformation in virtue. In other words, we “choose the image that will shine in the mirror of
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our lives.” I will address shortly the question of the nature of this transformation as a bodily
74

transformation and how the mirror, emphasizing less the ontological and more the question of
use, orientation, or relation, opens a connection between finitude and infinitude.
The mirror fundamentally has to do with the radical human freedom to shape oneself and
one’s world. If human nature is especially plastic, as Tanner has argued, this emphasis on
freewill “only adds to the plastic, shape-shifting character of human nature.”75 The plasticity of
human nature is coupled with a project of self-reflection and self-oversight, which means
freedom, will, and reason are powers to cultivate one’s drives toward great virtue or vice,
reworking human nature amidst a space that opens up and reaches beyond one’s own nature.76 So
Tanner concludes that freewill is less about “some vaunted power in a positive sense, an
imitation of divine omnipotence” and more that the power of self-direction as “humans can
rework what they are given by nature so as to imitate almost anything along the continuum of
ontological ranks, from the bottom to the top.”77 In view of the nature of this space of a mirroring
human nature amidst the vastness of infinite possibility, David Bentley Hart describes Nyssa as
putting forth a “specular economy,” a life of mirroring fastened in the life of the trinity that folds
out to all of creation.78 In this specular economy, the ability to see the invisible God is because
God always mirrors Godself in (giving) visibility; this is a “circle of Glory” formed by the
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“inseparability of paternal depth from image and glory.” There is advancement as we are
79

refashioned by the Spirit “so that our ‘depths’ are ever more conformed to the brightening
‘surface’ of our natures, making our ‘return’ to ourselves at once a reflex of God’s return to
himself within his circle of glory and also our ascent out of ourselves—out of our creaturely
insubstantiality—into his infinity.” 80 The plasticity of human nature unifies the material with the
immaterial; through their expansive flexibility and ability to include within themselves a variety
of formations through fundamental openness, humans image in their own way the
incomprehensible nature of the divine.81 But, again, such progress in this economy of reflectivity
must embrace the darkness of our creaturely depths. Upon the mirror this simultaneous logic of
darkness and light, material and immaterial is played out. This is the logic of enigma.
Connecting the Mirror with the Enigma
Thinking mirror and enigma together is gathered for Nyssa around 1 Corinthians 13:12.
Nyssa discusses this passage in his Homilies, noting that “there is a place where [Paul] calls
dimmer understanding and partial knowledge a ‘mirror’ and an ‘enigma’ (1 Cor 13:12),” which
teaches us (Nyssa says) how one must move from the letter “to shift to an understanding that
concerns the immaterial and intelligible, so that corporeal ideas may be transposed into intellect
and thought when the fleshly sense of the words has been shaken off like dust” (Cant prol., p. 5).
This partial sight is a matter of seeing and knowing in the darkness. Discussing how the Bride of
the Song is “surrounded by the divine night, in which the Bridegroom draws near but is not
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manifest,” Nyssa discusses a perception of presence that “escapes clear and distinct intellectual
grasp in being concealed by the invisibility of its nature.” Truth, partial in nature, “knocks at the
door of our understanding by way of certain hints and enigmas” through key words with
meanings that open up the hidden matters (Cant 11, p. 343). With the enigma, we indicate how
our finite condition is an obstacle to sight and also how this seeing-within-obstacle is the
condition for the possibility of a seeing that leads to understanding of divine truths. Nyssa
explains that “the divine Nature transcends the mind’s grasp;” thus:
Our thought concerning it is a likeness or image of what we seek, for it does not manifest
the form of that which no one has seen or can see. Rather, it sketches darkly
[skiagraphei], in a mirror and in an enigma, a reflection of what we seek that comes to
birth in our souls on the basis of some conjecture. All speech, however, that refers to
such intuitions has the function of some indivisible mark, being unable to make clear
what the mind intends. Thus all our thinking is inferior to the divine understanding, and
every explanatory word of speech [logon hermeneutikon] seems to be an abbreviated
tracery mark [stigmen] that is unable to embrace the breadth of the act of understanding.
(Cant 3, p. 97. Emphasis mine)
What is at stake in the enigma and mirror is the tension of tracing out from and in our finite
condition a true understanding in the face of the infinite. The enigmatic expresses a relation
between the material and the immaterial, where the material in the intentionality of its materiality
“perjures” its finitudinal aspect by indicating some infinite intentionality. And especially for
Nyssa, this has to do with how we secure virtue, as virtue is key to “this anagogical progression
in the divine life.”82
What is at stake here is the symbol’s hinting and hiding tension in its representative
nature (as I mentioned in the previous chapter). As a symbol is both “like” and “unlike” at the
same time, opacity expresses the nature of the symbol’s representation—that it only “hint[s]
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secretly” at (because it also hides) that which it represents; and “what is concealed is related to
what is revealed by unseen correspondences.”83 This tension of representation, this opacity,
expresses what is at the core of the symbol as enigma. According to Peter T. Struck, a certain
dialectic frames how the opacity of the symbol has been approached historically: a “poetics of
enigma” by allegorists in contradistinction from the “poetics of clarity” by Aristotelian rhetors.
At its earliest, this is a disagreement about the nature of language and its connection to a broader
ontology, especially as it relates to the interpretation of Homer. We have here two competing
visions of how to understand language and deal with its interpretation, especially related to the
“fantastic” or “obscure” or some apparent “flaw” or strangeness in a text. In a poetics of clarity
the opacity or enigma of language is considered an obstacle and a defect that must be avoided to
reach understanding; there is no unseen ontological linkage between words and deeper realities
(if anything, the apparent mirroring function of language would only produce phantasms and
deceptive images).84 In a poetics of enigma, while opacity is a kind of obstruction at first,
ultimately it is a redirection that leads to truer understanding, a poetic surplus out of which we
make meaning and selves. Herein lies the importance of “riddling” as the symbol and enigma
and their cognates “form the central concepts of ancient allegorical reading.”85 With the
allegorists, poetry and words are connected to deeper philosophical and theological matters.86
Obscurities in the text divert and challenge a literal reading and are a clue to a deeper meaning. 87
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The skilled reader traces the hidden meaning in the word, encountered through this obscurity and
poetic surplus, to its deeper more profound meaning.88 In the poetics of the enigma, of which
Nyssa takes part, the conceptuality of the mirror eventually becomes a place upon which to think
out the possibility of connecting surface appearances to deeper meanings through wise and
learned perception. In his thinking of the symbol as opening up to the immaterial, Nyssa drew on
Neoplatonic thought; but even drawing on a Neoplatonic symbology, he valued the importance
of the material, emphasizing, we could say, the more Stoic roots of Neoplatonic thinking.
Struck traces five key phases in the history of the symbol, from non-literary to literary
symbol, which becomes important to situate Nyssa’s symbology, especially as we seek to
understand the Stoic and Neoplatonic symbol. First, up to 300 BCE, the symbol begins as
material and concrete, as essentially half an object that is split to make an agreement and later
reassembled to confirm it.89 Thus, the symbol begins as a force to materialize “social agreement
and social commitment, in commercial, political, and personal spheres” and thus in its very
origin is characterized by lack as in its materiality it indicates a transcendent meaning—the
missing social agreement to be resolved.90 Second, from this concrete root a specialized (still
non-literary) meaning eventually occurs: that of symbol as “ominous chance meeting.”91 One
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might think, in a contemporary frame, of a black cat or black bird. Both in its earliest meaning as
contract marker and here as omen “significance is pulled from the void of happenstance by
looking to an intentionality [and secondary reference], social in the one case and divine in the
other.”92 The apparent material meaning at stake in the token or omen is itself normed by the
conventionality of human or divine intentionality. (Herein, I argue, lies the seeds of the symbol’s
inherent opacity and its connection to the enigma or riddle: still as only object yet representing
an immaterial reality.) Third, with the Pythagoreans the symbol shifts to a literary context. Here,
the symbol begins to be particularly associated with the enigma, as the symbol here was a riddle
or saying that functioned to “bind the group together and draw distinctions between them and the
outside world.” The Pythagoreans in this way used obscure sayings as authentication tokens, not
just to provide physical access to the community but to indicate entrance into a higher level of
insight and understanding.93
With the Stoics, the symbol emerges both as a key category for reading literature and as
having an ontological purchase. The Stoics used the enigma-symbol for an allegoresis built on
the specifics of Stoic ontology, especially in terms of the nature of the logos and pneuma as
underlying all of reality. Introducing “detailed thinking into the linguistic aspects of a
universalist ontology such as had never been seen,” with the logos/pneuma frame the Stoics built
a bridge between surface appearance and ultimate reference.94 Indeed: “All existing things
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manifest the pneuma dwelling within them, and all words, therefore, have always another
referent.”95 And in this way, all things were connected and coordinated at the deepest level to all
other things in the cosmos.96 Though materialist and immanentist in this way, in the Stoic frame
words can gain an ambiguity because the material foundation does not guarantee social linguistic
stability nor automatic access from word to deeper reference.97 In this framework, what Struck
calls a “universalist materialism,” no single word could “lay bare the collective logos itself, that
is, the collective language that is the divine pneuma itself.” Despite the connection between
words and ontological stability, the ambiguity lies in shifts of meaning and growing ontological
subcurrents.98 This basic sense of the polyvalence of language and need for interpretive schemas
because of “some hint of ontological linkage between surface referent and underlying referent”
only grows more prominent moving forward and especially toward Neoplatonic thought.99 The
Stoics thus bring to the history of the symbol its key place in interpreting poetic language
(allegoresis) as linked to broader claims of underlying ontological linkage between word and
greater reference.100
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The Neoplatonic ontologization of the literary symbol magnifies what was at stake in the
poetics of the enigma at it develops and gains prominence in Stoic thought, extending this belief
in interpreting words according to a mysterious underlying hidden correspondences to an unseen
world.101 Neoplatonic ideas of moving from surface to hidden meaning “rest on an ontological
assertion that relationships exist, sometimes intuitive, often opaque, in the world of things.” Thus
the Neoplatonists “advance such thinking by an order of magnitude.”102 It was particularly
Iamblichus, on Struck’s account, who brings to the symbol its framework that carries through to
key modern developments: “Iamblichus makes the ‘symbol’ the central link between the divine
and human realms. The symbol makes the impossible happen; it becomes the node on which the
transcendent can meet the mundane.”103 For Neoplatonists like Iamblichus “symbols translate
between ourselves and our gods by giving us a language of signs that (somehow) allows us to
talk about (and thus to worship) that which by definition is beyond all our puny words and
conceptions.” At this point, the symbol, as it “embraces and contains the paradox” of
transcendence (insisted on by Epicureans) and immanence (insisted on by Stoics), operates in a
way “that mirrors the deep structures of the cosmos.”104 Herein is a certain kind of depth, so
fundamental to opacity: the enigma or symbol in its very logic is able to function like a mirror,
showing something on its surface that is an indication of a deeper—perhaps truer—reality.
In this rich milieu of thinking about the symbol, Gregory used the figure of the mirror to
explain not only the relation between the material and immaterial, but how one could discern the
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divine in the human reality. Indeed, for Nyssa, like other late allegorists, the word was symbol
because the human mind needed a perceptible point from which to grasp immaterial meaning.105
Although Nyssa drew upon this poetics of the enigma and the fundamental gesture of tracing out
from poetic surplus a primary deeper theological truth, as “foremost[ly] a Christian thinker,”106
Nyssa is able to take these Neoplatonic convictions and yet draw on the Stoic roots of the
importance of materiality in constructing an anagogical or epektatic frame trying to hold together
the finite and the infinite. Even this Stoic influence toward materiality is rooted deeper in the
history of the symbol as first material object.
Bodily and Aesthetic Transformation: Moral Formation in the Face of Opacity
I have discussed how the notion of opacity (especially as it relates to the enigma and the
mystical darkness therein) provides for understanding the complex way in which Nyssa
configures creaturely vision in the face of the divine infinite. In this kind of anagogical
aesthetics, darkness is presented as the obstacle in the way of sight (quickly being moralized
within a symbolics of evil) and yet as the limit to creaturely sight which properly opens onto a
view of the divine. The mirror represents this darkness or enigma for Nyssa as it emphasizes the
ability in one’s free will to direct one’s attention toward any end for radical shaping of self and
also emphasizes the unknown infinite, thus emphasizing (in a Stoic vein) aesthetics as both
activity and reception. As I work my way toward the question of whether darkness for Nyssa can
truly be retrieved as a positive concept that values materiality and finitude, I need to interrogate
specifically the importance for Nyssa of the material and bodily in pursuit of the infinite. I have
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already made the claim that in the epektatic journey it is not just openness toward the divine but
also the rigor of one’s creatureliness that is formative toward transformation. Now I inquire just
how the mirror logic at the heart of epektasis operates by engendering a genuinely material
transformation—though it cannot escape the specter, at the same time, of surpassing the body.
Bodily Transformation in Nyssa’s Epektasis
The value of the body for an early Christian thinker like Nyssa is nuanced and
complicated. While there has typically been a suspicion that Nyssa, like other early Christian
thinkers, devalued the body, recent Nyssen scholarship has begun to emphasize how key bodily
reality was for Nyssa. Sarah Coakley’s claim of the importance of the body for Nyssa even as the
Christian progresses in the life of virtue has been influential: that Gregory’s works “from the
time of his De anima on … set out a developing and systematic account of how ordinary
perception and the gross physical sense are capable of a progressive transformation in this life
into spiritual senses via a purgative process of ‘death’ and regeneration.” She argues that Nyssa
moves beyond Origen’s Platonic disjunctive approach between flesh and spirit, beyond a
discontinuity between the senses, and to a “transfiguration” of the bodily senses. 107 The
connection is rather radical: “our very acts of visual perceiving and sensual responses might be
affected by our moral fibre, our spiritual maturity or our depths of scriptural engagement.”108
Spiritual formation is enabled as spiritual senses are inculcated through the transformation of
bodily senses—resulting in physically changed bodily aesthetic comportment. Indeed, while
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Nyssa generally subscribes to the Stoic ideal of apatheia, he shifts the emphasis so that the
passions are worked with and redirected toward some kind of paradoxical “passionate
apatheia.”109 Thus Nyssa writes of the changing of human nature “into something more divine:”
For what could be more incredible than to make human nature itself the purifier of its
own passions, teaching and legislating impassibility by words that are considered to be
tinctured with passion? For he does not say that one must be outside the motions of the
flesh and put to death one’s earthly members and have one’s mouth cleansed of the
language of passion. On the contrary, he has so disposed the soul that she directs her gaze
toward purity by means of instruments that seem inconsistent with it and by means of
impassioned utterances communicates a meaning that is undefiled. (Cant 1, p. 31)
Nyssa does not devalue the body, I argue, but insists on a certain use of the body rooted in how
the body and materiality should aim toward the good and ethical.
Gregory insists on the materiality of human existence. We can only pursue virtue through
our embodied existence, the concrete realities of created space and time—our diastemic
(διάστημα) condition.110 In fact, much scholarship has focused on how the fundamental
distinction for Gregory is between created and uncreated, not between spirit and matter in
Platonic thought; this gives Nyssa a way to value space and time and embodied existence in a
more distinctly Christian way.111 Boersma writes: “anagogy (which is always his ultimate
concern) is only possible because of and through the concrete realities of material existence …
[and] thus for Nyssen embodiment is indispensable for the anagogical pursuit.”112
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In this process of taking the body and creaturely reality seriously in epektatic
transformation, the mirror returns to importance, now not only a figure of the relationship
between the finite and infinite but as also empowering the very transformation of the material. In
De hominis opificio, Nyssa speaks of a set of interconnected mirrors. Similar to his idea of the
soul as mirror, now Nyssa writes that the human mind, as an image of the archetypal beauty,
partakes in beauty just as a mirror “receive[s] the figure of that which it expresses.” We have
already seen this idea of the human interior turning to the good and taking its form, like a mirror
does. But Nyssa now speaks of yet another mirror:
we consider that the nature which is governed by [the mind] is attached to the mind in the
same relation, and that it too is adorned by the beauty that the mind gives, being, so to
say, a mirror of the mirror; and that by it is swayed and sustained the material element of
that existence in which the nature is contemplated. Thus so long as one keeps in touch
with the other, the communication of the true beauty extends proportionally through the
whole series, beautifying by the superior nature that which comes next to it. (De hom
12.9-10. Emphasis mine)
The mind, itself a likeness to the archetypical beauty, functions like an archetype itself to human
nature and materiality. Such a set of “interconnected mirrors,” argues Wessel, worked to bring
“mind in conjunction with nature, and nature in conjunction with matter, thereby imbuing nature
and matter with archetypal residue.”113 For Nyssa, human nature functions only as it is connected
to the Good. He gives an illustration to this point: like a musician playing music as the “body” of
a musical instrument functions properly, the mind can only perform if the body is functioning
according to its nature (De hom 12). Moreover, Gregory argues that the mind makes its thoughts

112

Boersma, Embodiment and Virtue, 6-7. For evidence that Gregory occasionally acknowledges that also material
realities participate in the life of God, see 7-8. But: “we should not so highlight Gregory’s positive appreciation of
embodiment as to lose sight of the profoundly otherworldly cast of his overall theology. … Gregory consistently
aims for anagogical progression in the divine life and that this almost always implies a turn away from the material
toward the spiritual.” Boersma, Embodiment and Virtue, 9.
113

Wessel, “The Reception of Greek Science,” 40-41.

140
and perceptions known to the soul only through the bodily senses and their connection to the
material world (De hom 9). He also illustrates the mind as a city, receiving visitors from the
various senses (De hom 10). Reflecting on Nyssa’s thought here, Wessel concludes: “the mind,
far from being autonomous, in fact depended upon the body for its full expression; and … nature
was a mediating principle between mind and matter which made the unity of the organism a
physical reality.”114 Through this conceptuality of the body as a conduit between the sensory
world and the intelligible mind, “Gregory constructed a model of the intelligible mind and its
relationship to body that was deeply dependent upon the body’s interaction with the world.”115
The conceptuality of the mirror, by connecting materiality to the human mind, allows Gregory to
speak of a transformation that has both spiritual and material dimensions. While Nyssa was
dualistic in some sense, he intimately connected the physical body and the intelligible mind, thus
“resolv[ing] the sort of mind-body dualism found in Platonism and Origen.” Through his
drawing on Galen and Stoic thought (as I explained above), Nyssa was able to construct “a
unified theory of the human person in which the intelligible activity of mind not only interacted
freely with the physical body in its natural state, but depended upon the body functioning
naturally for the complete expression of its divine rationality.”116 In this way the senses
“establish the necessary association” between “the material and the immaterial” as the soul is
“made known through its activity in conjunction with the body.”117
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The body is important in this way for Nyssa because human diastemic nature—as
material and bound to space, time, and measurement—contributes to, and to some extent makes
possible, the life of virtue. This is because virtue for Nyssa has to do with measurement and
timeliness.118 Such a physical transformation of the body toward virtue, though, is not a given.
Stressing the ethical before the ontological, for Nyssa this is dependent upon the choice to set the
mirror of oneself toward that which is beautiful. In the passage just discussed about the chain of
mirrors, Nyssa discusses ugliness, noting it as “an interruption of this beneficent connection”
upon which “is displayed the misshapen character of matter” which, by its “shapelessness”
destroys the beauty supposed to be mirrored in the mind. Nyssa continues: “and so the
transmission of the ugliness of matter reaches through the nature to the mind itself, so that the
image of God is no longer seen” in it. In this case, notes Gregory, the mind has “set the idea of
good like a mirror behind the back” (De hom 12.10). Isolated from nature and thus severed from
the good and beautiful, matter “merely dissipated into formlessness. Through matter’s
connection to nature, and the mirror relationship between nature and mind that remained, this
formlessness was transmitted to mind whose beauty was thereby tarnished.”119 Thus the
connection between matter and the immaterial upon the logic of the mirror betrays an ambiguity
concerning the embrace of the opaque—similar to the ambiguity we have already seen with the
concept of darkness. Gregory is convinced that one must embrace the body in its materiality—
but insofar as one becomes w(e)ary to read opacity rightly toward virtue. At the end of the day,
Nyssa “is nonetheless impatient with the diastemic character of time. Nyssen is an anagogical
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As the body,

like all materiality, exists insofar as it can be understood through the intelligible ideas that
converge on it, the concern regarding the body pertains to its aesthetic-ethical direction. There is
always the possibility the body could become something else and be set on a different trajectory.
In this way for Gregory the body, like all materiality, is fundamentally “ontologically
malleable.”121
A Remaining Challenge: Nyssa on Virtue and Purity
Still set in this ambiguity over darkness and “ugliness” upon the mirror, a contemporary
phenomenological retrieval of Nyssa focused on a phenomenology of whiteness needs to take
account of lingering problems of a symbolizing of darkness of color as a symbol of evil,
including the danger of the body needing to be surpassed in an anagogical aesthetics. As
Boersma argues: “The significance of temporality or historicity fades for Nyssen as he wants us
to ascend to the purity and incorruptibility of the divine life. The upward character of the ascent
of virtue implies that at every point in time one ought to take the opportunity to move yet
higher.”122 Yet, Natalie Carnes’ argument on the importance of fittingness and gratuity in a
Nyssen framework that can embrace “ugliness” presents us with an opportunity to positively
retrieve a Nyssen framework for contemporary aesthetic problems. Most generally her claim is
about how Nyssa’s epectatic framework continually opens one up to see beauty in the here and
now. The notion of fittingness in Nyssa “allows us to invoke multiple levels of context” of
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while that of gratuity retains for beauty a kind of formative rigor

toward greater beauty. Thus: “An object’s fittingness draws the beholder to itself while its
gratuity points her beyond it, to a new object and a new framework in which to understand an
object’s fittingness” which itself will point to a greater beauty.124 As no object fully captures or
exhausts beauty, this Nyssen framework engenders a posture receptive to otherness. Carnes
particularly focuses on how Nyssa frames “ugliness” in a Christological framework, especially
focusing on the humility of Christ and then those humbled and oppressed.125 In this way, the
process of aesthetic formation for Nyssa hinges on an embrace of ugliness, not only in the
contradiction of God’s glory veiled in the humility of human flesh but in the identity of the
humble Christ with humbled and afflicted humanity.
Still, we cannot look past how Nyssa uses mirror imagery to discuss the need for a
cleaning or purifying of the mirror, and a certain trajectory this will set us on past Cusa and into
modern thought. In discussing the journey of virtue, Nyssa writes in his Homilies of the need for
the bride to gaze directly into the bridegroom’s face (in light of the mirroring aspect of vision),
and also of the need to “purify the surface of its mirror” (Cant 15, p. 467).126 Granted that a
mirror “is put together with skill and in conformity with its function,” Nyssa writes,
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it displays in itself on its clear surface the exact imprint of the face it reflects. In just this
way, the soul, when she has put herself together in a way suited to her function and cast
off every material defilement, has graven into herself the pure look of the inviolate
beauty. (Cant 15, p. 467)
Nyssa then refers to this purified mirror as the “life-endued and choice-endowed mirror” that can
focus entirely on the beauty of the form it sees in Christ and rid itself of “human and material
passions” such as pleasure, anger, fear, envy, and love of money.
In another key passage in his Homilies, Nyssa discusses how the “eye” or leadership of
the church “must wash away all the teary haze of vice with water, if he is to supervise, oversee,
and inspect in purity.” This water is the purifying wells of virtue: Nyssa names temperance,
humility, truth, justice, courage, desire for the good and alienation from evil (Cant 13, p. 417).
This idea of cleansing of the eyes from haziness, darkness or obstruction is not unique to
Gregory. Clement had similarly described sanctification in terms of washing one’s eyes,
discussing “the physical act of baptism as a corresponding spiritual surgery for the eye of the
soul”—specifically the uncommon and risky surgery of cataract removal.127 But Gregory
uniquely discusses such purifying not merely in terms of the eyes themselves, but in the broader
conceptuality of the mirror, keeping the mirror symbolism as central. This is especially
interesting in that here the mirror shows a negative aspect. Gregory discusses this purification of
eyesight in terms of a washing with milk because of the specific (non)mirroring qualities of milk:
For it is truly observed of milk that of all fluids it alone has the property that in it no
image or likeness appears. Things that are naturally liquid, as we know, behave like
mirrors in that, because of their smooth surfaces, they cause the likeness of those who
look into them to be reflected back; only milk has no such capacity for imaging. Hence
the highest praise of the church’s eyes is this: that they do not mistakenly image anything
unreal and counterfeit and empty that is contrary to what truly is but look upon what is in
the full and proper sense of that word. They do not take in the deceitful sights and
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fantasies of the present life. For this reason, the perfect soul judges that it is the bath in
milk that most surely purifies the eyes. (Cant 13, p. 417-419)
The emphasis here is specifically the danger of the mirror reflecting one’s image back to oneself.
Upon the mirror, the symbolism of darkness has been transformed into the idea of haziness or
obstruction of vision, which is connected to the uneasiness with the mirror in its merely selfreflective possibilities. What I mean is that Nyssa discusses the need to cleanse oneself from
various vices lest “the beam of self-conceit, falling upon the pure pupil of the eye, become[s] an
obstacle to sight” (Cant 13, p. 419). The end result of this cleansing is that “the eye may become
beautiful” when it is “not confusedly forming images of the unreal for itself.” A similar passage
sheds further light on this theme: Nyssa discusses the Church as a “clear mirror” showing the
Sun of Righteousness. Here, he notes that the “soul’s work of seeing is twofold” where what is at
stake is “pure eyes” as opposed to “perverse eyes”: “there are people who, by making wrong use
of different eyes, have a clear vision of what is not real and divide the One into many natures
because of the fantasies conjured by their perverse eyes.” These people “waste their time with
images of things that have no reality” (Cant 8, p. 271-273).
Ultimately Nyssa’s notion of “clear sight” or one-eyed vision as opposed to many-eyed
vision stresses not primarily an ontological danger of the mirror, but that one might use the
mirror to solidify an ontological world of one’s own making. The mirror can radically transform
the body and advance it toward that which it is directed, and so the admonition to turn it to the
good and not towards evil. On this point, through the notion of “vain” and “empty” images,
Nyssa speaks on the level of the idol. Nyssa discusses the effect of looking at idols: how “the
changeable nature of human beings had been altered to conform to that of unchangeable idols”
and thus has become “frozen stiff by the chill of idolatry.” Nyssa writes: “For just as those who
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look upon the true Godhead take to themselves the characteristics of the divine nature, so too the
person who is devoted to the vanity of idols is transformed into the stone he looks upon and
becomes other than human” (Cant 5, p. 147). The purity at stake in the mirror is a purity of the
intentionality of the subject and the use of finitude (and not necessarily a matter of ontological
aspects drawn from the mirror). The mirror, for Nyssa, is a pedagogical tool teaching one how to
properly relate oneself in one’s materiality to the infinite and move toward it. This question of
ontology and idols brings us to the heart of theological vision. Like the epektatic journey, the
icon is concerned with the transformative potential of human sight toward the divine in the
tension between the sensible material and the transcendent intelligible. We will have to establish
here how to discuss the icon, how important the mirror is to it, and whether we can go a different
direction. A determined effort to discuss “reverse perspective” helps to get us there.
A Contemporary Framework for Retrieval
In the overall scope of my argument, I present Nyssa’s framework on vision within
mystical darkness as an alternative account to white sight and one that, when retrieved in certain
aspects, can provide a corrective—though a problematic symbolism of darkness remains. A
shaping force for this effort is Carter’s claim about retrieving opacity within the horizon of the
icon for ultimately re-thinking race. Clarifying this allows us to retrieve the hermeneutically
productive enigmatic opacity at stake in divine darkness without the moral symbolism. In
considering the icon, we are considering Nyssa’s fundamental distinction between created and
uncreated and how the mirror links the one to the other. But I want to begin to critique the mirror
here. Problematizing the way human plasticity and malleability is thought upon the figure and
logic of the mirror, I want to explore how the icon can be first materiality-textuality before
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having to do with the mirror.
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This brings us to what is hermeneutically at stake in “reverse

perspective.” It also brings us to the question of what type of ethics might be at stake here.
Carter: Thinking with Nyssa on Opacity and an Iconic Framework
Carter brings Nyssa’s work on darkness toward a contemporary trajectory regarding race,
discussing opacity in its connection to race within a generally Nyssen framework that focuses on
the icon. We have seen with Marion, in the previous chapter, what is at stake in the icon as
opposed to the idol. The concern regarding just how to apprehend the divine in visibility is
Carter’s concern as well when it comes to the icon. Carter’s discussion of the significance of
opacity as discussed in an iconic framework is first set in the context of a certain disagreement
between Charles Long’s historical dialecticism and Albert Raboteau’s “iconic” reading of
history. Carter argues that Raboteau’s iconic reading allows for a “theological engagement with
history.”129 Ultimately, the significance Carter makes in thinking of opacity as connected to
blackness in this way is as follows: “Black existence and black faith relate to the eternal Logos
as an icon relates to that which it represents. In this way, the invisible becomes visible even as it
retains its invisible depth, a depth rooted in a freedom (for God the Creator), which cannot be
policed and thus enslaved.”130 Opacity, understood in this way as iconic, speaks of a blackness
that is free, that is a blackness that understands itself on its own terms and thus as it is open,

This will continue into the next chapter with Cusa’s work. Thinking epektasis in the framework of a
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productively, toward otherness (as a consequence of not being bound to a prior dialectic of
otherizing). On a larger scale, such opacity speaks of a relation of mutual freedom between
materiality (or finitude) and transcendence (or infinitude). Highlighting the conceptuality of the
mirror, Carter argues that what is at stake here is not a kind of dualistic representational
“mirroring” of “Greek ocularity” that would be susceptible to various critiques of metaphysics.
Carter writes:
For though the icon or image … as a phenomenon of creation is to be rigorously
distinguished from what it ‘represents,’ the icon’s representing capacity is not reducible
to that of a passive or inert mirror. Understanding the representational capacity of the
image in this way is precisely what gives rise to the need to theorize the correspondence
between type and archetype, between mirror and what is mirrored.131
This point about how representation occurs in an iconic logic in contradistinction with Greek
“ocular metaphysics” will be key to our own inquiry regarding how opacity is dealt with from
pre-modern to modern perspective.
Carter’s main point about opacity in an iconic framework is that opacity in an icon (and,
Carter argues, thus in Being itself) is in a dialectic with translucency. An icon, Carter writes,
is translucent insofar as the historically and existentially constituted image of God or
created Being is a reflection of divinity, albeit on the surface of creation. In this sense, to
be a creature is to be sheer impressio and pure emphasis. It is to have one’s existence
stamped somewhat like the imprint of a seal on a coin, to have one’s face or expression
(phasis) imprinted into Being or drawn into the enduring effect of existing rather than not
existing at all. In short, it is to be created, to be brought into the realization of creaturely
and therefore contingent identity.132
And yet this being impressed by Being, this passive creation by impressio, is in tension with the
creature’s expressio, that is, the creature’s “‘active’ and free participation in bringing itself to
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appearance or visibility.” Carter writes: “As expression, image consciously and intentionally
offers itself and in offering or presenting its face it discloses that face as the very surface of the
Infinite.”133 Infinite Being itself is dynamic, not static, thus allowing the iconic connection or
mediation with creaturely existence.134
Opacity in this iconic framework, then, means “a transcending of the self precisely in
being oneself.”135 In this way, opacity is the being-free-to-infinite-openness-in-one’s-own-selfsame-being, so that creaturely existence can never be bound or captured within merely finite
logics (though they may masquerade as infinite logics). Thus, to Carter’s main point:
creatures present themselves or are visible in such a way that their visibility cannot be
captured or enslaved without a massive and violent distortion of their existence as
creatures. In this respect, one might say that creaturely existence is opaque … But their
opacity and, hence, their visibility as creatures, it must quickly be said, is of a particular
sort: What it means ‘to be’ is to be visible but precisely as the visible icon of the invisible.
Creaturely opacity must be understood within the horizon of the icon. That is, creatures in
the particular forms in which they appear are opaque (there is something that is
uncapturable about creatures without distortion of what it means to be a creature.). But
their opacity is the opacity of the icon, whose opacity and translucency are not in binary
relationship (as is the beautiful to the grotesque, or the rational to the irrational, or the
civil is to the savage in Western metaphysics). To say the one—the opaque—is already to
have said the other—the translucent. Black existence in bearing witness to the form of
Christ displays just this theologically iconic nature of creation.136
By defining opacity theologically within the framework of the icon, Carter positively
connects opacity to blackness by claiming that creaturely density must be considered
theologically in tension with its infinite openness. This gives Carter a framework to discuss how
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blackness can understand itself as part of a logic of flesh that, caught up in the freedom of
transcendence, can escape cycles of violence to the flesh. In thinking about opacity and race with
Nyssa in this way, Carter pushes our phenomenology of whiteness to consider how a
phenomenology of the icon might allow us to think more carefully about the opaque tension
between finitude and infinitude.
The Challenge: slave-humanity and the plasticity of pure potentiality
Zakiyyah Jackson connects the idea of human plasticity to the problem of racialized
black flesh as pure plasticity. In pushing back against the issue of human plasticity in the frame
of an anagogical aesthetics, I begin to highlight the condition for the possibility of the racial
pathologization of opacity. Jackson focuses on how enslaved black flesh represents a limit-point
for human transformation, in fact how, in the economy of the Trans-Atlantic slavocracy, the
making-a-slave is not a denial of a slave’s humanity but goes beyond this to actually “producing
a [new] kind of human.”137 Jackson argues that “black(ened) humanity is understood,
paradigmatically, as a state of abject human animality.”138 This happened through “coerced
formlessness as a mode of domination and the Unheimlich existence that is its result.”139 This,
Jackson argues, was an experiment in a newly constructed infinity: the “transmogrification of
human form and personality, as an experiment in plasticity and its limits therein” made it such
that black slaves in their humanity “could function as infinitely malleable lexical and biological
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Two points are important to mention here. First, that this

plasticization hinged on “the site of reproduction” and thus on the black woman as figuremateriality upon which the slavocracy and new economy was formed.141 Second, the ultimate
concern of this pure plasticization of black flesh was to forge the distinction-in-relation between
human and animal. Jackson argues that “blackness is the mode of ontological plasticity that
stabilizes and gives form to ‘human’ and ‘animal’ as terms.”142 In this biopolitical arrangement,
through an “inclusion that nevertheless masks itself as exclusion” black people are “selectively
incorporated into the liberal humanist project.” In this arrangement, “animalization and
humanization of the slave’s personhood are not mutually exclusive but mutually constitutive.”143
In this way, black flesh as pure plasticity was the mirror which normed a “new” epektatic
frame for modernity. Upon the creatureliness and materiality of black flesh was stretched a
newly constructed infinity that would stretch black flesh not towards the divine infinite but
internally toward its own (ever-deepening, self-surpassing) limits, as a kind of negative freedom.
Black(ened) flesh, “enslaved humanity,” is a rendering of human beings as a plasticity that
questions the whole mode of human transformation toward the good and infinite—potentiality
“gone wrong,” humans rendered as pure potentiality: “In this act of transmogrification … the
black(ened) body and mind are twisted and contorted in a manner indifferent to structures of
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form, their integrity, and their limits.”

A certain “imagination of matter” (thinking back to

Long) is at play here: a newly racialized conception of form and space takes hold of newly
crafted artificial infinity, and this imagination is played out upon the black body.145
Despite the challenge Jackson brings to centering a notion like human plasticity in the
face of an iconic aesthetics, she opens this very route in another direction. Even in this
plasticization, blackness/matter/woman figures as “a central and ever present unsettling excess
that nevertheless eludes representation.”146 Black, female flesh destabilizes the new project of
infinity and its order; black matter “holds the potential to transform [and rewrite] the conditions
of possibility of the empirical.”147 Jackson illustrates this, following a literary analysis of Toni
Morrison’s Beloved, by focusing on how the “animal perspective” of Mister (the rooster)
suspends or disengages the question of plasticity and its historical function. The poignant episode
comes when the protagonist of the story, Paul D, “discovers” his abject human animality (notice
he has a bit in his mouth) as caught in the rooster’s gaze:
He recounts, “[I]t wasn’t the bit— that wasn’t it. . . . The roosters. . . . Walking past the
roosters looking at them look at me. . . . Must have been five of them perched up there,
and at least fifty hens” (Beloved 85). It is seeing himself being seen in the gaze of a
rooster named Mister. Reflected in Mister’s eyes, he sees for the first time the extent to
which his being has been distorted by slavery. He is ashamed that Mister is witness to all
of it.148
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We will come to see how this seeing being seen is precisely what is at stake in the iconic gaze.
Through this opaque, animal perspective, before it is caught up in the ontological apparatus of
the western project of modern perspective, there is a fissure or critical opening for a new way of
seeing things and shaping human (and animal) subjectivity.149 So Jackson notes that the iconic
perspective gaze, in its opacity, is able to reveal and critique problems with the plasticization of
black flesh. It is in being caught in the gaze of the genuine other that a critical view is opened.
An Icon’s Depth and Perspective that it gives: Reverse Perspective
In critically interrogating how the plasticity and malleability of created being can “go
wrong” upon black flesh in this way, I question whether we have to move beyond the createduncreated dialectic of the icon to a more factical or historical angle focused on the question of
the trouble with filiation, that is, how the body is included in spiritual transformation. This
factical angle puts the question of configuring human plasticity within the frame of the iconenigma on a social and historical (hermeneutical) plane. If the icon becomes the conceptual
figure which allows us to see into the darkness of the infinite from our finite position, and if we
take Nyssa seriously about the fundamental place the body has in this, we must explore how an
iconic or epektatic vision can be crafted as a textual-material event, thus pausing the typical
claim to a transcendent vision granted by the icon. Ouspensky writes that icons “impinge on our
consciousness by means of the outer senses, presenting to us the same supra-sensible reality in
‘aesthetic’ expression” the intelligible element of divine truth.150 I am, however, trying to
reframe the icon, emphasizing it as a textual-material event, not merely a transcendent or eidetic
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event. This exploration ultimately tries to open up the icon in the direction of how it might be a
challenge to white sight, ultimately how the “synthetic vision” and thus reverse perspective at
play might engender the development of a “new habit of seeing”—as long as, again, we take this
in a different direction than a transcendental, eidetic vision.151 This approach focuses less on
viewpoint and the radical autonomous foundations of the subject who sees; it focuses on the
multiplicity of sight in community and on the formation of sight amidst the subject’s sociality.
As discussed in the previous chapter, reverse perspective is “a defining feature of the
icon.” Here I want to work toward what is at stake in this reverse perspective, its hermeneuticaltextual eventness. At its core, reverse or iconic perspective is about the turning back of or
challenging of subjective seeing. Theologically, Antonova argues that reverse perspective is
fundamentally “informed by a timeless conception of God’s eternity.” As God transcends space
and time, divine vision is “simultaneous and thus ‘view-pointless’, i.e., things are not seen from a
certain point of view but, potentially, from all possible viewpoints at once.”152 Thus an icon
attempts to grasp and illustrate what something appears like to the divine vision, or to give us an
experience of that vision. The construction of this vision or view-lessness of the icon decenters
the viewer and knower as it challenges the particularity of human sight, which is partial. Another
theological level furthers this decentering: the how of the icon’s method of representing is
fundamentally an illustration of the “abasement” of the kenotic descent of the Son.153 Moreover,
in the depiction of the abased God—the invisible made visible—the image itself is hypostatically
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connected to the Person of Jesus Christ, though different in nature and essence.
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So there are a

number of levels of decentering of sight that contrasts with what is at stake in other ways of
seeing and perceiving.
Particularly, an iconic perspective resists the kind of perspective put forth in linear
models of seeing. Since the icon gives “an image not the prototype” on the surface of the panel,
iconic perspective is not about the illusion of “space or volume” though there is both space and
depth in the icon.155 Ouspensky writes:
It expresses three dimensions, but these three dimensions never violate the plane of the
panel. Any violation of this plane, however partial, damages the meaning of the icon. …
Inverse perspective does not draw in the eye of the spectator; on the contrary it holds it
back, precluding the possibility of its penetrating and entering into the image in depth;
and it concentrates the attention on the image itself.156
As such, the icon does not lead us to the “invented, fantastic world” of idealization with its
illusionistic space and depth (at stake in linear perspective). Ouspensky asserts that such
idealization “introduces a subjective, limiting element and so inevitably mutilates, or distorts
truth to a greater or less extent. … This is quite intelligible for, from himself, a man can give an
account only about himself.”157 Instead of giving an idealized space, the icon gives a “synthetic
visibility,” as “the simultaneous representation of different planes of the same image on the
picture surface, regardless of whether the corresponding planes in the represented objects could
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be seen from a single viewpoint.”
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Here, even though a unified image is given, it shows how it

is constructed from a number of disparate points, decentering monocularity.
Of course, even as I try to peel back the layers of idealization, in traditional
understandings of the icon, there still remains a tension. On the one hand, the icon is meant to be
a likeness of “deified prototype,” and image of “flesh transfigured, radiant with Divine light”
which gives a beauty and glory contrary to “corruptible human flesh.” The icon, as such,
“testifies to the immutability and fullness” of the Incarnation and testifies to the catching up of
nature into God’s grace as art is caught up in Truth.159 The icon shows transfigured flesh, a
glorified face, and spiritualization of senses (through, for example, showing a small nose and
large eyes).160 The icon then calls forth an experience of transcendent vision. On the other hand,
there is a radical materiality at stake in the icon. Though firstly about spiritual life and not
artistry, still there is a detailed technique in iconography that involves radically mundane
materials and processes (such as egg tempera and creation of pigments through earth materials).
Icons are also concerned holistically with “vegetable, mineral and animal worlds.”161 Thus, while
it is difficult to circumvent the ontological schema, we must press on to return the power of the
enigmatic icon and an anagogic aesthetics in the vein of Nyssa back to its textual-linguistic roots.
Ethics that the Icon gives: reception of otherness
The icon can move us away from ontology, its opacity—as an expression of the openness
to otherness through the double intentionality of the textual-material enigma—putting us within
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the realm of ethics in terms of the use of the material and the body. Carnes’ dialectic of
fittingness and gratuity presents one way in which creaturely rigor can orient us in the face of the
vastness of being. The key is that such rigor of materiality is not reified and made an impediment
to sight. In fact, Carnes herself emphasizes that the rigor of materiality is the face of the poor and
thus gives an ethical shape to life in this way: “In tending to the poor who bear Christ, those who
give imitate the God who loves the poor.” The poor, according to Nyssa, are seen in beholding
Christ, for they bear his face.162 Carnes writes:
The holiness and horror of the afflicted mingle with the holiness and horror of the
Incarnation and Crucifixion. The rest of humanity is taken up in this horror and holiness
through the afflicted with whom they share humanity and the poverty of humanity, and
also through Christ who shared humanity with all humans and his face with the
afflicted.163
This understanding of ugliness, darkness, or opacity, in which the mirror of God’s face gives the
face of the poor, can open up an aesthetics and theological vision which seeks to be attuned to
the ethical reception of “darkness” or otherness, including that of the humble body. Carnes
writes, in reflecting on Nyssa’s thought: “Perceiving the beauty of Christ requires right attention
to the ugliness of affliction.”164 This presents an opportunity to re-examine moral interpretations
of darkness, to reexamine how the body can be transformed as it is oriented toward ignorance
and darkness, the rough and unseemly.
It is ultimately Nyssa’s theological context in which we can situate epektasis upon the
path of a hopeful opacity, toward an ethics moored deeply in just relationships (both human and
divine). Gregory’s argument is that the very limitlessness of human freedom itself limits human
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freedom through the ethical test-case of human ownership over another human. In fact, one of
the reasons Carter himself draws on Nyssa is for Nyssa’s abolitionist thought, that is, his
emphasis on the freeness and uncaptureability, of each human being.165 Ramelli explains how
Gregory pairs the epektatic pursuit of beauty with the quality of human freedom, which is most
central to human being.166 Although the life of virtue by its very nature admits of no master and
is voluntary and free from every necessity or coercion, virtue must be pursued within the context
of creaturely finiteness. The openness of virtue is limited by the limitless freedom of each human
being: thus, humans cannot enslave another human because of each human is absolutely free.167
Nyssa’s argument against slavery ultimately concerns how the divine economy gives shape to
human economy: it is grounded “in human freedom as an image of God’s freedom, and in the
equality of all humans as an image of the equality of the Persons of the Trinity.”168 In an
epektatic framework, there is also a focus on the hereness and nowness of the infinite, in other
words an eschatological hereness. Reflecting on this, Carnes writes, “Seeing the eschatological
setting of the present life means not just that one inhabits one’s role lightly, but that one inhabits
it differently.”169 This life of justice for Gregory has to do with the ability to respond to the
humility of finitude and the body, to grant the importance of the body, not simply surpass it. But
this is not a turning inward to materiality in such a way that closes particularity into itself, but a
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radical embrace of materiality and finitude in its integrity—that is, in its unique potential to
present a passageway to the infinite. Nyssa ultimately presents us an opportunity to consider an
“aesthetics of opacity” which opens up into an “aesthetics of reception” toward otherness.
What is ultimately at stake here is tracing out the face of God in the face of the poor.
Nyssa passionately writes that one should “not allow your neighbour to be taken care of by
someone else; may no one else take hold of the treasure that is prepared for you! Enfold the
unfortunate as though he were gold.”170 Thus, epektasis receives its ethical vector out of that
which is symbolized in the ugly Christ. For Nyssa “Christ is always the object of our vision”
who “fulfills the desire to see God face to face” and yet leaves a never-ending depth and
epektatic progression in the visio dei.171 In this vision is both desire and despair at the same time.
But this kind of “lover’s wound” is what gives shape and trajectory to human flourishing that
hollows itself out by an endless well of insatiable desire for the good of oneself and of others. 172
When one’s body is used properly for other bodies, the pedagogy of the symbol—a training in
proper mirror-setting and -looking—has been engaged. This equips one to resist the temptation
to turn the mirror back upon oneself in the “beam of self-conceit,” which represents the birth of
an ontology that seeks to fundamentally grasp what it sees.

Our exploration of Nyssa, in light of our phenomenology of whiteness, yields a key challenge.
We see in Nyssa the moral symbolization of darkness within a symbolism of evil which becomes
the symbolic substructure making possible early modern logics of race. As I will argue, setting
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up the apparatus of the symbolization of darkness in this way is seized upon in early modernity,
especially with Nicholas of Cusa thinking out these matters in a perspectival framework. The
racialization of opacity occurs in modern perspective when both the “darkness” or density of
one’s creatureliness and the “darkness” or alterity of the unknown horizon are rejected and
conquered; mystical vision and perception, which claimed a sight of the transcendent within a
creaturely particularity dispossessed by the infinite, is now repositioned as “white sight,” where a
certain cultural (cum racial) particularity is codified as the access point to transcendent vision.
And even that transcendent vision is no longer “participated in” in a dispossessive manner, but
grasped and possessed (seen paradigmatically in the “new humanity” arising upon the
transmogrification of black flesh). In the next chapter, we will see the logic of the mirror come to
a place of final bankruptcy with Cusa and the rise of modern perspective. Thus we will have to
suspend thinking out the logic of opacity upon the logic of the mirror just because the enigma
was discovered there: in so doing, we return the enigma back to its social and linguistic roots.
Once we make this critique, Nyssa’s notion of epektasis will represent for us a horizon of
hope, a way of thinking that insists that our bodies are inextricably bound up in any ideal or
spiritual transformation toward the infinite—and hold within their nature radical possibilities for
transformation toward the good. Returning to the root of the symbol, to the way in which the
enigma is first a material, linguistic, and social dynamic put to use for the sake of human
community, returns us toward how the symbol is implicated in “an economy of desire.” Struck
explains: “The symbol itself, precisely in its being a symbol, generates a passion, an inquiry, an
investigation, and an examination, or, to employ a term that embraces both lack and desire, the
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CHAPTER THREE
NICHOLAS OF CUSA, LINEAR PERSPECTIVE, AND THE RISE OF THE
TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT
Having examined how in Gregory of Nyssa perspective is forged upon the notion of
mystical darkness as it is tied the transformation of bodily perceptive senses through epektasis,
here I want to explore how in Nicholas of Cusa, a 15th century German theologian, mystical
darkness is approached within a framework of a “new perspective” rooted in an all-seeing gaze.
This is a key point in our study: we consider the rise of perspectiva artificialis or Renaissance
linear perspective, crucial to understanding the dawn of white sight, and examine how Cusa
reflects theologically upon perspective in a way that marks the very threshold of our modern age.
I will not adjudicate whether Cusa is the last medieval or first modern, as other scholars debate;
although I am sympathetic to Karsten Harries claim that he “straddles the threshold” of
modernity.1 Indeed, tying Cusa too closely to modern thinking (especially Descartes and Kant)
may have less to do with Cusa himself and more to do with his rediscovery by early twentiethcentury Neo-Kantians at Marburg and Heidelberg who were interested in concerns of the
“mathematization of nature” (incidentally, among the same networks to which Husserl
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belonged). This being said, I argue that Cusa does provide important insight into modernity
through his thinking on perspective. I especially find Harries convincing, who writes that “the
history of art, especially the history of the theory of perspective, provides helpful hints”
regarding how “the destruction of the medieval cosmos follows from a changed selfunderstanding, bound up with a new sense of freedom … [and a] passionate interest in
perspective and point of view. … That interest in perspective is in turn bound up with theological
speculations centering on the infinity of God.”3 Perspective, as I have already argued, is not a
mere art technique, but a whole theory of seeing—and now, in a new way that shapes a new age.
Heidegger makes the effect of this new perspective, in fact, decisive: “The fundamental
event of modernity is the conquest of the world as picture …. Within this, man fights for the
position in which he can be that being who gives to every being the measure and draws up the
guidelines.”4 Yet Cusa, as a threshold figure, will help give us a more nuanced understanding of
what is at stake in modern perspective. I challenge the modernist interpretation of Cusa—and yet
still seek to explore his relation to the trajectory of modern thought toward Kant—through
focusing on how Cusa articulates the apparatuses of modern perspective upon its theological
foundation. Forging perspective upon the theological discourse of the “darkness” of the infinite
divine, Cusa lays open the apparatus of modern perspective in a way where it shows itself—
shows its fissures and allows for critique. Particularly, Cusa will lay open the apparatus of
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perspective in its symbolic potency toward racialized anthropogenesis. In this way—again
Harries—Cusa is “a thinker who can help us to open windows in the house modernity has built,
windows to transcendence.”5 I am more interested, however, in how Cusa co-opts and captures
finitude in the logic of transcendence to re-present it as masked in a purported infinite.
I focus on Cusa’s On the Vision of God (De visione Dei), in which a picture or icon of an
all-seeing face is central to what is at stake in Cusa’s perspectivism, an omnivoyant that
engenders an experience in which Cusa, reflecting on God’s gaze, confesses “because you [God]
regard me, I am.”6 Particularly, I am interested in how—played out upon the notion of the
mirror, darkness, enigma, and cloud—the crossing of gazes re-orients the notions of form and
space through the discourse of a “color code” within perspective; better, for Cusa, a “color
space” (thinking with Jeffrey Hamburger), which gives rise to a nascent racialized color
symbolism. To this end, I focus on the development of modern perspective, wrestling with the
relation between Cusa’s perspectivism and Renaissance linear perspective. From there, I offer an
archeology of the subject that explores the phenomenological nature of aesthetic experience
marking the turn to our own modern age. In Cusan perspective we see a laying bare of the
conceptuality that makes possible the birth of the modern, transcendental subject. More
specifically, we see how through the rise of linear perspective, darkness comes to represent a
negation of otherness or opacity at the center of modern subjectivity. Modern perspective, this
chapter argues, is articulated within and upon—though ultimately negates—the notion of
mystical darkness, along with its themes of the mirror and enigma. Of particular interest,
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phenomenologically and hermeneutically, is a disagreement between Jean-Luc Marion and
Emmanuel Falque over the nature of perspective, specifically as it pertains to whether Cusa
describes an icon (Marion) or a Renaissance picture (Falque). The question is how this Cusan
confession of seeing oneself seen speaks of both genuine subjectivity and genuine sight of the
other, whether it is about the immediacy of vision or the hermeneutical detour of vision. I show,
however, that there need not be a sharp divide here, as a hidden relation is at play. This chapter
allows for us to trace out how “darkness” theologically transforms with the emergence of modern
perspective, through which is engendered an entirely new—eventually racialized—way of
seeing, perceiving, and being as the colonial era unfolds.
Cusan Perspective as Situated within Mystical Darkness
Central to my analysis is a key point of Cusa’s thought: how, in Harries’ words,
perspective “is used to undermine the traditional idea of a center” and (potentially) deconstruct
hierarchies.7 While we have to examine the relation between Cusan and linear perspectives to see
the extent to which this is truly the case, I first make clear how Cusa founds his perspectivism
upon the notion of mystical darkness, mirror, and enigma, even while ultimately hiding—and
negating through exclusive inclusion—such darkness within perspective’s apparatuses.
The All-Seeing image as Similitude and Enigma
An examination of De visione Dei, and specifically the “darkness of God,” brings us to
“the focal point of Cusanus’ speculation.”8 Cusa writes this text in 1453 to the Tegernsee monks
to show “the facility of mystical theology” and so to help them uncover mystical wonders
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“which are revealed beyond all sensible, rational, and intellectual sight.” Cusa writes that “by
means of a very simple and commonplace method” he will “attempt to lead [them] experientially
into the most sacred darkness (in sacratissimam obscuritatem)” (DVD Preface §1, p. 235.
Emphasis mine). He explains to them: “to transport you to divine things by human means, I must
use some kind of similitude”—the most suitable being, in his estimation, an omnivoyant image
(one of which he sends to them with the letter) where “[t]hrough the painter’s subtle art its face is
made to appear as if looking on all around it” (DVD Preface §2, p. 235). To enter this mystical
darkness, Cusanus suggests a dramatic thought-exercise: the monks should hang on the wall this
all-seeing picture or icon he has provided. Cusa tells the monks that each should move around
the image separately in various directions (say, from East to West). Through this experiment, the
monks each experience a gaze that is simultaneously unchanged and changeable as “the
immobile face … is moved toward a single place in such a way that it is also moved
simultaneously toward all places, and that it beholds a single movement in such a way that it
beholds all movements simultaneously.” Each experiences what seems to be the face regarding
them alone, giving them some kind of identity, in whatever place they look at it. They discern this
as they hear each other’s testimony while crossing paths in their semicircular ambulation around
the image. This, Cusa writes, will lead them to “marvel” because the “imagination will not be
able to grasp” the simultaneous fixing and moving: each monk will come to believe his fellow
monk, “but unless he believed him, he would not imagine this to be possible” (DVD Preface §3,
p. 236). As Cusa would have it, at one and the same time the monks learn of the uniqueness of
their perspective, of their perspective’s relativity in the face of other perspectives, and of its
transcendence as they grasp the absolute power of sight. As I will trace out, the omnivoyant
image, bearing a logic of coincidentia oppositorum (the “coincidence of opposites”), thus
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facilitates an impossibility which catalyzes an experience of God’s absolute vision, a
transcendental vision which is the essence of God’s love, providence, grace, and creative power.
At the core of this experiment in Cusan perspectivism is a reliance on the all-seeing face
as similitude to contemplate infinity and absolute vision as if “in a mirror, in an icon, in an
enigma” (DVD 4 §10, p. 240). The image becomes the face of God as, observing it “with the
eyes of sense,” Cusa “attempt[s] with inward eyes to behold the truth that is designated in the
picture” (DVD 10 §38, p. 252). The key here is the ability to behold God’s face in the painted
figure through one’s spiritual vision:
But I see the invisible truth of your face, represented in this contracted shadow here, not
with the eyes of flesh, which examine this icon of you, but with the eyes of the mind and
the intellect. Your true face is absolute from every contraction. It has neither quality nor
quantity, nor is it of time or place, for it is the absolute form, which is the face of faces.
(DVD 6 §17, p. 243)
In a coincidence of opposites, God’s exemplary face (or “face of faces”) that precedes every face
and form, and is beyond all particularity, measurement, or comparison, is yet seen in this
particular image before the monks. In fact, Cusa writes, “In all faces the face of faces is seen
veiled and in enigma” (DVD 6 §20-21, p. 244). Because God’s absolute face is “the exemplar
and truth of all faces,” Cusa confesses: “Every face, therefore, which can behold your face sees
nothing that is other or different from itself, because it sees there its own truth” (DVD 6 §18 p.
243). The implications of this are immense in terms of how perspective leads to subjectivity.
But decisive is just how this path is forged. Cusa argues that God’s face is not seen
unveiled so long as one does not “leap beyond every knowledge and concept” to enter into the
“cloud, mist, darkness, or ignorance,” into “a certain secret and hidden silence beyond all faces
where there is no knowledge or concept of a face.” Without this leap beyond all forms and
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figures (and, yes, “colors,” the colors here of the painted face), God’s face remains only veiled
9

in visible faces; thus one seeking mystical ascent “must leap beyond every visible light” to
enter into that which lacks visible light and thus is darkness to the eye. And while one is
in that darkness, which is a cloud, if one then knows one is in a cloud, one knows one has
come near the face of the sun. For that cloud in one’s eye originates from the exceeding
brightness of the light of the sun. The denser, therefore, one knows the cloud to be the
more one truly attains the invisible light in the cloud. I see, O Lord, that it is only in this
way that the inaccessible light, the beauty, and the splendor of your face can be
approached without veil. (DVD 6 §21, p. 244-245)
Issuing forth from this clouded place where—paradoxically—the denser the cloud the more there
is of unveiling, comes a certain clarity: Cusa’s testimony of seeing oneself seen, his confession to
and of God, “because you regard me, I am, and if you remove your face from me, I will cease to
be” (DVD 4 §10, p. 240. Emphasis mine). While the mirror, by virtue of its enigmatic quality,
should turn back or redirect vision, in Cusa’s mirror of mystical darkness, in this seeing being
seen, the self achieves a certain clarity of vision. In the mirror of this mystical darkness,
awakening to God’s gaze, one gains the vision of God and “sees all things openly and nothing
remains hidden to this person” (DVD 7 §25, p. 246).
Docta Ignorantia and the coincidence of opposites
This experience reflects the broader Cusan notion of docta ignorantia or “learned
ignorance,” a new mode of thought that reflects Cusa’s claim of the absolute disproportionality
between the finite and the infinite, the human and God.10 In De visione Dei, reflecting on
approaching the infinite God, Cusa writes:

Despite David Albertson, “Before the Icon: the Figural Matrix of De visione Dei,” in Nicholas of Cusa and Times
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Duclow (Boston: Brill, 2018), 284.
9
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Does not whoever ascends above the end enter into what is indeterminate and confused
and thus, with respect to the intellect, into ignorance and obscurity, which belong to
intellectual confusion? The intellect, therefore, must become ignorant and established in
darkness if it wishes to see you. But what, my God, is intellect in ignorance if not learned
ignorance? (DVD 13 §52, p. 258)
To attain learned ignorance is to attain completely the “desire to know that we do not know.”
This is because, for Cusa, all human knowledge and inquiry “consists in a comparative
proportion” but “[b]ecause the infinite escapes all proportion, the infinite as infinite is
unknown.”11 At the same time, God, as the “absolute maximum,” is marked essentially by a
oneness that includes within all opposites (where maximum and minimum coincide in
coincidentia oppositorum). In making such claims that God is “above all affirmation and
negation” and “above all oppositions” (DI 1.4 §12, p. 92), Cusa claims to be rooting his doctrine
of learned ignorance in a faithful interpretation of Dionysius. 12 “[T]he absolutely maximum,”
Cusa writes, “transcends all our understanding, which is unable by the path of reason to combine
contradictories in their source, for we proceed by means of the things made evident to us by
nature, and reason, falling far short of this infinite power, cannot join together contradictories,
which are infinitely distant” (DI 1.4 §12, p. 92). God here is like an infinite sphere which has its
center everywhere and circumference nowhere such that center and circumference coincide.13 As
such, God is equally immanent in all parts of the universe. This means something for our own
pursuit of knowledge—not just of God but of the world as well, as Cusa then transfers this

pedagogical use of ‘comparison’ (similitude) with the sensible can here serve as a means to reach the ‘without
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conceptuality to the cosmos or “world machine,” which then has its center nowhere and
everywhere (DI 2.12 §162, p. 161). Still, the ““precision of truth” shines out from the darkness
of our admission of ignorance.”14 Beyond affirmation and denial, in learned ignorance we still
can speak, try to make sense of the world, even name and praise God (though not absolutely).
It was, as Cusa claims, as he was contemplating rest and motion in the physical world—
apparently when “returning by sea from Greece” from a papal mission—that, reflecting on the
perception of a fixed-point perspective while actually in motion, the notion of learned ignorance
came as “a celestial gift from the Father of Lights.” Thereupon, Cusa writes, he “was led to
embrace incomprehensibles incomprehensibly in learned ignorance, by transcending those
incorruptible truths that can be humanly known” (DI 3 §263-264, p. 205-206). In Cusa’s new
cosmology, our own view only appears to be from a fixed point as all viewpoints,
proportionality, distances, and, too, rest and motion themselves, are relativized in the infinite as a
natural center (even a heliocentric one) is lost. Cusa makes clear that the ancients in their
geocentrism mistook their fixed-point analysis for universal truth. Though our body gives us
some kind of center or location it is not absolute, as one can imagine and inhabit other
viewpoints. Instead, as Cusa would have it, “the nature of perspective will teach us that whatever
presents itself to the eye, to perception, is no more than subjective appearance.”15 And this
despite the (illusory) organization and centering of “the experiencing subject” around this
point.16 Here, then, both a sense of subjectivity and a certain abyss coincide. To become learned

14

McGinn, The Harvest of Mysticism, 443.

15

Harries, Infinity and Perspective, 33-34.

16

Harries, Infinity and Perspective, 38

171
about one’s ignorance is to become aware, in one and the same experience, of one’s perspective
as uniquely authorized and yet as infinitely relativized by the perspectives of others.
Let me unpack the significance of this new theological way to approach the infinite by
highlighting certain ways in which Cusa reinforced it in his own contemporary debates about the
nature of mystical theology. First, Cusa had to defend docta ignorantia against the claim,
launched by one of Cusa’s main opponents, John Wenck (especially in his On Unknown
Learning), that the notion of learned ignorance and its underlying claim of coincidentia
oppositorum was the same as the condemned Neoplatonic dialectical thinking of Eckhart and the
beguines and beghards. Wenck attacked the notion that the mystical identity at stake in learned
ignorance could lead to “attaining indistinction with God” as the abstraction of “divine unity”
makes God formally everything.17 The concern is the blurring of the line between creator and
creature, the notion that one could bring the “eschatological” to be manifestly present. Cusa
insisted he was only faithfully interpreting Dionysius’ mystical notion of God as “beyond being.”
This allowed Cusa to rest docta ignorantia on unquestionable theological authority.
In addition to the Dionysian issue of the “beyond being” of divine mystery, there had
arisen a debate concerning the tension, as McGinn puts it, between “affective” and “intellective”
Dionysianism (a matter, indeed, at the heart of the correspondence between Cusa and the
Tegernsee monastery). Though not always easy to distinguish these two key aspects in Christian
mystical thought, through Thomas Gallus, Hugh of Balma, and later Jean Gerson, there was in
Cusa’s time a growing priority given to love or affection, such that love ultimately cuts off the
intellect at the mystical summit.18 Kaspar Ayndorffer, the abbot of the Tegernsee monastery, had
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written to Cusa asking this very question of whether one can ascend to God “without intellectual
knowledge … by affetcus alone.”19 Cusa wrote back in September, 1452 (before sending them
De visione Dei) arguing the coincidence of love and knowledge in ascending to God.20 He would
reinforce this in a second letter in September, 1453, and further stress that to do mystical
theology one must go beyond negations themselves and “place [oneself] in the cloud beyond all
reason and intellect, even leaving self behind.”21 As Cusa argues and demonstrates in De visione
Dei, the significance of docta ignorantia was in the insistence that both love and knowledge
would unite one to God in mystical ascent. Yet learned ignorance also shifts away from this
dialectic to a new synthesis focused on the vision of God, a synthesis emphasizing the negation
of negation and the coincidentia oppositorum.22 With this insistence is a twofold stress which
comes to show up in De visione Dei. First, a stress on the concept of infinity. Cusa writes in the
aforementioned 1453 letter,
It seems to me that the whole of mystical theology is to enter Absolute Infinity itself, for
infinite expresses the coincidence of contradictories, that is, the end without end, and no
one can see God mystically save in the cloud of coincidence which is infinity.23
And second: a stress on the image which can lead one to the vision of God—that experience
which engenders a broader viewpoint that directs one past the tension between the affective and
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the intellective. The visio Dei unites love and knowledge. With this idea of seeing God, Cusa
24

25

begins to stress the simultaneous way in which God sees us: thus our sight taps into God’s very
vision. The influence of Eckhart on Cusa’s thought is clear here. Eckhart had written, “The eye
in which I see God is the same eye in which God sees me.”26 Cusa relied on Eckhart’s idea of the
fusing of identity between God and self through a mutual gaze, through the visio Dei.27
In Cusa’s experience of visio Dei, dispossessed of an absolute center, truth is just always
out of reach; yet our perspective still finds value in the pursuit of precision toward the truth as it
is oriented toward the infinite. “[T]he intellect, which is not truth,” Cusa writes, “never
comprehends truth so precisely but that it could always be comprehended with infinitely more
precision” (DI 1.3 §10, p. 91). It is because “the precision of truth cannot be grasped,” in fact,
that Cusa thinks it necessary to “use examples as guides in a transcendent way” (like the infinite
circle or triangle) as one “abandon[s] sensible things” in ascending toward “simple
intellectuality” (DI 1.2 §8, p. 90). Cusa asks us to reason through the similitude in which we are
able to grasp after infinite truth only by leaping over (even as we go through) the finite figure.
Leaping over (while going through) things “rooted in materiality, rationality, and the senses,” the
figures and words themselves must be interpreted “transumptively” in order to be lifted “from
the sign to the truth” (DI 1.10 §27-29, p. 98-100). Perspective, then, opens up to a higher order
insight which grounds or authorizes the “truthfulness” of one’s viewpoint despite its relativity.
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The “wall of coincidence” in De visione Dei
In significant ways, then, seeing is crucial for Cusa. Cusa closely links God and sight,
noting an etymology of theos as that “God looks on all things” (DVD 1 §5, p. 237). God is “true
uncontracted sight.” And this uncontracted or absolute vision exists in and engenders all sight as
it “embraces all modes [of vision] in such a way as to embrace each, and it remains entirely
absolute of every variety.” God’s seeing, in the end, is both universal and particular. It is in this
way Cusa’s mirror-like, omnivoyant image grants absolute sight: “There is no doubt, therefore,
that what appears to exist in the image exists more excellently in absolute sight” (DVD 1 §6-7, p.
237-238). Cusa explains:
You look on all and each together, even as does this painted image that I contemplate,
and so I marvel, O Lord, at how in your visual faculty the universal coincides with the
particular. But I am mindful that my imagination does not grasp how this may be so, for I
seek your vision within my own faculty of sight. (DVD 9 §32, p. 249)
But the marvel here is not just the coincidence of God’s vision as both particular and universal,
but what this can mean for our own particular vision—that our sight can, while being particular,
take on a certain kind of universality. Cusa confesses to God that whoever comes to see God’s
face in the particular “sees all things openly and nothing remains hidden to this person. Whoever
has you, O Lord, knows all things and has all things, and whoever sees you has all things” (DVD
7 §25, p. 246). Human, contracted sight is a certain manifestation of the potentiality of God’s
uncontracted vision (DVD 9 §34-35, p. 250).
Cusa gives us another image of explanation in this regard to complement the mirror
imagery of the all-seer—that of the wall. Both the mirror and the wall are figures which, in
learned ignorance, become “avenues that open the mind’s eye to see something other than what
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seems literal.” The imagery of the wall not only holds together this dialectic of absolute and
28

particular vision, but it also deepens the thickness of mystical darkness as it speaks of a certain
liminality, a difficulty (yet ease) of progression into the clouded depths.29 As Cusa comes to
approach the “wall of paradise,” he writes: “I experience how necessary it is for me to enter into
the cloud and admit the coincidence of opposites, above all capacity of reason, and to seek there
the truth where impossibility confronts me” (DVD 9 §36, p. 251). Indeed, God “cannot be seen
elsewhere than where impossibility confronts and obstructs me,” as God is “found unveiled,”
“girded about with the coincidence of contradictories” in this place where “impossibility
coincides with necessity.” So Cusa confesses: “O Lord, you … have given me courage to do
violence to myself.” This is because God resides on the other side of this wall:
The wall’s gate is guarded by the highest spirit of reason, and unless it is overpowered,
the way in will not lie open. Thus, it is on the other side of the coincidence of
contradictories that you will be able to be seen and nowhere on this side. (DVD 9 §37, p.
251-252)
This is a wall of coincidence that is at times described as a wall of absurdity and obstacle. In the
end, this wall is less a wall of separation, and more threshold, a point of liminality for the
mystical experience which marks the need for the Cusan leap (DVD 12 §49, p. 257).30
As I transition away from the close exegesis of Cusa’s text, what I particularly want to
make a point of is the generative nature of the experience that happens here within Cusan
perspective, how it gives a certain subjectivity. Gazing into this mirror, now standing at this wall
and peering into Paradise where God resides beyond opposites, where God’s seeing is God’s
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loving, Cusa confesses, “By no imagining, Lord, do you allow me to conceive that you love
anything other than me more than me, for it is I alone that your gaze does not abandon. And
since the eye is there where love is, I experience that you love me because your eyes rest most
attentively on me” (DVD 4 §10, p. 239). From this loving crossing of the gazes springs the
creation of the subject as a whole. Cusa notes that when he is “at the door of the coincidence of
opposites,” in front of “the entrance of paradise,” he begins to see God. He confesses:
For you are there where speaking, seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, reasoning, knowing,
and understanding are the same and where seeing coincides with being seen, hearing with
being heard, tasting with being tasted, touching with being touched, speaking with
hearing, and creating with speaking. … You are visible by all creatures and you see all.
In that you see all you are seen by all. For otherwise creatures cannot exist since they
exist by your vision. If they did not see you who see, they would not receive being from
you. The being of a creature is equally your seeing and your being seen. (DVD 10 §40, p.
252-253. Emphasis mine)
Here God’s seeing is God’s being. Hence the key confession, which I have already centered:
“And since your seeing is your being, therefore, because you regard me, I am, and if you remove
your face from me, I will cease to be” (DVD 4 §10, p. 240). In seeing God, God gives Godself to
be seen by me (DVD 5 §13, p. 241). And in this giving of Godself to be seen be me, wherein
seeing coincides with being seen, the Lord, Cusa writes, says to our heart, “‘Be yourself and I
too will be yours!’” as God “wait[s] for me to choose to be my own” (DVD 7 §25, p. 247).
Selfhood arises, transcendently, from an abyss. As we awaken to the impossible-madepossible of God’s gaze upon us and upon all, forged upon the discourse of mirror, door and cloud
(notions of darkness, enigma, liminality and threshold) we see—and as we see, we are. Falque
therefore marks this as the “birth of egoity.”31 More generally, Peter Sloterdijk points out here
Cusa’s influence upon the nascent modern age as it pictured God as “lender of eyesight
31
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[ . . . and] of subjectivity.” This transition—or better, this disjunction—from perspective to
32

selfhood by surpassing the enigma of the mirror through mystical darkness is the unexamined
secret (perhaps we call it the “color code”) of modern subjectivity and the space it forges. 33
The Relation of Cusan Perspective to Linear Perspective
To understand what is at stake in placing the birth of the modern subject here upon this
discourse of mystical darkness, we need to explore the relation between Cusan and linear
perspective, since the latter is thought to be key to understanding modern subjectivity. The exact
nature of this relation is disputed (even though Cusa was part of the same social circles as
Renaissance perspectivists34 and himself writes of how the “art of perspective” has been
discovered in order to “correct errors of vision”35). On the one hand, Hans Belting, among
others, argues that Cusan perspective “is the counter-position to the perspective picture, which is
constructed to serve only one focal point and seeks to make that view absolute.”36 Similarly,
Michel de Certeau argues in a detailed manner how Cusa’s perspectivism avoids linearity.37 In
such a view, Cusan perspective is a type of non-linear or “reverse” perspective which resists the
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monocular, controlling gaze of the subject (as I discussed in previous chapters). Again, common
in such perspective is the simultaneous showing of multiple viewpoints or planes of vision
(similar, the argument goes, to the experience of Cusa’s all-seer). On the other hand, scholars
like Charles Carman find intimate similarity between linear and Cusan perspective in the ability
to invoke “the presence of an infinite manifest to all viewers.”38 Undoubtedly, the juxtaposition
in Cusa’s text of a de-centering of one’s perspective and a centralizing of subjectivity as one
gains absolute vision argues for a complex relationship between Cusan and linear perspective. I
argue that these two apparently contradictory aspects are just what hold Cusan and linear
perspective together. Particularly, this happens through the use of the mirror at the center of both
Cusan and linear perspective. Cusa’s theological conceptuality, which I have just traced, lays
open in advance how modern perspective hides within itself or is built upon (and then negates)
nonlinear perspective. This has to do with how it deals with the darkness at stake in the mirror.
Linear Perspective and the Operation of the Mirror
My interest here is to explore the relation between (as I described in Chapter One) the
seeing-through “window” perspective of the Renaissance (and the transcendental subject it
engenders) and the apparent “overturning” or reverse perspective of the enigmatic mirror-like
all-seer in Cusan perspective. Both, I argue, are a perspective borne out of a seeing oneself seen
forged upon and negating the matter of the mirror from which it arose. We can unravel this
puzzle by focusing more directly on the constitutional origin point of linear perspective. Alberti
himself dedicates his De Pictura to Filippo Brunelleschi, who in 1425 had, through linear
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perspective technique with an apparatus of a mirror and panel, created a precise picture of the
Florence baptistry.39 Antonio di Tucci Manetti’s Vita di Filippo Brunelleschi, written in the
1480s, provides the most complete account of how viewers were to use the mirror in
Brunelleschi’s demonstration: the mirror operated in concert with a hole placed at the backside
of the picture, the mirror held in one hand in front of them at a distance and the picture in the
other hand held up against their face, though from its backside; this hole corresponded to the
picture’s vanishing point on the frontside, a hole specifically carved so one could fit their eyeball
in the backside of the picture as they gazed through the hole at the mirror they held in front of
them to view the picture in its reflection. Standing in the right place, they could then remove the
mirror, still looking through the hole, to compare the actual baptistry with the picture’s
reflection.40 The key here is how within the apparatus enacting the experiment, subjectivity was
shaped through the mirror’s operation: first, to found the subject within the crossing of gazes as
it engenders the coincidence of the viewpoint with the picture’s vanishing point toward infinity;
but second, that it needed to “doubly” show the clouds and sky by an additional mirror—
excluding by including that uncapturable element more associated with color than shape.
Damisch argues that the “essential thing” about the experiment, “the act organizing it as
such” was the creation of a view-point (literally) through this “piercing of a hole in the panel’s

Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, 59. Damisch notes that it was Filarete’s Treatise on Architecture (1460–
1464) that first associated Filippo Brunelleschi and his experiments with the discovery of linear perspective, a
tradition echoed in Vasari’s “Life of Brunelleschi.” Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, 61, 68-70. Damisch shows
how Filarete, in particular, focuses on how the mirror had a key place in understanding linear perspective
construction, both as demonstrative aid and to show its veracity, but also in providing a shortcut in seeing proper
foreshortening. See Damisch, The Origin of Perspective 63-67. While Brunelleschi is known for two experiments, I
will only discuss the first. In general, the second experiment would have been an extension of the first, showing “its
pertinence and efficacity under conditions closer to that of normal vision.” Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, 146.
39

On Manetti’s text and its explanation, see Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, 115-118; also Edgerton, The
Mirror, the Window, and the Telescope, 44-53; and Damisch, A Theory of |Cloud|, 115.
40

180
center.” This hole, moreover, was precisely positioned so that one’s vision reflected on the
41

mirror would “pierce” the image most accurately, in terms of Alberti’s centric ray. The purpose,
then, of the apparatus, argues Damisch, was “to satisfy a theoretical premise,” specifically “that
the point we today call the ‘point of view’ coincides, in terms of projection, with the one we call
the ‘vanishing point’ [toward infinity]: both are situated at the intersection of the perpendicular
sight line and the picture plane—this perpendicular itself corresponding to” the centric ray.42
Within Brunelleschi’s perspective apparatus, Damisch writes, “the point of view and the
vanishing point [of the picture] coincide on the plane of projection” and this is “due exclusively
to an effect produced by the projection onto the mirror.” Infinity here, represented by the
vanishing point in the perspective painting, is “behind our heads.”43 As such, infinity is
constructed (anew) for the modern subject through the artifice of a virtual depth.
The force of perspective “is such that the only way for the [now modern] subject to
obtain self-confirmation is for him to place himself behind the painting, to move behind it to
look at it in the mirror, through the screen, pierced by a hole, of the same painting.”44 Through
the operation of the mirror, we are caught in, and constituted by, the gaze of infinity as we see
ourselves being seen. But this is only possible through “projection onto the mirror,” which
allows one to place oneself “behind” or “in” the painting. Thus, as Margaret Iversen explains,
Damisch shows (in a Lacanian vein) that in linear perspective the “vanishing point has the value
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of a look of the Other [or Infinite]” a decentering look “that constitutes me as viewer.” We
45

should note the resonance with the decentering at stake in Cusan perspective, but a decentering
that then constitutes the viewer for the first time. We could say that linear perspective had to reintroduce the mirror in trying to relate the finite to the infinite, trying to portray a finite vision as
a vision into the infinite. In this way, as with Cusan perspective, the mirror affects the
simultaneous magnification of infinite transcendence and subjective immanence.
Moreover, like with Cusa, in this reflexive moment something “analogous to that of the
‘I’” is crafted—a subjectivity caught in the gaze of the Infinite, in seeing being seen, even as it is
fixed to a very narrow viewpoint, a peephole to peer into the mirror gazing back at one’s face.46
The hole in Brunelleschi’s panel was shaped like a lentil to fit the eyeball up to its surface,
reducing the subject to the eye and the eye to a point:
obliged to peer through a small hole at the image thrown back at it by the mirror, the
subject in the experiment is reduced to the position of a voyeur. But a singular kind of
voyeur, one who discovers that he is himself being looked at, and from the very spot from
which he himself looks, subjected as he is from the start to a form of seeing that elides his
body, reducing it to an eye, and soon enough to a point. For the image cast back at him by
the mirror is not his own but that of the painting that screens out his body, only to
substitute its own, which the eye captures solely as a reflection. Under the conditions
governing the experiment, the eye, in the mirror, does not see itself seeing, nor seeing
that which it sees: there is someone there who looks at it, and whom it does not see. What
it does see, directly in front of it, on the spot supposed to correspond to the point of
maximum clarity and distinction, is a hole blotting out the center of the image.47
Caught in the crossing of gazes which grants view of infinity, one transcends to an absolute view
through the elision of their particular vision. Like Cusa’s own “virtual” spatiality created through
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the experiment with the omnivoyant image, Brunelleschi, too, creates a “virtual” space via the
image upon the mirror, wherein one makes the leap from their own viewpoint to an “objective”
vision through the coincidence of viewpoint and infinite vanishing point on the plane of
projection.48 This is a kind of “reduction” that excludes the real in order to extract one outside
the unit of things—except what is “included” (as exclusion): the problematic sky and clouds.49
Brunelleschi had left the space in the panel above the baptistry as polished reflective
surface, thus functioning as a mirror itself which would provide a reflection of the reflection of
the clouds in the hand-held mirror. While the entire apparatus, Manetti writes, “shows” the
representational nature of the painting—such that “it seemed that one was seeing truth itself”—
Manetti explains the need for a “double showing” (dimostrare) for the sky and clouds.50 Of
course, we must inquire just why Brunelleschi would treat the clouds this way, needing this
“cloud mirror” to (doubly) show them in his experiment. We can note, with Damisch, that the
historical challenge with clouds in terms of representation in painting was their vaporous nature
that resisted form, shape, and outline: “Linear perspective only needs to ‘know’ things that it can
reduce to its own order, things that occupy a place and the contour of which can be defined by
lines.” But clouds were more associated with color than with shape. Aristotle discusses clouds as
composed of a mass of tiny mirrors that reflect colors but, being so small they are incapable of
subdivision, cannot reflect shape.51 Since painting was first a matter of drawing and thus of
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outlines of shapes, “color played no more than a secondary role, as a kind of extra” and thus
color and other things which resisted form, shape, and outline, like clouds, were marginalized,
even suspect. 52
But the clouds are, in the end, included within Brunelleschi’s perspective apparatus
through the cloud mirror. This means ultimately that to leave the clouds unmeasured by linear
perspective’s showing (but captured by a double showing), Brunelleschi “resorted to a subterfuge
that introduces into the representational circuit a direct reference to external reality.”53 The
enigmatic mirror already functions at the very heart of linear perspective, but must end up
showing itself explicitly in this demonstration. Damisch explains in detail:
The new idea of the painting at the center of perspective’s origin myth called for
inclusion in the demonstration—on its margins, it would seem, and in the form of a
reflection—of this unmastered, unmasterable background element. … Thus the cloud
mirror functioned as the index (narrowly construed) of a discontinuity between the order
of that susceptible to representation by the means of perspectiva aritifcialis, and another
element which, admitting of no term and no limit, seems to escape capture, demanding to
be presented ‘in its natural form.’54
The cloud mirror, akin to some kind of foreign body, reveals perspective “as a structure of
exclusion, the coherence of which is founded upon a series of rejects, and yet which has to make
room for the very things that it excludes from its order.”55 Lines and points rule the logic of
perspective in its quest for the illusion or artifice of depth, subordinating color (and cloud) to
only supplemental function—negating through exclusive inclusion that which is shapeless. The
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perspective code, in crafting the artifice of depth through capturing and making inoperative the
enigmatic mirror of mystical darkness, brings with itself a “color code subordinated to it.”56
Ultimately, the effect of pressing one’s eye up against the panel, as Damisch explains,
was to create a lens or “the origin or principle around which a construction was deployed” that,
in an effort to reinscribe the infinitude of “the vanishing point as the external point of view,”
excluded by inclusion the observer’s “exteriority in relation to a closed-circuit configuration.”57
Thus Samuel Edgerton is right that Brunelleschi’s effort is not primarily through the mirror to
capture in painting what was captured in the eye, but that his demonstration “permitted viewers
to believe that they had penetrated the very ‘enigma’ of the mirror”—that is, its connection to
spiritual realities and the vision of God.58 This technique engendered, through this gaze into the
deep mystery of reality, the forging of modern subjectivity by co-opting the potentiality and
potency of the mirror’s enigmatic darkness—that ultimately uncapturable, evasive depth of the
unknown. Subjectivity finds itself only as it hides its own opacity. The self is now that which
maps out onto a plane and surface the unknowns of the universe through transcendent vision.
Returning to Cusa: the Centrality of Seeing Being Seen
What is fundamentally at stake in linear perspective and in Cusan perspective is that in
both an apparatus of perspectival vision is configured in which one sees oneself seen as one
gazes into the infinite configured according to the gaze of the mirror. I have sought already to
show how the all-seer at the heart of De visione Dei is a type of mirror. It is also true that Cusa
discusses how God’s sight is like a “living mirror” as God’s eye as mirror takes in “all things
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without turning” because God’s angle of vision is infinite (DVD 8 §30, p. 249). And elsewhere in
his corpus, in an illustration wrestling with how God is as form of all forms, Cusa connects sight
not only to mirrors but also faces, explaining how a face is reflected in a mirror but does not
become composite with it, remaining singular even as it “manifests itself in different ways.”59
But it is not just that perspective itself is found in this place of the crossing of gazes upon the
logic of the mirror, but that in Cusan perspective, as we have already seen in linear perspective,
subjectivity is founded precisely in this seeing oneself seen. Creaturehood and being itself, for
Cusa, is simultaneously seeing and being seen by God. In this lies the authorization of one’s
particular perspective.
We have already seen how this is enacted with Brunelleschi’s experiment, but how is this
so within the Cusan experiment? In part, this has to do with how Cusa is seeking to re-orient
form and space upon the logic of the mirror (the details of which I will discuss shortly). Drawing
on the workings of the mirror, Cusa discusses the reflective dynamics of God as form of forms:
Therefore, my God, when you confront me as if formable prime matter, because you
receive the form of whoever behold you, then you lift me up that I may see how one
looking on you does not give you form, but rather one sees oneself in you, for one
receives from you that which one is. Thus, what you seem to receive from one who looks
on you is your gift, as if you were the living mirror of eternity, which is the form of
forms. While anyone looks into this mirror, one sees one’s own form in the form of
forms, which is the mirror. And one judges the form which one sees in the mirror to be
the image of one’s own form since this is the case with a polished material mirror. Yet
the contrary is true. For that which one sees in this mirror of eternity is not an image but
what one sees is the truth of which one who sees is an image. Therefore, in you my God
the image is the truth and the exemplar of all things and of each one of them that exists or
can exist. (DVD 15 §63, p. 263-264)
God is image of all insofar as God is exemplar of all. I find my face to be true because it is an
image of the true face of God. Yet, Cusa continues: “My face is also an image because it is not
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the truth itself but an image of absolute truth. In my thought I enfold the truth and the image of
my face, and I see that in my face the image coincides with facial truth so that insomuch as my
face is image it is true” (DVD 15 §64, p. 264). Creaturehood is fastened in this seeing oneself
seen upon the mirror as truth and image, self and Other coincide.
Cusa here reveals the radically theological nature of this nascent modern subjectivity.
Because of the conceptuality of the mirror—that though God’s absolute face as truth remains
unchangeable and yet changes with my changing face—God offers Godself, Cusa confesses, “to
any of us looking on you, as though you receive being from us, and you conform yourself to us
so that we will love you more the more you seem like us.” He continues, noting that we
“embrace our likeness because we are shown ourselves in an image and we love ourselves in it”
(DVD 15 §65, p. 264-265). More radical:
Out of the humility of your infinite goodness, O God, you present yourself as though you
were our creature that thus you may draw us to you. … In you, O God, being created
coincides with creating. For the likeness that seems to be created by me is the Truth that
creates me, so that in this way at least I may grasp how greatly I should be bound to you,
since in you being loved coincides with loving. For if I ought to love myself in you, my
likeness, then I am greatly constrained to do this when I see that you love me as your
creature and your image. (DVD 15 §66, p. 265)
In the kind of subjectivity given out of the profound depths of the crossing of gazes,
creaturehood itself seems to lose its distinction with Creator-hood.
In view of this historical recounting, we have in linear perspective, as in Cusan
perspective, the juxtaposition of two seemingly opposed logics, namely, of an enigmatized
observer who gains subjectivity through absolute vision. But the fact and nature of this
relationship is obscured in linear perspective in the flight toward transcendentality, and the dark
spot of the modern subject’s vision—that is, its foundation in the enigmatic—is left un-reflected.
The more revealing, specifically theological, conceptuality of Cusan perspective lays open how
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Renaissance linear perspective is built upon but hides within itself notions of the mystical
darkness of the infinite. What follows in the remaining course of this chapter, then, is two tasks:
first, to explore how this seeing being seen is tied to fundamental changes in form, space, and the
symbolism of color as modern perspective gains trajectory toward its racialization; and second,
to establish how it is that what Cusa does marks our very own perception with a certain
sedimentation of significance—that we are not mere spectators here to some history.
Cusan Perspective as Symbol: The Operation of the Mirror
I want to focus on several ways in which the symbol of perspective, forged upon and yet
negating the mirror’s enigmatic potential, shaped key developments in modernity. Even if one
could argue that Cusan perspective is more nuanced in its operation upon the mirror (in that it
shows its theological reliance on the notion of mystical darkness), we cannot escape its similarity
to linear perspective and thus its connection to a whole history regarding how, upon the mirror,
opacity and darkness is brought toward racialization. Working toward this, I will discuss three
transformations undertaken within Cusan perspective (as especially shown in De visione Dei),
which bear resemblance to broader transformations amidst the rise of Renaissance perspective:
re-orientation of form, space, and color upon the logic of the mirror. While the first two aspects
are much-discussed, I propose to only briefly define what is at stake so as to situate them vis-àvis the rise of a nascent symbolism of color. I argue that all three changes are forged within
Cusan perspective upon the logic of the mirror at the heart of mystical darkness, where what is
most interesting to me is how therein a nascent color symbolism emerges as “darkness” is
enmeshed in certain moral, spiritual, and social discourses. Thinking such changes in form and
space through concurrent changes in color symbolism can shed new light on how Cusan
perspective might connect to logics of race developing at the threshold of modernity. One
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underlaying key here—which makes sense in terms of my argument of the hiding of the center of
mystical darkness—is that such changes are a result of Cusa’s apophatic perspectivism. Cusan
changes in form, space, and color essentially affect a new way to craft infinity upon the mirror,
to see the infinite from the finite.
The Symbol of Perspective and Re-orientation of “Form:” the birth of the mind
Within the new perspective is a re-orientation of form amidst the ascendency of the
creative power of the mind. Cusa’s thought becomes illustrative of what Giorgio Agamben refers
to as the “‘artistic machine’ of modernity,” where, beginning in the Renaissance, there was a
transition from the “working” (energeia) of artwork as being outside of the artist and within the
art produced, to the artist who now “possesses his energeia in himself and can thus affirm his
superiority over the work.” 60 Instead of the artist showing form in displaying the
interconnectedness of being through the exercise of “habit,” there was now a collapse of form
into mere efficient causality. This represented a move away from ontology toward the power of
subjectivity, away from being informed by being to informing being itself. This transition had to
do more broadly with the rise of Nominalism at the end of the Middle Ages, which affected, in
the words of Louis Dupré, the disintegration of the “ontotheological synthesis.” As form lost the
ontological function of mediating the between the finite and the infinite, it eventually became
associated with the expressions of the human mind.61 Indeed, for Cusa not only is the mind
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important, but the mind itself functions like a mirror as “[t]hrough its capacity for measuring,
numbering, and representing, [it] accomplishes everything” as an image of the divine mind. 62
Seeking a new immanence for God in the wake of nominalism—which had “effectively
removed God from creation,” as Dupré writes63—Cusa insisted on the direct and absolute
immanence of God in all the universe. While in Neoplatonism, forms mediate between God and
immanence in creation, for Cusa there is “no realm of forms independent of their individualized
existence in time.”64 Thus Cusa writes in De beryllo: “specific form—one of which is distinct
from another—is not other than the subject but has within itself its own essential principles, by
means of which it is determined substantially.”65 Unlike Plato, for Cusa forms are not reified,
existing in a separate realm; forms are experienced—even constructed—through the power of the
human mind to see “generic harmony” of forms differentiated but still essential in their
specification (DB §62, p. 821-822).66 It is through the mind’s power in measuring and
mathematics that this leap of insight can be made from specific to absolute.
Key to this re-orientation of form around the power of the mind is Cusa’s retrieval of
Protogaras’ notion of “man is the measure of things.” Noting that Protagoras was correct, Cusa
writes: “Because man knows—by reference to the nature of his perceptual [cognition]—that
perceptible objects exist for the sake of that cognition, he measures perceptible objects in order
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to be able to apprehend, perceptually, the glory of the Divine Intellect” (DB §69, p. 825). For
Cusa “to know is to measure” (DB §71, p. 827). Thus Harries: “It is precisely because of this that
Cusanus, like Alberti, calls man a second God, that is, a creator of conceptual forms in which he
mirrors or unfolds himself and by means of which he reconstructs or recreates in his own image
the manifold presented to his senses.”67 All of our understanding and experience is thus already
also “the interpreting activity of the human mind,” our own perspective. And yet this response,
this unifying function of the mind, is a response to the logos or divine art unfolding in the world.
The measuring of the mind fits with what it is measuring in representation: this is its mirroring
function.68 Here de Certeau highlights within this notion the Cusan tension between
“observation” and “intuition” and how this takes place upon the mirror: “These two forms of
‘seeing’ constantly intersect …. Their point of coincidence lies in the visible figure in which the
gaze grasps the invisible element active within the figure. This instrument for the passing
(transsumptio) from one ‘seeing’ to the other is the mirror.”69 Through the mirror the mind
makes the mystical transition from the “visible places” and “‘perceptible image’ offered to ‘the
eye’” to the vision of “formal relations and their possible developments.” 70 Finite reason
eventually gives way to a flash of infinite insight, bringing clarity to the coincidence of the
infinite here in the midst of our finitude.
Cusa also puts forward the figure of “intellectual beryl” here. For Cusa, the beryl stone is
a figure—functioning with the same conceptuality of the mirror, cloud, or door—that gives us
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insight into the coincidence of opposites: “I will adduce a mirror and a symbolism by which each
reader’s frail intellect may be aided and guided at the outer limits of the knowable” (DB §1, p.
792). Cusa notes just what the beryl stone is:
Beryl stones are bright, white, and clear. To them are given both concave and convex
forms. And someone who looks out through them apprehends that which previously was
invisible. If an intellectual beryl that had both a maximum and a minimum form were
fitted to our intellectual eyes, then through the intermediateness of this beryl the
indivisible Beginning of all things would be attained. (DB §3, p. 792-793)
Similar to the mathematical figures of learned ignorance like the infinite triangle or circle, in the
beryl, Cusa writes, “you see the maximal and the minimal” and thus “through a mirror and by
means of a symbolism you may see the absolute First Beginning” (DB §9, p. 795).71 Specifically,
the beryl “makes us see more acutely, so that, in the Uniting Beginning, we see opposites prior to
duality, i.e., before they are two contradictories” (DB §41, p. 810). 72 Through its mirroring, the
beryl gives a vision in this way of the Indivisible that actually goes beyond all knowledge and
clarity (DB §53, p. 816). The mirroring operation here does not so much mark a limit of vision
(even though that is indeed at stake), but it indicates more so the possibility to leap in one’s
vision toward a transcendental vision or infinite sight.
That this re-orientation of form is configured upon the conceptuality of the mirror is clear
in De visione Dei. In explaining how to see simultaneously one’s face and God’s face in the
mirror of the omnivoyant, Cusa explains how, as immanent, God is not mediated by forms but is
the “power or principle from which all things come.” Giving an illustration of a nut-tree, Cusa
writes: “with the eyes of the mind I perceive that this tree existed in the seed, not as I look at it
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now, but virtually.” But ultimately, to see the desired “absolute power of all such seminal
powers,” one must, again, “leap beyond” the notion of seminal power of nut to tree and “enter
into that ignorance in which nothing at all remains of seminal power or energy” (DVD 7 §22-23,
p. 245). Cusa continues: “Hence, I see this tree as a certain unfolding of the power of the seed
and the seed as a certain unfolding of omnipotent power. … And thus in you my God the tree is
you yourself, and in you it is the truth and exemplar of itself.” Once one grasps God’s “absolute
face to be the natural face of all nature,” is that moment in which—as I have already discussed—
one “sees all things openly and nothing remains hidden to this person” (DVD 7 §24-25, p. 246).
The Symbol of Perspective and the Re-orientation of Space
This re-orientation of form is closely related to a re-orientation of space. In Cusa, the
developing theory of linear perspective with its new understanding of sight fundamentally reorients Christian thinking on the nature of space. One theorist straightforwardly argues the point:
The conception of space which conditions the construction of perspective in the
Renaissance differs from that of the Greeks. For the latter, space is discontinuous and
heterogeneous …, whereas with Nicholas of Cusa will be born a conception of space
formed by the relation between elements which are equally near and distant from the
‘source of all life.’ In addition, the pictorial construction of the Greeks corresponded to
the organization of their stage, based on a multiplicity of points of view, whereas the
painting of the Renaissance will elaborate a centered space. 73
This question of the fixed point, or reference point, was of incredible interest to ancient thought,
and often involved pairing conceptual notions like finitude with central point and infinitude with
decentering.74 In Cusa, then, the major issue is how a homogenous and infinite space coexists
alongside a centered subject.
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Classically, Erwin Panofsky’s Perspective as Symbolic Form speaks of this change in
spatiality as the transition away from so-called “antique optics” to Renaissance perspective.
Panofsky argues that antique optics “fit its theory more snugly to the factual structure of the
subjective optical impression … [b]ecause it conceived of the field of vision as a sphere” which
related objects and spatiality through “degrees of angle or arc, and not in simple measures of
length.”75 There is a kind of “tangibility” here, notes Panofsky, as visible objects represented in
art “were not merged in painterly fashion into spatial [and systematic] unity, but rather were
affixed to each other in a kind of tectonic or plastic cluster.”76 Thus, according to Cassirer
(whom Panofsky draws on for the language of “symbolic form”), in such a “mythic”
understanding of space, “each place has its own mode and its own value” as space is “both
anisotropic and unhomogeneous in contrast to the metric space of Euclidean geometry.”77 That is
to say, in antique optics, space—like a piece of wood which is easier to cut along the grain—
manifests different properties when traversed in different directions. But in modern perspective,
Panofsky argues—and we have already seen this—an abstraction of space is produced. The
puzzling thing about modern perspective, then, is that such a homogenous and infinite space is
created, and yet one can be master over it in the power of the gaze.78
Similarly with Cusa, there is the juxtaposition of an infinite space leading to infinite
perspectives with the coexisting nascent subject whose viewpoint is authorized (even though in

75

Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, 35.

76

Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, 41.

77

Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 2: Mythical Thought, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1955), 84; Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, 41.
78

See Knight, “In a Mirror and Enigma,” 116.

194
79

such spatiality the subject should be decentered). The contradiction, notes Damisch, is only
abated if “that depolarized space is infinitely saturated with centers.” He continues:
But for us to conceive the notion of an analytic space whose center is everywhere and
nowhere, allowing of no origin save one that is arbitrary and peremptory, we must have
nothing less than a revolution in the mathematical armature of knowledge; the infinitist
geometry of Desargues must supplant the finite geometry of the Greeks, while
computation of infinitely small quantities must become ubiquitous.80
Ahead of his time, Cusa’s conceptuality (and that of modern perspective as a whole) comes to
make sense in the transition from elementary Euclidean geometry to projective geometry
influenced by Desargues’ reflection on perspective art. This new geometry “posits a space
organized in relation to a point of view through which order is imposed” back on that space
which first was and fundamentally is random. Here “the point encompasses space and space
encompasses the point.”81 So the key aspect of the new spatiality emerging here in this time, and
certainly in Cusa, is a positing of an infinite space simultaneously with a centered space around a
certain viewpoint, the way in which things appear—ruled by a linear rationality—to the
emerging subject. As Michel Serres notes: ““Infinity carried the center off from us, yet seemed
to restore it to us in a new guise.”82 The new power of the mind and transformations in form
allow one to take up a centered position through the intellect or reason.
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One more point: this is not only a re-centered space, but (at least hypothetically in Cusa’s
framework) a space re-centered around a plurality of viewpoints; even if my own subjecthood is
engendered in the moment constituted by my point of view, this is the case ad infinitum for
others. This is made possible in the ideational nature of space granted through its projection and
virtualization in modern perspective. As Harries writes:
To recognize the limits imposed on what I see by my location here and now, I have to be
in some sense already beyond these limits, capable of imagining and conceiving other
locations. … Not only am I able to move, but in imagination and thought I am able to
transcend these limitations even without moving. This ability of the self to raise itself
above the perspectives that first bind it leads to demands for more adequate—that is less
perspective-bound, and ideally truly objective—descriptions; it thus leads to demands
also for a conception of space that allows us to go beyond all merely perspectival
descriptions.83
In this way Cusan perspective calls us, in recognizing the limitations of our own perspective,
beyond our particular viewpoint itself, to become in fact “aware of the conditions that rule our
seeing.”84 As Harries indicates above, the eventual unease with the partiality of perspectival
knowledge calls forth the desire for a more objective space that itself would fit well with an
infinite homogenous space: the way is made for a new science and a new (Cartesian)
rationality.85 Cusa, admittedly, does not quite get us that far, even if he begins to open the way
toward it by “link[ing] the infinity of space to the infinity of each individual and to the infinity of
God.”86 Once one is able to grasp or see God’s “absolute face to be the natural face of all
nature,” is that moment of insight in which one “sees all things openly”—this absolute vision I
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have discussed (DVD 7 §24-25, p. 246). The dance around the absolute truth intensely grants to
my partiality a truthful center; in a coincidence of opposites, I am both dispossessed of and
authorized for the centering of my space around myself.
Such re-orientation of form and space is configured upon the conceptuality of the mirror,
specifically as the mind takes upon itself the operation of the mirror as screen, which I will
finally argue. This leap toward the infinite through the traversal of the finite is made possible in
the ideational nature of space and form granted through the fundamental notions of projection
and virtualization in modern perspective. The infinite now envelops the finite as a “virtual
reality” of sorts; such virtual reality “is a middle in which we are already participating, which
envelops to such an extent that it exceeds every grasp.”87 Amidst the milieu of Cusa’s virtual
reality, the mind is raised to a new, creative power as it is able to forge the abstraction of form
(and space) necessary to transcend finitude. But in this re-orientation, Cusa hides finitude and
then re-presents finitude as related to the infinite, superseding finitude for a higher transfinitude
or infinite logic. Herein is engendered a thought birthed out of recognition of one’s perspective
that, at the same time, reveals a higher logic through which one overcomes one’s perspective as
one leaps toward the infinite. The opacity of mystical darkness now tends toward becoming a
void that is sought to be overcome—not by the passageway of finitude (in its self-integrity) as
perpetual progress toward the asymptotic infinity—but by a leaping over finitude, into a
(purportedly) “bodiless” panopticon where one comes back to see all. Cusa relativizes the
“hereness” of my particularity, the strength of my orientation to finitude, in such a way that
abrogates the tension inherent in the mystical self.
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We have seen how this leaping over finitude happens more concretely in modern
perspective upon the apparatus of Brunelleschi; Cusa installs this theoretically within the
(theo)logic(s) of enigmatic mystical darkness, co-opting (and negating) the potentiality of its
depth and darkness in an effort to project a virtual reality. Cusa writes how we come to see more
correctly and accurately “as we labor in the dark of enigma” (DI 1.12 §33, p. 102). Discovering
one’s perspective in the crucible of the mirror of mystical darkness, only to then hide one’s
perspective in order to overcome it, the secret center of modern thought is forged. In this
ideational “leaping over” motif, we have departed from Nyssa’s conception of perspective as
grounded in the very transformation of the bodily senses. In Cusa, (bodily) space, itself, is
negated as it is impregnated with the infinite. Having experienced the vision of God, forged upon
the logic of the mirror, “the eye-subject . . . becomes absorbed in, ‘elevated’ to a vaster function,
proportional to the movement which it can perform” through the measuring mind as it spans and
expands the abstract and homogenous world created through the symbol of perspective—a world
“constituted not only by this eye but for it.” In this virtualization (or, we could say, linearization)
of the new world, the imagination, fueled by the eye’s infinitely-expanding reach, affects a
figuration or “phantasmatization of objective reality” including that of color.88 This, however, is
not a simple process but a complex moral symbolism.
Emergence of a Nascent Racial Color Symbolism
By focusing on color, initially I mean to focus on the significance and fate of the
omnivoyant image in De visione Dei qua painted face. Although Albertson argues that, in a
progression of Cusa’s thought on images and icons, what Cusa does with the color of the icon in
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our text “adds” to the experience of the invisible, I try to take seriously the overall conceptuality
of perspective, how even color is leaped over toward the infinite colorless. 89 Cusan thought on
color will bear this out. I argue for the emergence of a nascent color symbolism in Cusa
alongside of the re-orientation of form and space, a color symbolism imbuing such changes with
moral and spiritual discourses. This, if you will, sheds more light on the potency of the “color
code,” as Damisch had discussed it in terms of the cloud mirror—but now, with Cusa, a more
robust “color space” develops. I will show in Cusa’s thought on color that a thickness or
dimensionality emerges which begins to move a symbolism of color toward affecting materiality
and spatiality. We begin to discern this in the very language Cusa uses in reference to mystical
darkness. While Cusa often speaks of mystical darkness in terms of a fog, mist, or cloud (caligo),
he also uses the notion of shadow (tenebra); this term, as well as another kind of darkness
(obscura, which Cusa uses to describe mystical darkness in De visione Dei) are occasionally
paralleled with the physical color black (nigrum). Thus, what I want to press on is a kind of
semantico-logical cluster around darkness of color that reveals for us a certain archaeology
important to modernity’s developing racial logics.
In Cusa’s time, there was a larger shift in aesthetics, with Alberti’s move away from the
Cennini color system as he sought a more naturalistic representation of color.90 Alberti enacted,
as he put it, “a more sensate wisdom” (la più grassa Minerva), a desire to better relate the
intellect to the sensual in painting through depicting things the way they are visualized more
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“naturally.” Still, color is situated in a larger apparatus as this “sensuous wisdom” involved the
91

ability to move from mental ideas and representations of what appears to one’s vision toward the
translation of these to a plane; and this fundamentally involved discrimination in how to use lines
and points, shapes and thresholds, to bring depth, body, and texture to these representations. It
did, yes, involve skill in “organization of tonally differentiated pigment” and “the manipulation
and organization of sensuous plastic substances” needed in the making and preserving of colors,
but hidden in this utilization of color through sensate wisdom is an entire method of how to see
in the first place, how to give aesthetic attention.92 This is generally what is at stake in, as we
have seen from Damisch, the “color code” of modern perspective, that is, the subordination of
the shapeless (color and clouds) to shape (lines and points).93 The painter, Damisch argues,
knows only of figures (surfaces) that stand out against a background (a plane). To
delineate the area within which they are inscribed, he is guided by the contour that is
circumscribed or signified by a line. An illusion of depth depends upon a division, the
correct adjustment of the plane of projection. In other words, strictly speaking, a
perspective construction implies, in the first instance, the elimination of depth—primarily
in the form of color—and the representation’s reduction to the graphic dimensions of
Euclidean geometry.94
In Christian thought, this was magnified by the concern over images. As Jeffrey Hamburger
writes: “Outline drawing was perceived as purer, less contaminated by matter and sensory
perception, than painting in pigments.”95
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More specifically, Hamburger’s recent work on Cusa and color highlights how Cusa
himself utilized color in his thought, influenced by theologian Heymeric of Campo (1395-1460),
John Pecham (1230-1292), and Robert Grosseteste (1175-1253), specifically as Cusa utilizes
their thought toward the construction of his “color space.” Heymeric, a follower of Albertus
Magnus and influenced by the mystic Ramon Llull, believed that the very interaction between
line and color was instructive: the play between lines and color was akin to a mirror, as it relates
visible and invisible, corporeal and intellect, capturing what can be seen (color) and what is
hidden and fades toward invisibility (outline). Thus color in its sensuousness can lead the mind
toward truth. In this way he influenced Cusa toward the theological use of diagrams for
theological instruction.96 For Heymeric, the function of the diagram is that “its uncanny ability
both to mimic and to model the process of ratiocination, served as a means and method of
cultivating an especially self-conscious form of contemplation.”97 But, argues Hamburger, Cusa
goes further in stressing the importance of color in view of his belief that color was essentially a
“contracted” form of divine light (which itself remains imperceptible): color, especially in its
qualities of value, hue, and saturation—over the practice of the time of “blocks of unmodulated
color”—is used epistemologically to engage the dialect between light and color in his apophatic
frame.98 Particularly important here was Robert Grosseteste. In his De colore (c.1225-1230),
Grosseteste wrote:
Light—bright, copious and in a pure diaphanous medium—is whiteness; and light—
scarce, dim and in an impure diaphanous medium—is blackness [Lux igitur clara multa
in perspicuo puro albedo est; lux pauca obscura in perspicuo impuro nigredo est.] This
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statement explains the statement of Aristotle and Averroes who posit that blackness is
privation and whiteness is property or form.99
This definition of color through these three bipolar qualities (multa/pauca; clara/obscura; and
purum/impurum) gives shape to “a color space permitting continuous and infinite gradations.”100
Hamburger argues that Cusa’s diagrams and how they would utilize color takes up this kind of
color space laid out by Grosseteste as a crucial factor in their epistemological purpose and
objective. Instead of being colored with blocks, as shaded and dimensional color space, color in
Cusa “complements line just as cataphatic complements the apophatic … [as] color provides the
very embodiment of materiality.”101
The epistemological value and purpose of color in Cusa’s diagrams lies in the relation-indistinction between light and color. John Pecham, through his Perspectiva communis on
perspective (as optics), was one influence here for Cusa in this regard.102 For Cusa, color was
specifically a contraction of divine light.103 Divine Lux is contrasted with creaturely lumina, a
distinction rooted in Plotinus; here, light is not of interest for its own sake but as it relates to
divine unity and simplicity: “Corporeal light – the light that humans see and through which they
perceive – stands in an anagogical relationship to intellectual light.”104 Divine light is invisible
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and “does not belong to the region of colors,” but makes possible corporeal and visible light,
through which color is seen.105 But in this configuration (like form and space in their reorientation according to a transcendentalizing framework), color—since it is manifest in
corporeal light—is marginalized within the quest for transcendental, absolute luminosity.106 Thus
color (and corporeal sight and light) is situated within a certain ontological apparatus, from
which it gains its meaning or significance. Discussing the specifics of his theory of vision, Cusa
writes: “Our sight is produced both from a certain lucid and clear spirit that descends from the
summit of the brain into the organ of the eye and also, along with the concurrence of external
light, from a colored object that reproduces in the eye an appearance like itself.”107 Color, then, is
crucial to visibility, as contracted divine light: “apart from color the visible world does not attain
anything but judges that everything not colored is not something.”108 In this process, however,
Cusa asserts that what brings discernment of visible objects through color is not the spirit “that
descends from the brain through the optic channels into the eye” which sees the object but “the
spirit that is present in sense accomplishes its work by means of a higher light, namely, that of
reason.” So Cusa concludes: “When, therefore, the eye says that this is ‘red’ and that is ‘blue,’ it
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is not the eye speaking but rather the spirit of its parent speaking in it, namely, that sensitive
spirit whose eye this is.”109 In this way, “it is necessary that color be made visible by a second
light, from what illuminates the visible. For in darkness and shadow the visible has no aptitude to
be seen.”110 So Hamburger writes: “A manifestation that does not show itself, a showing that
remains invisible: Cusa’s definition of divine light places it beyond and outside the realm of
color.”111 And yet, the very purpose of color in Cusa’s “geometrical mysticism” is to mark “the
boundary between the invisible objects of the intellect and the perceptible realm of material
things.”112 In this way, Hamburger argues, color in Cusa’s diagram serve the epistemological
purpose of teaching the coincidence of opposites and the play between the cataphatic and
apophatic in Cusa’s broader thought.113
But what is interesting for us—working toward how this “color space” works to
symbolize color within a moral symbolism of evil—is how Cusa more specifically explains the
manifestation of color through the work of light as connected to the property of reception of the
material or object. Discussing the nature of the “divine ray” of light as it is likened to the sun’s
ray, Cusa writes that the sun’s ray is received by the air and “penetrates the air deeply and
illumines it thoroughly.” He continues:
Thereafter, it is received on a surface by material objects, which are end-points. There it
causes different colors, in accordance with the different dispositions-[to-receive-it. It
109
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causes] a bright white color if the surface is bright; [it causes] black if [the surface is]
dark; and [it causes] in-between colors in accordance with the in-between dispositions [of
the receiving material]. (DB §30, p. 805)
It is not just that color is marginalized and negated through the overriding divine light, but color
is tied to certain qualities of objects themselves. Brightness (in the passage, specifically “a bright
white color”) is favored; Cusa adds in another place: “material objects actually or by tendency
emit brightness: [they do so] actually insofar as they are things lucid; [they do so] by tendency
insofar as they are things colored … Now, brightness is projected quickly, and from very distant
objects, along a straight line; our sense of sight is naturally adapted for perceiving it.”114
Transparency is stressed over obduracy.115 Brightness and clarity are elevated, and so the objects
that would produce such things.116 In fact, sight itself is in a somewhat tensive relationship with
color as it relates in this way to material surfaces: “sight is deceived by a colored medium, such
as glass or a transparent stone or some other thing. Sight, therefore, is so pure, without every
blemish of visible things, that by comparison with it all visible things are only a certain shadow
(tenebra), and, in contrast to the spirit of vision, are a certain corporeal density (corporalis …
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spissitudo).”

Ultimately “color can ascend to its rest and to its end only in the light of its

principle,” just as “our intellectual nature can attain to the happiness of its rest only in the light of
its intellectual principle,” illuminated as it is “by the divine light of its principle in accord with its
aptitude for the light to be able to enter.”118
I want to highlight two examples of how a nascent racial color symbolism is emerging
here on the threshold of modernity. First, an examination of a set of key diagrams for Cusa:
Cusa’s Diagram P (Paradigmatic Diagram) and his Diagram U (Universal Diagram), through
which Cusa (as I want to show) moralizes blackness of skin in a symbolics of evil. Diagram P
“serves as an illustration of how the infinite (God) participates in the finite (his creation) and
how, in a reciprocal process … the mind in turn can come to know the divine.” Specifically,
Diagram P shows “the interlocking and proportional relationship of Oneness to Otherness in
terms of the interpenetration of light and dark.”119 In this diagram, “there is no point at which
light is completely separated from darkness or darkness from light, each increases as the other
diminishes.”120 This integration of light and darkness represents also the integration of other
qualities like maleness and femaleness, and actuality and potentiality.121 Importantly, there is a
moral symbolism at stake:
Moreover, if you wish to view in terms of its differences a life, for example, of form or of
spirit or of anything else, then first of all analyze it in terms of the Diagram P in
accordance with the oneness of light and the otherness of darkness. In this way you will
behold that noble life in the brightness of whose oneness all otherness is absorbed. And,
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on the other hand, you will behold another life, whose oneness is enveloped in the
otherness of fleeting and inconstant darkness.122
Through this diagram, Cusa begins to weave a thicker web between light and darkness, white
and black, amidst moral and ontological significations.
Cusa broadens his thought “with the purpose of extending the diagram’s purview to all
things” by intersecting Diagram P with Diagram U: “As a summa of medieval cosmology
predicated on complementary quaternities, Cusa’s calculus of color also comprehends
differences defined in terms of the four points of the compass, as well as distinctions of gender,
age, climate, and complexion, the latter related to the mix of humors in the body.”123 Cusa
specifically uses this diagram to tie skin color to an overall moral symbolism. Cusa initially
intersects the two diagrams in this way:124
If you are inquiring about the color of men, construe the northern point as oneness of
light and the southern point as [otherness] of darkness; and you will see that the
northerners are of the white region, that the southerners are of the black region, and that
those in the middle have inbetween shades.
This is framed alongside a more global application of the two diagrams. Such that, for example,
one can map the “temperament, shapes, vices and morals, subtlety and grossness” where
the ascent of the human species is from north to south; and the descent of the human
species is from south to north. Thus, all men who partake of the horizon in the highest
heaven are more lively in intellect; those of the middle heaven who partake thereof are
more lively with regard to reason; those of the lowest heaven who partake thereof are
more lively with regard to the senses.
In this schematic, “inhabitants of the middle region are better tempered, since in that region the
extremes are more harmoniously and concordantly brought into a certain combination of
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oneness.” Northern and Southern inhabits have excess and defect. Similarly, in terms of vices
and virtues, “humanity, making at the arctic pole a beginning of its ascent toward the antarctic
pole, reaches at the equator its altitude and the end of its ascent.” Thus those occupying “the first
third of the world’s ascent” are like infants still growing, and “the more southern peoples … are
between old age and decrepitude.” By configuring light and darkness according to Diagram P
and expanding the symbolism at stake in it by crossing with Diagram U, darkness of skin
specifically is mapped not only according to a moral symbolism (of evil) but a moral geography.
Let me expand on what is at stake in the moral symbolism of color by exploring a second
example of this nascent racial symbolism, turning to a couple passages from Cusa’s sermons.
First, from Cusa’s sermon Obsecro Vos tamquam Advenas (sermon 281), from May 8, 1457.
Discussing 1 Peter 2, where the apostle beseeches his listeners to abstain from bodily passions
and desires, Cusa comes to discuss the phenomenon of seeing, both physical seeing and
intellectual sight. Eventually discussing this alongside the advent of joy at the sight of Christ and
being seen by Christ, he moves to the analogy of a woman giving birth, explaining that threshold
of moving from suffering to immense joy, but more significantly the various transitions the fetus
illustrates (spatially from vegetative womb to perceptible light at birth, and in its own
constitution from vegetative uterus to animal life to rational power itself). Cusa writes:
Therefore, an offspring goes out from the womb-of-the-sensory-life (which is a shadow
of reason), so that, once freed from the shadow of bedarkened ignorance (umbra
tenebrosae ignorantiae), it may be present in its living and lucid intellectual region.
Similarly, an animal-[life] goes out from the darkness of the maternal womb (opacitate
materni uteri), from the vegetative region, into the perceptible light, wherein, in its own
way, it makes progress and is delighted.125
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This maternal uterus, described as “opaque” (opacitate) is parallelly referred to as “the place of
darkness (loco tenebrae).” Cusa continues by noting that this “separation from the mother,” from
the opaque, dark uterus is akin to the joy the soul comes to have after coming out the other side
of suffering: such a soul is
more similar to Christ than gold is found to be bright as the sun and incorruptible—[gold]
that was conceived in a black mine and hidden (in minera nigra occultatum) from the
influence of the sun and which when purged by fire leaves behind its slag of blackness
(scoriam nigredinis).126
What we should notice here is that the uterine place of darkness and opacity (opacitate materni
uteri … loco Tenebrae) is negatively paralleled with the color black (nigredo).
We also observe in Cusa’s sermons the theme between opacity and the need for
purgation. In Sermon 153, Cusa discusses how faith gives the soul “the strength of clearing itself
(purgandi) and expelling the density (pellendi densitatem).” Connecting this also to how love
“covers a multitude of sins,” Cusa employs the metaphor of removing a dark spot from a
parchment by using a drop of oil: “just as a drop of oil poured into papyrus or a thick parchment
is effected, because the opacity (opacitas) is removed and the brightness (claritas) rises.” He
continues, noting how “we ought now to tend to the fact that the soul is purged of opaqueness
(purgetur anima de opacitate), so that under the influence of the sun of righteousness we may be
able to receive the food of life on Passover.”127
Darkness of color for Cusa is set in a broader ontological and moral framework. Opacity,
mystical darkness, shadow, and the color of black are poetically working together to carry the
weight of a complex color symbolism, one caught up in moral discourses with an interest in
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purgation and cleansing (and, interestingly, one co-articulating femaleness, sensuousness,
potentiality—that is, lack, and blackness (of skin) within a moral symbolism). In discussing color
within a light-darkness aesthetic, and especially as it is overridden by an absolute and colorless
vision, certain qualities like brightness, lucidity and undifferentiation work towards the favoring
of the color of white when color in its finitude ultimately has to be accounted for in the mystical
ascent toward the Infinite (and this is everything in terms of the racializing of the colonial
world). The function of hiding non-linearity within linearity just is the function of racializing,
color-based colonialism, as form and space are caught in the same logic as color symbolism. Our
modern world has been built through this hiding and negating of darkness, for the sake of the
lucidity of reason and of the building of the self. Cusa exposes the archeology of the modern
subject, especially once we adopt a new key—now revealed—of tracing this in terms of race.
The Phenomenological Stakes of Cusan Perspective
Now, the mirror’s operation and its color code at the core of modern perspective is
primarily something that concerns us in our own subjectivity. Jean-Luc Marion and Emmanuel
Falque’s debate surrounding Cusa’s De visione Dei can facilitate this examination. Their
disagreement about the nature of the omnivoyant is well-known; what is significant, for us, is the
phenomenological claims that follow from their argument regarding whether a subjectivity
moored in seeing oneself seen is a matter of immediacy or of a hermeneutics of intersubjectivity.
In other words, whether a theological, iconic vision is transcendent and “pure” (that is,
unmediated), or if it is complex and hermeneutically constructed. Now, both are clear this
conceptuality of perspective is fundamentally concerned with genuine sight of the other. Marion
helpfully discerns the transcendental dimensions to seeing the other in Cusan perspective; but he
misses how this is complicated by the operation of the mirror. Falque indeed brings us to the
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mirror, but he misses how its potency is compromised by Cusa’s trajectory toward the infinite.
While Marion and Falque claim to show two possible (and diverging) paths of modern
perspective’s trajectory toward subjectivity, I argue we can navigate this sharp dispute by
applying our insight into how modern perspective relates nonlinear and linear perspective upon
the mirror in ambiguous ways.
Cusan Perspective and Iconic Subjectivity
In Chapter One, I discussed the kind of iconic phenomenology that Marion advocates,
and its relevance to this matter of opacity and the mirror in our overall inquiry. Instead of
rehearsing this here, I want to center on his commentary on De visione Dei, from which I want to
draw out the promise and difficulty of transcendentality in seeing the other. Marion finds Cusa’s
text and work on the icon rather important, particularly taking up the text to focus on connecting
the phenomenon of the icon to the “possibility of seeing the other” expressed in Cusa’s focus on
seeing oneself seen; this is a matter of the icon because it is the matter of the genuine crossing of
gazes granted by the icon’s double gaze.128 Marion stresses, interpreting Cusa, that human sight
is derived from God’s absolute sight; moreover, human sight of the other as truly other is only
possible in light of God’s anterior absolute sight, represented in the icon’s gaze. When this
anterior and transcendent—and fundamentally loving—gaze crosses ours, we gain genuine
vision to see the other, as we are seen. To see the other as truly other, there must be a crossing of
the gazes, given through the icon.
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Cusan perspective, for Marion, is fundamentally an overturning of vision, specifically as
the all-seeing image is an actual icon of the face of Christ.129 In the case of the icon’s “double
gaze,” as with Cusa’s omnivoyant, the viewer’s own gaze is overturned because the icon “sees so
originarily and so completely the one who looks at it that [the icon] overturns the order of
intentionality and makes itself felt precisely through the experience of receiving a gaze that is
absolutely concentrated on each of the spectators. To see an icon amounts to seeing oneself seen
by it.”130 Ultimately, Marion is concerned about “the other” not being merely another object in
our sight, and thus not truly seen as other. The other becomes visible as other and not merely as
object “to the precise extent that, with his invisible gaze, he sees me;” this is precisely the
transition Marion makes from Cusa’s conceptuality of God’s iconic gaze to a model of an iconic
gaze of the other.131
This crossing of gazes, this seeing oneself seen, though, is difficult, Marion argues: the
other “does not show himself as a visible object in the world” but must be discerned; and yet it is
difficult to discern this seeing oneself seen because the gaze itself gives “nothing to be seen
directly: that which exerts the gaze, the eyes and more precisely the pupils, show nothing and
express nothing, consisting only in a black point, or even less—a black hole, empty of the visible

For Marion’s particular argument about how Cusa is putting forth an icon of Christ here and not merely a
painting (in disagreement with Falque): “Thus, precisely because an all-seeing figure remains relatively common …
the establishment of the figura cuncta videntis is not enough to define the proper goal of De visione Dei (the
experience of theologia mystica). We must specify this figura as that which bears the universal gaze of God—in this
case, the gaze of Christ as an all-seeing face.” Marion, “Seeing, or Seeing Oneself Seen,” 310. See also 311-312.
Marion elsewhere in his writings does discuss the importance of the mirror in painting and its ability to let a painting
open itself “onto another space that precedes” it, though not in distinguishing linear and non-linear perspective. See
Marion, The Crossing of the Visible, 7.
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and thus of meaning.”

132

There is even a resistance to being seen, the fear of being naked and

exposed.133 In order to tolerate this being seen, then, there needs to be two conditions: “that there
be alter egos and that they love me.”134 But such conditions are not easily fulfilled. Ultimately,
Marion is concerned about the impossibility of being seen—“as such, not as an object, an
empirical me”—by the other, if the other is caught in the objectifying vision of the subject. 135
Explaining the promise of Cusan, iconic perspective, Marion finally asks: “How do we
get past this objectification, which conceals the other from me at the very moment of presenting
him to me … ? How do we avoid objectifying that which is subject to vision (whether it is me or
an other than me)?” Some kind of leap or break—an escape from the “linearity” of the idolizing,
objectifying gaze which traps one within the horizon of the object and prohibits genuine sight of
the other—is necessary to properly see the other; for Marion, an iconic phenomenology like
Cusan perspective provides just this very thing.136 Marion puts it this way:
In order to be able to see oneself seen as such, and not make oneself seen as an object, it
would thus be necessary to change horizons, which means, exit from the horizon of
objectity, and thus escape from the necessarily objectifying gaze. But what evasion will
allow for such an exodus? For, if nothing less than changing horizons is necessary, it will
have to happen right away, at once, without transition or mediation. It is because it dreads
or is unaware of this radicality that contemporary thought strains to open access to the
other as such.137
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Marion, “Seeing, or Seeing Oneself Seen,” 322. I should note here that Marion draws heavily on Jean-Paul
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At stake in the icon is a kind of “unmediated” mystical leap in exiting the realm of objectifying.
Thus, Marion makes the transition from “vision of God” to “vision of other” through the same
kind of “leaping over” logic of docta ignorantia of mystical darkness we have traced with Cusa.
Marion makes three points about the gaze of the icon (as face of Christ) here from Cusa,
as through it is unfolded the visio Dei: God’s gaze is non-objectifying, individualizing, and
loving. 138 As such, God’s absolute sight “is freed from the horizon of objectity and no one can
or should be able, strictly speaking, to idolize it.”139 The fundamentally transcendent dimension
of the mysterious opacity of the Infinite opens us up to embrace otherness. In this way, Marion’s
stress on the iconic, absolute dimension seems to preserve the ungraspable, uncapturable aspects
of perspective expressed theologically in Cusa through the motif of mystical darkness—which,
through its opacity-as-potential (as fund or fount) opens up all particularity of vision toward
otherness. And yet, I have shown that linear perspective itself similarly lays claim to a
perspective in which one sees oneself seen; this troubles the possibility of understanding vision
only through an iconic phenomenology as it puts in play the (eventually realized) possibility of
“the vision of God” being lent to the modern self.
Indeed, while Marion’s phenomenology of the icon, with its infinite dimension of vision,
puts the possibilities for transcendental subjectivity in the light of their productive capacity
toward acceptance of otherness, the problem is whether this configuration of the icon negates the
enigmatic mirror that gives it power to grant genuine vision. By linking the icon so closely with

Marion, “Seeing, or Seeing Oneself Seen,” 323-324. On this last point, Marion draws out from Cusa this
implication: “while the gaze of the natural attitude (ours) occupies itself first with seeing without any concern for
loving, at the risk of not loving in order better to possess …, God sees insofar as he loves, and to the extent that he
loves—that is to say, he sees universally, because he loves infinitely.” 324. This kind of mode of seeing should be
contrasted with the mode of seeing borne out of the libido vivendi I will discuss in the last section of this chapter.
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God’s absolute vision and with an experience of immediacy, Marion (reflecting a broader
operation in modern perspective as a whole) hides the hermeneutical moment within the
phenomenological moment, the interpretation of perception within the immediacy of sight. A
whole history and operation—which I have traced above archaeologically within the operation of
Renaissance perspective in terms of the mirror, and which is fundamentally concerned with
overcoming the mediation of darkness and enigma—haunts any claim to immediacy of sight that
modern perspective and its subjectivity claims for itself. These considerations make the opacity
that marks the divide between seeing the other as object or as other as a divide that is already (in
its potentiality) a racial problem. Any absolute gaze, in its factical manifestation, is an
authoritarian panopticon, one perspective masquerading as the universal perspective. Such
transcendental vision does not untie the enigma that marks the divide between seeing the other as
object or as truly other, but only reinscribes the aporia on a higher plane. This calls for not an
anchoring of perception in absolute sight but a paying attention to facticity, to particularity and to
the categorical—that is, a paying attention to the hermeneutical suspension of the immediacy of
vision. This is where Falque in particular troubles Marion’s iconic phenomenology—precisely
(as we have traced) in terms of the working of the mirror.
Cusan Perspective and Communitarian Subjectivity
Emmanuel Falque rightly moves us to understand what Cusa is doing in light of the
mirror and Renaissance perspective. Like Marion, he centers on this central confession of
“because you regard me, I am” and considers the problem of genuine sight of the other to be
central to Cusan perspective. Falque, however, problematizes Marion’s iconic conceptuality and
its claim to immediacy of vision as he focuses on the hermeneutical and intersubjective nature of
sight as forged upon the mirror. Reflecting on this notion of seeing oneself seen, Falque writes:
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In short, it is a ‘reversability’ of the looking and the looked-at, which, in giving itself in
the darkness of the impossibility of seeing oneself, deepens that which still remains
overall translucent in the duplicity of the touching-touched. I cannot see-myself-seeing,
although I am able to touch-myself-touching. In this discrepancy—or better, in this
enigma of the emergence of seeing—there is the entire history of thought. From ideation
(idein) to intuition (intuere), no one sees himself or thinks himself outside of the pupil of
the other.140
Reflecting on Cusa’s all-seer, Falque argues that what Cusa is doing here is to make “the
intention of seeing in the counter-intention of the seen the ordinary mode of all true vision”; thus,
argues Falque: “the subjectivity of the seen in its self-perception or apperception requires the
intersubjectivity of seeing in order to be constituted precisely as vision.”141 Vision is only
counter-vision, and the self is born only in the sight of the other.
Falque correctly notes the importance of Renaissance perspective for Cusa, and this
becomes decisive for his difference with Marion. Referencing Jan van Eyck’s Giovanni Arnolfini
and his Wife (1434), Falque writes of the rise of the all-seeing gaze in the “new perspective” of
Renaissance paintings, specifically connecting this motif to the “new use of ‘mirror’ . . . as it is
attested in the aesthetics of the fifteenth century and as it is also in use by Nicholas of Cusa in his
theology,” which, Falque claims, marks the rupture that overturns the order of vision. He
continues: “a world takes place in the mirror, which, far from merely reflecting, attracts us to it,
to the point of containing another reality that I do not see.”142 Falque continues:
I am taken and seen in my own space of seeing, in the very place of my spectacle, rather
than taken and transported into the unseen where I am lost because of my not being
sighted. Where the ‘icon,’ in the Byzantine and philosophical sense of the word, has
drawn me into a ‘depth’ of that which is not me, the ‘image’ or the ‘painting,’ in the

140

Falque, “The All-Seeing,” 761.

141

Falque, “The All-Seeing,” 762.

142

Falque, “The All-Seeing,” 769–770.

216
Renaissance and aesthetic sense of the concept, refers me to a me or self captured by the
gaze of another rather than engulfed in it.143
Whereas the icon engulfs the observer, the Renaissance mirror “allows for the ‘including the one
looking with the represented space.’”144
This new “inclusive” space created by the Renaissance perspective painting with its
conceptuality of the mirror is already and necessarily communal and intersubjective, as it
engenders the birth of the self as one is seen by others in filial community. It is not just that
“[t]he inverted mirror of the One who truly sees me in him constitutes me as subject,” 145 but that
this happens for Cusa, argues Falque, upon the “‘non-place’ of God who can dwell everywhere
at once;” this binds the community “by a common vision not just ‘one to another’ one by one but
between ‘one and another’ together in the Third of a ‘common world’ which is the perception of
God himself, or rather the possibility of always being perceived and received by him.” 146 In
stressing this intersubjectivity to Cusan perspective, Falque interrupts the icon’s transcendent
vision by the anterior situation of being seen by another (brother), thus creating a network of
various perspectives in the “third” of a common vision—without (supposedly) recourse to
securing this transcendentally. Here Falque pays better attention to the hermeneutical
sedimentation of modern perspective. Indeed, noting how for Cusa “seeing is … reading” (DVD
8 §29, p. 248), Falque writes: “No phenomenology without hermeneutics, then, nor presentation
of the image without speech or interpretation of the image.”147 This space for an “intervening”
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critical hermeneutics amidst the immediacy of sight opens up the importance of other senses,
especially that of listening, which are less prone to being co-opted by a transcendental lightdarkness schematic.
This interruption of immediate vision and experience of God is decisive. Accordingly, the
crux of Cusa’s experiment, argues Falque, is the hearing of the “revelation of the witness” who
“reveals the validity of the revealed to me,” because otherwise the reality of the All-Seer would
have been impossible.148 Indeed, as I have already recounted, Cusa writes that “unless the first
brother believed [his neighbor], he would not imagine this [all-seer] to be possible” (DVD 3, p.
236). Still, Falque goes so far as to argue that here the filial “gives way to the fraternal in the
vision of God.”149 An aesthetics of reception intervenes amidst the apparent immediacy of sight,
replacing the ontic with the modal:
Advising a monk to ‘ask’ another brother if my real vision (of being followed everywhere
by the gaze wherever I go) could be his as well amounts to relativizing my real in his
possible, and making out of his possible my truly real. And it is the only measure in
which he also verifies his real by what was my real, even though I have always held his
as ‘im-possible’ …, our respective reals encounter one another and become attuned to
one another, thereby creating something like another and new possible world.150
The Cusan experience is less about God’s absoluteness and more about my neighbor in whose
perspective I have to trust. Perspective awaits verification—not by God, but by the testimony of
my neighbor who alone can reveal what God has to say: that while seeing me, God also
simultaneously sees the other.151
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The danger here is whether all verticality (or the infinite) has collapsed into a
horizontality with its own kind of linearity, whether finitude has taken upon itself a certain
transcendence that obscures the hermeneutics of the mirror from which it arises. Relating his
interpretation to the broader Quattrocento spirit regarding faith in humanity, Falque writes that
the vertical transcendence at stake in Cusan perspective is
revealed heuristically in the horizontality of this Painting hung on the northern wall, …
where man is not so much taken up in the verticality of the Wholly Other as he is
confirmed in the horizontality of this Other who gives himself to man, to all of them
together and each one at the same time, in one same place and with one same gaze which
is enough to diversify Him in a community constituted by Him.152
In making this point, however, Falque comes close to having the same problem I have discussed
in critiquing Marion. Instead of, one could say, horizontality being hidden in verticality (for
Marion), here a certain verticality remains hidden in the horizontality. In both cases, finitude can
come to be negated. In fact, I believe that Falque looks past the dangers of the emergence of
“Man” here (with the immediate vision “Man” actually does claim) and, in fact, shows the very
roots of the transition from opacity-as-enigmatic-potentiality to opacity-as-racialized—the
collapsing of opacity, in modern thought, into the immanent plane along with a banishment of
translucency at stake in the iconic dialectic.
These two thinkers, in the end, highlight both the complexity of Cusan perspective (in its
nonlinear and linear aspects) and its phenomenological importance—certain phenomenological
considerations that help begin to shape my eventual constructive move toward a contemporary
hermeneutical phenomenology of whiteness. On the threshold of modernity, Cusan perspective
carefully reveals the conceptuality of the apparatus of modern perspective in its theological
foundations upon the notion of mystical darkness, but provides a certain nuance and therefore
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critique of the trajectory of modern perspective since it does not yet commit to the trajectory of
the racialization of modern perspective through the development of whiteness. But the question
then becomes: Is it at all possible for the perspective that we have inherited—even if exposed in
this way—to generate a subjectivity able to genuinely see the other? Falque shows us a way
forward with Cusa’s conceptuality. It must become our concern to wrestle with how, as our
phenomenological exploration has shown, an all-too-immediate phenomenological vision is tied
up in, but seeks to negate, a hermeneutics of the mirror that is at stake in the intersubjectivity of
seeing oneself seen. Until we first release any non-linear perspective from its linear strictures, its
full potential is not easily activated. As we have closely examined how Cusan perspective lays
open the apparatus that modern, transcendental subjectivity founds itself upon, we can
understand how linear perspective co-opts the power of the mirror. To understand the obscuring
of the negation of the enigma is to begin to understand racialization.
Mirror as Screen: phenomenological genesis of modern subjectivity
In the end, for Cusa, opposed to Nyssa, the mirror represents or engenders the disjunction
between the senses and rationality, and thus represents a negative center in the midst of human
freedom. Gregory’s epektatic synthesis is stretched to a breaking point as a human infinite is
crafted anew alongside the divine infinite. The mirror comes to function as a type of screen in
Cusa, which brings together the seemingly contradictory ideas in modern perspective of a
“looking through” (of a window) and of a turning back of vision (in the mirror). Even Alberti’s
“window” turned out to be more of a screen, since it was a “rectilinear frame gridded with a
network of strings” (which he called a “veil,” velum in Latin).153 The veiling nature of Alberti’s
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window-grid already anticipates (or impinges upon) the enigmatic quality of the mirror in nonlinear perspectives. The screen, then, brings both ideas together in the dialectic of transparency
and opacity—yet not the same kind of dialectic at stake in the icon’s dialectic of opacity and
translucency. Through its straining, obstructing, or (re-)directing function, a screen only
secondarily serves the transparency and openness of the window. As the screen or veil grows in
opacity (almost toward solidification, maximizing this obstructing function), it transmogrifies its
seeing-through visibility into the “virtual” visibility of projection (as with a movie screen). It
saturates finitude with pure idea. In terms of Cusan perspective and the trajectory it enlivens, the
enigma of the mirror absorbs into itself, under the dense veil of mystical darkness, a kind of
substantive opacity and becomes a solid screen. While purporting to retain its transparent seeingthrough and world-opening qualities, the Cusan mirror operates according to a kind of
transparency saturated with mental ideation, capturing the nuance of depth and variability into its
fair and flat surface and re-arranging it according to the transcendental logic which befits a
homogeneous and rational conception of space.
Cusa’s effort to loosen and indeed to sever the participatory relation between the finite
and the infinite through the notion of perspective affected no less than the now more technical
suturing of the rift through the formation of a new center of transperspectival subjectivism. This
engendered a kind of techno-artificing of the subjective perspective of the finite in order to reach
the infinite by way of mere causal link. Such a re-orientation of the relationship between finitude
and infinitude, crafted upon the discourse of the mirror-as-screen, empowered a desire to
unriddle the enigma, to capture the unknown through what one can measure.154 Ultimately the

In DVD, Cusa writes of God: “you will to be grasped and possessed by me and yet to remain incomprehensible
and infinite. … unless you remained infinite, you would not be the end of desire.” DVD 16 §68, p. 266. Desire, on
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newly freed mind “is moved to measure by the desire to measure itself and its own capacity.”
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A new world is engendered in the virtual reality created by the screen as the transcendental
subject projects externally its imagination fueled by the eye’s infinitely-expanding reach.156 But
claiming to have screened out our finitude (including the material body and the realm of colors)
by virtue of the disembodied seeing subject, linearity only carries within itself the hidden—now
repressed—presence of finitude as it advances into a virtual infinity.157 What Cusa does with his
perspectivism—this hiding of enigma within an omnivoyant or transcendental frame—engenders
a larger history of modernity and forms a new world in which one’s particular vantage point is
given over to a symbolism of color.
As Belting notes, the subject’s “impulse to see—his visual drive—leads into uncertain
territory.”158 Marion refers to such “uncertain territory” as a “counter-world” that the screen
creates. While a mirror can, ideally, open a world, Marion argues a screen does not represent an
“opening of a world but rather an (en)closure of it.” He continues: “the screen substitutes for the
things of the world an idol constantly repeated for viewers, an idol multiplied without spatial or
temporal limits, in order to attain the cosmic scope of a counter-world.” Such a counter-world is
normed by the desire to see (libido vivendi), “which satisfies itself with the solitary pleasure of
the screen, [and] does away with love by forbidding sight of the other face—invisible and

this account, is both enmeshed in infinitude and tied to the one’s subjective internal drive to grasp and possess in our
finitude. Now the horizon of the unknown fundamentally represents or marks the lack of mastery of finitude as one
desires to see with clarity and certainty.
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real.”

159

Everything is filled up merely as the product of what one wants to see and comes to

form an economy of commerce, distribution, and commodification. While linear perspective and
its disembodied seeing subject claims to open a world in screening out any kind of mediation
(desires, finitude, body, colors, and so on), instead it encloses our subjectivity back upon itself,
engendering a (virtual) counter-world fueled by the repression of otherness. The screen might
open a view for the first time, but only as the finite, material world is first broken by framing it.
Yet an actual, material world, our modern world, does come to birth in linear
perspective. This “conquest of the world as picture”—in Heidegger’s words—is already a
colonial world because it is a world constitutionally normed by both the mirror-turned-screen
and the libido vivendi. As such, it is crafted through the negation of darkness, now not just of
mystical darkness but of unknown lands and dark-skinned people. This is not merely a
philosophical line of thought. Cusa and his close friend Paolo Toscanelli, as well as Alberti,
shared a great interest in geography and accurate cartography. In fact, as Harries explains,
Toscanelli “is rumored to have been the author of the chart that first encouraged Columbus to
seek the East by going west.”160 And Cusa, in his Compendium, explicitly paints a picture of
humankind as a geographer who, having “five gateways of the five senses” receives messengers
“from all over the world [to] enter [these gateways of the senses] and report on the entire
condition of the world.” Continuing to receive the messengers to gain more accuracy, once “he
has made in his city a complete delineation of the perceptible world, then in order not to lose it,
he reduces it to a well-ordered and proportionally measured map.” In this, there is ultimately an
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analogy to God as a geographer.
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My examination fundamentally puts into question what was

at stake in this exercise of trying to clarify the horizon and seek a new world: whether or not this
seeking to unriddle the enigma (of unknown, dark lands) was a matter of hiding “alternative”
perspectives (that is, native ordering of space) within linearity. Walter Mignolo, for example,
writes that “the process of putting the Americas on the map . . . was at the same time a process of
concealing the Amerindian’s representation of space.”162
One could, however, argue with Cary Nederman, reflecting on Cusa’s De Concordantia
Catholica, that Cusa himself did not envision such an “imperial reach;” that, in fact, “Cusanus’s
emphasis on the ‘historicity’ of secular political life, and hence of the inescapable diversity of
systems of rule, may indeed be viewed as a recurring theme in his social thought.”163 There is
even an ethnic rootedness to his insistence of various systems of consent of governance. In a
similar vein, de Certeau argues that Cusa was trying to articulate “dispersion without being able
to reduce it to unity.”164 Nevertheless, Cusa’s “one religion in a variety of rites” envisions “a
decidedly Christian unity of belief in matters of salvation.”165 In yet another register, then, we
observe the hiding and negating of unknown, unseen, “dark” particularities within a unifying
linearity. The uneasiness with darkness and the unknown in the phenomenological and
perceptive domain inevitably finds its way to the ethical and political domain. In a “new world”
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of cultural contact, a symbolism of color is at play as the libido vivendi seeks to master darkness
and the unknown as art, aesthetics, and theology meet at the very point of color, of light, of
darkness and shadow within the discourse of the “darkness of God.”

What I have accomplished in this chapter is to show how the mirror and mystical darkness were
decisive for the making of the self. And it was decisive in this way: that the very constitution of
the modern self was as the self sought to hide and make inoperative its own darkness. Modern
perspective—as it is shaped by both perspectiva artificialis and Cusan’s theological
perspective—fundamentally is marked by a manifold “cleavage”: between knowledge achieving
greater precision of the indivisible; between a “vision” of some ultimately unknowable truth.
And the subject, here, too, is marked by a cleavage, as a being in history with a certain
perspective and yet as one able to verify or authorize this perspective. 166 The notion of opacity
marks and defines these cleavages, perhaps because it marks the (a)topos upon which these
cleavages are forged: the enigma or mirror which is already essentially opaque. And yet the
significance of Cusa—as threshold figure, caught between mystic and modern, a figure who
conceptualizes the apparatus of modern perspective but does not fully seize on it—is that he
exposes and shows these very cleavages (and thus reveals fissures to recover a perspectival
thinking that might come to critique modernity’s hubris). We can witness in Cusa’s work the
secret concordance (not yet entirely a discordance) between interpretation and intuition,
hermeneutics and phenomenology, the enigma and the ego.167 Consider how Cusa ends his De
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visione Dei, where he writes: “each intellectual spirit sees in you, my God, something which
must be revealed to the others if they would attain to you, their God, in the best possible way,” as
each “reveal[s] their secrets to one another” (DVD 25 §117, p. 288). With such a promise, Cusa’s
“virtual reality” created within the forging of this secret concordance between enigma and
selfhood could be recovered as a type of distanciation or epoché necessary to recover subjectivity
not as foundation but as task.168 In my conclusion, then, Emmanuel Falque’s argument will be
further explored regarding how Cusa develops perspective in order to build a public space found
only through the multiplicity of perspectives. Here, enigmatic opacity is the potentiality that
fundamentally dispossesses us, even while shaping our selfhood; a darkness or thickness in its
anteriority before being pathologized, like a horizon never reached: this is mystical darkness in
its promise.
In the next chapter, I want to pick back up Panofsky’s claim regarding the “symbol of
perspective” and especially its connection to Kant and modern thought, and how the darkness at
stake in the enigma and the mirror becomes ontologized, so to speak, in contributing to the
construction of race as a social construct. This will be, in part, to revisit the link between Cusan
perspective and the modern rationality of Descartes and Kant. Particularly, I will explore how the
notion of “moral geographies” explains how modern perspective’s “color code” and “color
space” continue to shape how notions of form and space perceive and create the modern and
racialized world.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PATHOLOGIZATION OF MODERN PERSPECTIVE TOWARD
COLONIALISM AND A SYMBOLISM OF EVIL
In January 1455, seven years after Pope Nicholas V elevated Cusanus as cardinal, the
Pope, through the bull Romanus Pontifex, would cast space as racialized and colonized as he
granted the known world at the time to King Alfonso V of Portugal. After referencing in
narrative account how “many Guineamen and other negroes, taken by force, and some by barter
of unprohibited articles, or by other lawful contracts of purchase, have been sent to the said
kingdoms,” papal permission is given King Alfonso (and Prince Henry) to:
invade, search out, capture, vanquish, and subdue all Saracens and pagans whatsoever, …
and the kingdoms, dukedoms, principalities, dominions, possessions, and all movable and
immovable goods whatsoever held and possessed by them and to reduce their persons to
perpetual slavery, and to apply and appropriate to himself and his successors the
kingdom, dukedoms, counties, principalities, dominions, possessions, and goods, and to
convert them to his and their use and profit.1
Reflecting on this racial grasping of “geographic authority over all peoples and all lands,” Willie
Jennings writes: “From the beginning of the colonialist moment, being white placed one at the
center of the symbolic and real reordering of space. In a real sense, whiteness comes into being
as a form of landscape with all its facilitating realities.”2 This begins to answer Damisch’s

“Bull Romanus Pontifex, January 8, 1455,” in European Treatises Bearing on the History of the United States and
Its Dependencies to 1648, vol. 1, ed. Frances Gardiner Davenport (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington,
1917), 23. See Willie James Jennings, The Christian Imagination: Theology and the Origins of Race (New Haven,
CT: Yale, 2010), 26-29.
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question that has been before us: “Perspective designates it in the art of painting. But who
designates it in truth and ethics?”3 That is to say, though the perspectival viewpoint gives an
apparatus that engenders that point from which the picture of reality is truthfully constituted, we
are left to ask who the one is whose viewpoint organizes the world and its space that comes to be.
Considering our examination of Cusa, this is now the question of how the “color space” of
modern perspective is manifest racially in the new world. While Cusan perspective only begins
to show the problematic overcoming of the enigmatic power of reverse perspective by linear
perspective, modern perspective closes the theological tension that Cusa tried to keep open: the
theological crafting of a new experience of human transcendence simultaneous with a
magnification of divine infinity gives way to the modern crafting of a merely human infinite, as
the depth of opacity is seized upon and used in the colonialist racialization of the new world.
So I ask in this chapter what happens to this mystical center of divine darkness and its
opacity as the threshold is crossed into modernity. If Cusa’s “learned ignorance” represents the
unique theological foundation of modern perspective at its emergence, this chapter inquires how
this mystical “unknowing” becomes in modernity a kind of epistemic “ignorance” that, through a
secret evil, creates and perpetuates the racialization of space. I show that this is not coincidental
but constitutional to modern reason. Consider, for example, Kant’s confession of the hidden
center at stake in his transcendental schematic that relates sensibility to intelligibility:
This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere
form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul [ist eine verborgene Kunst in
den Tiefen der menschlichen Seele] whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely
ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze.4
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This hidden (mystical) center of unknowing in modern reason, I assert, emboldens white sight as
it gains ascendency by using the “unknowing” engendered by opacity, now not as productive
toward meaning-making but as cultivating the solidification of meaning by claiming an
absoluteness that latches on to logics of transparency and lucidity. Tracing the development of
white sight in this way ultimately highlights the production of space: how a symbolism of color
enmeshed in a symbolism of evil leads to a moral geography in which geographical space is
produced out of and in service to these symbolic commitments.
In this chapter, I will first seek to understand the connection between Cusan perspective
and modern perspective by highlighting how perspective functions as a symbol, drawing on
Erwin Panofsky and Ernst Cassirer. I will closely examine how Cusa’s perspectivism shapes
modern reason, highlighting what is at stake in the mystical unknowing of Cusa which is
inherited by modern reason. In light of this, I will trace out how “learned ignorance” is utilized
as a colonial logic toward a “white ignorance.” I will, second, examine how Kant’s views on
freedom and reason are built on a hidden mystical foundation, not to argue Cusa was a modern
(even a proto-Kantian, as some have done), but to argue that Kant himself is indebted to mystical
thought in shaping modern reason. I will especially focus on how Kant deals with the problem of
evil in light of the mystical center, and how this issues in the pathologization of opacity in the
fetish. Third, to understand how the fetish relates to the (ab)use of opacity, I will trace a certain
pathologization of opacity toward the fetish by way of the sublime and uncanny. Understanding
this modern (ab)use of opacity, will be key for us in getting to the question of how race is
symbolized as a symbol of evil within modernity’s moral geography. The fetishization of opacity
shows how anxiety over filiation and generation fundamentally shapes and obscures modern—
and theological—vision. Finally, this brings to a head our exploration of the “desiring subject,”
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the modern subject who desires after the genuine infinite but displaces this desire by forging a
material world through moral geography. Such a move toward a psychoanalysis of whiteness
highlights the dissimulation of symbolic meaning and the need to therapeutically work through
this. This is not meant to overcome a broader picture of the productive and teleological
dimension to mystical darkness (and the possibility of embracing it in the undoing of white
sight)—a point I will highlight in my closing chapter.
From Cusa to Colonial Perspective
The connection between Cusa and modernity is a debated topic, but I want to forge a new
path in focusing on how Cusan perspective intersects with growing racial logics through modern
reason: that is, how mystical darkness becomes the unthought, racialized foundation of modern
reason. Drawing on Ernst Cassirer and Erwin Panofsky, I discuss how perspective comes to
operate symbolically, and how this angle can explore a nuanced way in which Cusa’s mystical
center impacts modern thought. I focus on how Cusan mysticism is carried into and affects
modernity in a complex way focused on the crafting of a new sense of transcendence. I then
show the ways in which mystical unknowing begins to take on a new dimension as it is
racialized. In the rise of colonial reason, there is the concerted effort to render inoperative
“myth” or other enigmatic and “unreasonable” elements. But mystical darkness is still utilized
under the surface—though now in a new way that empowers a “white ignorance” which enables
the quiet violence catalyzing colonial evil.
On Linear Perspective as Symbol
Through the notion of docta ignorantia, Cusanus brings mysticism across the threshold
of modernity. We must understand how perspective functions symbolically to see how this is the
case. Erwin Panofsky, drawing on Ernst Cassirer, refers to linear perspective in this way, writing
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that perspective may “be characterized as (to extend Ernst Cassirer’s felicitous term to the
history of art) one of those ‘symbolic forms’ in which ‘spiritual meaning is attached to a
concrete, material sign and intrinsically given to this sign.’”5 Perspective is not merely an art
technique but a way of seeing or new subjectivity related to and rooted in the concrete world. My
examination of the founding apparatus of linear perspective in the previous chapter has already
prepared us to realize how perspective affects subjectivity through its symbolic nature. As
Damisch argues: “In the art of painting the impact of perspective is not limited to the register of
the imaginary; it not only facilitates the construction of images, it assumes a role, a function that
we may properly designate as symbolic.”6 That is to say (here Damisch is using a Lacanian
framework), the perspective apparatus does not just shape the images issuing from one’s
imagination but shapes the very imagination that produces images. The question is how the
symbolic apparatus of perspective engenders subjectivity in this way and what kind of shape this
subject takes. And for me, specifically: how, in this, the modern self hides its indebtedness to the
mystical center and power of the enigma upon which it is forged. From this unthought center,
modern notions of race emerge as the production of racialized space takes hold in the world.
Panofsky argues that linear perspective is symbolically effectual in that it represents not
just an aesthetic experience, but the experience of the world as infinite. Working out of the
school of Alois Riegl, who sought to connect the Kunstwollen or spirit in art with the broader
“will” (Wollen) of the epoch and its “worldview” (Weltanschauung), Panofsky utilized Cassirer’s
notion of “symbolic form” (which I will soon explore) to strengthen Riegel’s idea of art as
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expression of Wollen, seeking to analyze it according to formal categories. In this way,
Panofsky approached Renaissance linear perspective in terms of its transcendental structure,
moving away from the questions of style and aesthetics of Riegel’s historical relativism.8 I
myself have already shown how Panofsky argues that Renaissance perspective seeks to create a
rational, infinite, homogenous, and mathematical space by complete abstraction from the
apparently psychophysiological processes that engendered antique notions of space. 9 For
Panofsky, the development of perspective technique decisively moves toward that point when
“‘aesthetic space’ and ‘theoretical space’ recast perceptual space in the guise of one and the same
sensation: in one case that sensation is visually symbolized, in the other it appears in logical
form.”10 In this way the perspective technique refashions the world itself into “a substantial and
measurable world” in the face of an infinite continuum forged by way of art and science.11
Panofsky traces the development of linear perspective up to Lorenzetti’s Annunciation of 1344,
where orthogonals on the ground plane are all oriented toward a single point; he writes: “the
discovery of the vanishing point, as ‘the image of the infinitely distant points of all the
orthogonals,’ is, in a sense, the concrete symbol for the discovery of the infinite itself.”12 And yet
“the concept of infinity is still in the making” (as well as the specifics of linear technique, which

Christopher S. Wood “Introduction” in Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, 11-12. Wood writes that
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were approached differently in different regions of Europe). Finally, around Jan van Eyck there
was a “fully unified orientation of the entire plane.”13 The symbol of perspective in this way
functions to open a new infinite world. Panofsky writes: “[t]he picture has become a mere ‘slice’
of reality, to the extent and in the sense that imagined space now reaches out in all directions
beyond represented space, that precisely the finiteness of the picture makes perceptible the
infiniteness and continuity of the space.”14 In this way, explains Panofsky, the Renaissance
succeeded in mathematically fully rationalizing an image of space which had already
earlier been aesthetically unified. This, as we have seen, involved extensive abstraction
from the psychophysiological structure of space, and repudiation of the antique
authorities. But, on the other hand, it was now possible to construct an unambiguous and
consistent spatial structure of (within the limits of the ‘line of sight’) infinite extension,
where bodies and the intervals of empty space between them were merged in a regular
fashion into a corpus generaliter sumptum.15
In this way, perspective concretely expressed and carried forth all the larger scientific and
epistemological understandings regarding changes in spatiality. Art rose to science. Moreover,
“the subjective visual impression was indeed so far rationalized that this very impression could
itself become the foundation for a solidly grounded and yet, in an entirely modern sense,
‘infinite’ experiential world.”16 A certain symbolization comes back upon the world to
(re)interpret the world (and its materiality) itself.
Before assessing how Cusan perspective relates to this, let me turn to Cassirer, since
Panofsky builds his argument by drawing on Cassirer’s notion of “symbolic form.” Cassirer’s
neo-Kantian project attempts “to renew the project of critical philosophy … within a framework
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no longer delimited by the power of reason alone” and thus on the level of a broader cultural
critique.17 Cassirer was concerned with “how the universal in the form of the concept can
combine with the sense impression of the particular” beyond the confines of mere reason.18 In his
general notion of symbolization, he thought he had found this critical “all-embracing medium in
which the most diverse cultural forms meet,” this “grammar of the symbolic function as such”
which gave him a universal way to understand cultural forms.19 Kant’s own answer here had
been in the “third thing,” in some way both intellectual and sensible, which he called the
“transcendental schema.” 20 This transcendental schema is that “art concealed” in the soul that
cannot be discovered (which I mentioned at the opening of the chapter), though we are conscious
of a “synthesis” at stake.21 Cassirer connects his own understanding of the symbol and symbolic
form to this central notion of Kant’s transcendental schema. For Cassirer the symbol is “the
constant intermediary of all human consciousness and activity.”22 As such, the symbol, through
the power of the mind, is able to transform human sensuousness into intelligible, meaningful
human existence.23 For Cassirer, symbolic form is specifically about the “inner form” or
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constitutional putting-together of various spheres of human culture (language, logic, art, and so
on) that moves them forward. Functioning in this way, the symbol is very broad (much broader
than that of Ricoeur which we have explored), covering the way in which culture in its vastness
builds itself and moves forward.24 Especially interesting for us is the relation between myth,
language, and logic in Cassirer’s notion of symbolic form.
It is important to understand key forms and their relation to each other. Language has a
particularly central place, for it is fundamentally and essentially symbolic more than other
symbolic forms.25 Language also points toward the growth from myth to logic. In speaking of
this transition from myth to language to logic, Cassirer focuses on the sensory origins of
language (like pointing and mimicking) and how this is surpassed in the ascension to ideality.
Cassirer writes: “Sensory-physical grasping becomes sensory interpretation which in turn
conceals within it the first impulse toward the higher functions of signification manifested in
language and thought.”26 In this way, “the coordinations and classifications of language contain a
certain ideality, a tendency toward the objective unity of the ‘idea.’”27 The symbolic trajectory is
a movement from the mythic level to language and then to logic.
Myth, for Cassirer, is the beginning of all forms, though it is eventually overcome.28
Instead of placing language (and thereby logic) in productive dialectic with myth, Cassirer seeks
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to cull that excess to get to abstraction and concept, stressing logic of clarity over the logic of
enigma: “If language is to grow into a vehicle of thought, an expression of concepts and
judgments, this evolution can be achieved only at the price of forgoing the wealth and fullness of
immediate experience. In the end, what is left of the concrete sense and feeling content it once
possessed is little more than a bare skeleton.”29 In this move from mythic thought to reason
“language becomes liberated from the immediacy of the stream of sensory impressions.”30
Although originally grounding itself in the power of the myth, language liberates itself toward a
new spiritual power through art.31 This “progression” in symbolic form towards transcendental
schematism is key. Cassirer writes:
In this function language casts off, as it were, the sensuous covering in which it has
hitherto appeared: mimetic or analogical expression gives way to purely symbolic
expression which, precisely in and by virtue of its otherness, becomes the vehicle of a
new and deeper spiritual content.32
Unlike Ricoeur, where the symbol fundamentally maintains connection with its sensuous, mythic
element, for Cassirer there is a doing away with it as logic gives us “our most comprehensive
grasp of experience.”33
All of this is quite relevant for us in that Cassirer connects myth to a symbolism of evil
since it is normed by notions of the sacred and profane. Drawing on Rudolph Otto’s notion of the
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sacred in The Idea of the Holy, Cassirer distinguishes mythic thought from logic by the fact that
myth is immediate and possessive instead of reflective and objective; instead of the universality
of logic and law, it relies on the intensity and uniqueness of personal experience. This later
aspect of myth yields the counterpart of universal objectivity in the idea of “transcendence” and
with this the notion of the “sacred.”34 Mythical symbolization affects the following according to
Cassirer: “All reality and all events are projected into the fundamental opposition of the sacred
and the profane, and in this projection they assume a new meaning, one which they do not
simply have from the very beginning but which they acquire in this form of contemplation, one
might say in this mythical ‘illumination.’”35 The symbolics of evil of this mythic space—that is,
notions of sacred and profane which divide and organize experience—is effective in grasping
together the notion of the world in a unified and transcendent consciousness. But, Cassirer
argues, this is fundamentally different than the logical synthesis that emerges in the scientific
mindset.36 Thus, myth and its symbolism of evil is overtaken and overcome by the abstraction of
space produced in logic, as one grows from (primitive) mythology to rationality and civilization.
As symbol, then, modern perspective is the forging of an idealized space upon the
destruction of a mythical center. Thus, the symbolic form, in Damisch’s reflection, is “the
conquest of the world as representation.”37 This discussion of Panofsky and Cassirer opens a
horizon in which we understand modern perspective as a symbol and can interrogate how as such
it affects modern subjectivity and rationality. For Cassirer, symbolization moves myth and
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language toward ideality and logic. Panofsky capitalizes on this notion of “symbolic form” and
applies it to perspective. Now, what is ultimately at stake in this idea of perspective as “symbolic
form” is whether perspective betrays merely a regional history of a certain artistic style, or
whether it is a part of the very way subjectivity is engendered in the apprehending of the world
(the symbolic formation of subjectivity, a claim which is at the heart of my own project as a
whole).38 Damisch himself doubts that Panofsky properly proves the truly symbolic nature of
perspective (Damisch himself claims to do so by discussing perspective in a Lacanian frame).39
In the end, Damisch argues that Panofsky’s work is difficult to “debunk” from an historical
standpoint and can complement Cassirer in some ways. Panofsky’s analysis and historical work
“demonstrates, makes tangible, how art was able, in its own way, to serve as both site and
instrument of an intellectual project casting doubt” on certain Aristotelian frameworks that held
back thought on the infinite universe.40
From Cusa to Modern Rationality
Thinking of linear perspective in terms of how sight relates the mythical or mystical
imagination to the materiality of the world and thereby affects a new material reality can grant
us a nuanced view of the relation between Cusa and modernity. Cusa’s docta ignorantia
represents a distinctly theological and mystical project that critiques (that is, shows the limits of)
modern rationality, even as it encapsulates an early form of such modern thinking. The versatility
of Cusa’s thought in this regard particularly hinges on a new understanding of transcendence. I
have already noted key changes in form, space, and color reflected in Cusa’s thought—but here I
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ask how it is that Cusan perspective, as symbol, specifically shapes modern thought going
forward. I argue that Cusa’s docta ignorantia, rooted as it is in the notion of mystical darkness,
not only shapes modern reason but does so in such a way as to indebt modern reason to an
enigmatic center (which modern reason then must continually negate and hide). Thus, I want to
focus less on how Cusa’s learned ignorance might have shaped aspects of modern reason more
positively, and more on how learned ignorance, as a form of early modern thought, betrays the
complicated mystical center of the rational project.
There is scholarly consensus that Cusa’s thought had implications for, influenced, or
prefigured scientific developments and modern reason, though the specifics of just how are
disagreed upon. In the previous chapter, I discussed how Cusa’s knowing is perspectival and yet
seeks objectivity. In a significant way, perspectivism itself (especially with Alberti) can be
linked to the rise of the new scientific paradigm and even “offers itself as a figure of the
Cartesian method” with the perceiving subject as its center and measure.41 As Harries describes:
Yet even as reflections on the distorting power of perspective reveal the world to be a
theater of appearances, they also open the way toward a more adequate understanding. …
Through our reason we can transcend the limitation of the here and now and arrive at a
more objective mode of representing the world. As we represent the world we initially
perceive as a collection of objects moving in an endless homogeneous space, the
perspective-bound form of representation characteristic of painting is transformed into
the transperspectival form of representation characteristic of science. … Perspectivebound everyday experience gives way to the descriptions of science.42
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Cusa’s learned ignorance certainly resembles this new scientific outlook which grants a “higher
order” perspective to access reality.43 But Harries points out that, unlike his contemporaries,
Cusa de-centers human knowledge so radically that it “does not seem capable of giving such an
account [of Truth]: it suffers shipwreck on the infinity of space.”44 Dupré similarly highlights
how Cusa’s doctrine of docta ignorantia holds him back from a totalizing claim of “an
exhaustive knowledge of God through the infinite cosmos” as Giordano Bruno does.45
This puzzle is complicated by Cusa’s relation to nominalism and, therein, the rise of the
mind. Dupré writes that nominalism “prepared the scientific revolution” by “conveying to
concepts and terms an exclusively mental status” that could be built into a system of the mind’s
creativity and independence.46 Cusa’s re-orientation of form, space, and color did indeed have to
do with this rise of the mind. The mind constructed for itself a world as it stopped being a
passive contemplator of the cosmos, and instead made the modern world intelligible. Now “the
human subject assumed the part of sole form-giving principle while reducing nature’s given
meaning to a subordinate, increasingly instrumental, position.”47 As an answer to the erasure of
form, nature could be studied in and of itself but also manipulated and mastered through
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technology. I want to highlight this theme of the mind again, now under a new emphasis. What
48

I want to explore is the tension Cusa ventures on to hold together, in the unfolding power of the
mind, a simultaneous magnification of transcendence and immanence as he reflects upon
infinity. Cusa, in holding together the infinity of God and of the human, brings out this theme of
mastery of nature which comes to a head in his notion of filiation, the telos of seeing God.
Cusan perspective holds together a growing tension within the emerging understanding of
transcendence. Through learned ignorance, Cusa uniquely and competently holds together the
integrity, “indeed intensification,” of divine transcendence even as he enfolds this into “the
advancement both of man and the cosmos toward the qualities of this transcendence.”49 The
“world” emerges as an unlimited object that could be interrogated, now with man as infinitely
able to construct it.50 Hans Blumenberg’s exploration of Cusa’s relation to modernity as
threshold figure, in light of Blumenberg’s overall claim that modern subjectivity “reoccupies”
the kind of questions the mystic self was asking (though tries to obscure this in fighting for
legitimacy), draws out the significance of the mystical aspect of Cusan perspective for which I
want to argue.51 Particularly on this point about a new understanding of infinity and

Harries writes: “Alberti, as we shall see, also promises something like a mastery of nature through mathematical
representation. Theory plays an important part in his treatise, but what matters far more is a new desire to put theory
to work.… This embrace of mathematical speculation by a world pursuing worldly interest hints at the social
changes presupposed by the shift from a contemplative science to one aiming at mastery of what is.” Infinity and
Perspective, 16. Emphasis mine. In terms of the promise of science and technology filling this void emptied by the
erasure of form, Harries writes of the sentiment of modernity: “Artifice will gain us back that clarity of vision Adam
lost. Technology will help us undo the results of the Fall.” Harries, Infinity and Perspective, 106.
48

49

Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 1983), 484-485.
50

Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, 485-487.

Blumenberg interprets Cusa as threshold figure, especially related to Copernicus (478-479). He writes: “The
question of the Cusan’s ‘modernity’ promises to open up access to the problem of the legitimacy of the modern age
as well. The solution that suggests itself is, with the help of this early ancestor, to find in the wrong the
consciousness of the modern age, which arose from the will to break with tradition and formed itself in opposition to
51

241
transcendence, Cusa holds together the idea of systemization and consistency from the medieval
system of thought, but in recognition of its decline and an openness to the future of new
knowledge.52 This was an expression of Cusa attempting to occupy, in the words of McGinn,
“the broad middle ground of varying attempts in the Middle Ages to do justice to both faith and
reason in the pursuit of God.”53 The relation between Cusa’s theological docta ignorantia and
the more scientific ideas of rational grasping of infinity lies in the fact that for Cusa “revelation
completes the search for wisdom rather than canceling or overriding it.”54 Cusa can be seen to be
wrestling in a theological frame with the generally emerging new ideas of infinity.
I should point out that Panofsky writes of Cusa that he shows especially clearly the
“transition from the basic cosmological vision of the Middle Ages to that of modernity.”
Although Panofsky adds that for Cusa “the world was not yet truly ‘infinite’ (infinitus), but
nevertheless ‘unlimited’ (indefinitus).”55 Whether understanding the world as “truly” infinite or
not, Cusa is in the midst of constructing a new understanding of infinity which is overall
connected to an unfolding and enfolding connecting God, self, and world in the matter of
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transcendence—“retranslating” transcendence in the direction of anthropology and cosmology.56
Learned ignorance, indeed, becomes the Cusan way of “clasping together [immanence and
transcendence] by means of the image idea” through their mutual intensification.57 This mutual
intensification of transcendence and immanence upon the doctrine of learned ignorance as
mystical center is crafted upon a use of language toward its own limits and self-suspension in
reaching for the infinite:
In this process, language is a medium that can only be brought into relation to the truth by
taking itself as provisional and tending continually toward the point of its selfsuspension. Imagination and language reflect one another from the point of view of the
limiting case of their self-suspension; but this is no longer an act of medieval humility, no
longer the sacrificium intellectus [sacrifice of the intellect] in view of the mysteries of
faith, but rather a quasi-experimental procedure of continually renewed testing of the
boundary of transcendence.58
Through using language (and all of sensible reality) in this way, one “experiences”
transcendence even as they only reach toward it.59 With the notion of docta ignorantia “there
begins a recollection of the unknown, no longer only in order to reject the presumptuousness of
the pretension to knowledge but also at the same time to refer to the still unknown scope for the
expansion of knowledge.”60 This “capacity to reflect on the surpassibility of the state of
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knowledge at any time,” however, does not turn into “the resignation of definite finitude” but,
bringing a certain kind of “unrest” to the modern age, “allows one to see systematic stabilization
as a possible exhaustion of the will to know.”61
How is Cusa’s mystical center functioning here in this project of “retranslating”
transcendence simultaneously in the direction of the divine and the human? In his own day, the
objection to Cusa’s notion of coincidentia oppositorum was concerned with the blurring of the
line between creator and creature, the notion that one could apparently bring “eschatological”
fullness to the here and now.62 But Cusa himself does not (quite) claim eschatological clarity of
vision: figures and finitude can only “lead one to the limit of this visual clarity.”63 I argue,
though, that this problem of “eschatological” intrusion in human knowledge is just where Cusa’s
thought becomes decisive to the unstable foundation of modern rationality. McGinn writes how
Cusa brought together many key tensions in the debates of his time into a synthesis that
fundamentally had to do with unitive vision as filiation.64 It is precisely this point, this sharing of
absolute vision (of God), which gathers up the promise and problem of the mystical center for
modernity and its rationality. The wrapping of human vision into God’s vision (and vice versa)
becomes the first step to the ascendency of a sovereign seer who inhabits a merely human
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infinite and thus must engage in an indefatigable effort to obscure the mystical basis of this new
human power—a base always threatening the deconstruction of this universal vision.
Cusa’s De Filiatione Dei, highlights this dilemma.65 Filiation, Cusa writes, is about the
“perfection of the intellect,” which consists in “the apprehension of truth, not as truth is
bedarkened in figurativeness and symbolisms and various degrees of otherness in this sensible
world but rather as truth is intellectually visible in itself” (1.53, p. 341-342). Cusa writes that
sonship is not achieved fully on this side of life but only when “we are free from this world,” that
is when our intellect intuits the absolute truth “without the contracted bedarkened images of the
sensible world.” Still, we can participate in the Absolute Sonship of Christ through a modal
participation now (1.54, p. 342-343).
One of the main motifs that Cusa uses to discuss filiation is that of mastery. Connecting
sonship to intellectual power which draws on “light’s continual influences,” Cusa discusses the
passage from boyhood to perfect manhood, which is also the transition from servant to master
(2.56, p. 343). Here we learn particular things by the senses, but in the mastery that is filiation
“[w]e pass from the sensible world of particulars unto a universal knowledge, which is present in
the intellectual world” (2.57, p. 343-4). The intellect then must “use,” Cusa argues, “temporal
shadows of the sensible world” in its service (2.60, p. 345). In this way “we will contemplate
intellectual things in and through sensible things; and we will ascend [contemplatively], by
means of a certain disproportional parallelism, from transitory and insubstantial temporal things,
whose being is in constant flux, unto eternal things” (2.61, p. 345). Drawing on the fundamental
notion of coincidentia oppositorum, Cusa writes of being able to see the unattainable God “Face-
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to-face” through the pure intellect (3.62, p. 346). At such a point our intellect “is divine
universal-knowledge in which and through which all things exist” (2.58, p. 344).
To give an illustration of how God can be seen with a “Face-to-face” vision even though
God transcends the intellect, Cusa discusses how a gaze is affected by whether a mirror is
straight or curved (3.62, p. 346). Cusa asks his readers to imagine a beginning Reflection “in
which God Himself appears” as “a Mirror-of-truth that is without blemish, completely straight,
most perfect, and without bounds.” Cusa continues: “And let all creatures be mirrors with
different degrees of contraction and differently curved.” Intellectual natures are like relatively
straight living mirrors, “alive and intellectual and free,” such mirrors that (reminiscent of
Nyssa’s claim of purifying the mirror of one’s soul) “can curve themselves, straighten
themselves, and clean themselves” (3.65, p. 347). These straight mirrors not only reflect and
show the original brightness, but they reflect each other as they are faced toward one another.
Curved mirrors, however, “appear not as they themselves are but in accordance with the
condition of the receiving mirror, i.e., with some diminishment because of the receiving mirror’s
deviation from straightness” (3.66, p. 347). Thus, it is the straight intellectual mirror, like a
“living eye,” that reflects in itself the first Mirror-of-truth; and in reflecting in itself this first
Mirror, it thus “beholds (within itself) all the mirrors in its own [conditioning] manner.” Cusa
writes: “For the more simple and less contracted and more bright, clean, straight, just, and true
[the intellectual mirror] is, the more clearly, joyously, and truly it will behold within itself God’s
glory and all mirrors.” This is sonship, when the intellectual mirror is “all things in all things,
and … all things are in it” (3.67, p. 347-348). In view of this, Cusa calls on his readers to
[mentally] remove the quantitative contractions of the sensible mirrors, and free your
conception from place and time and all things sensible, elevating yourself unto the
rational reflected-brightnesses, where in clear reason our mind beholds truth. (For we
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seek out the hidden recesses of uncertain matters with the clear light of rational
reflection; and we know to be true that which reason teaches us.) Hereupon, transfer the
foregoing paradigm unto the intellectual realm so that by means of such guidance you can
elevate yourself more closely unto mentally viewing divine sonship. For by means of a
certain bedarkened intuition you will be able to relish, in advance, the fact that sonship is
nothing other than our being conducted from the shadowy traces of mere representations
unto union with Infinite Reason, in which and through which our [intellectual] spirit lives
and understands that it lives. (3.68 p 348)
In this way the intellect sees everything living within itself and nothing living outside itself such
that it knows that “in it itself all other things live eternally in such way that they do not maintain
its life but, rather, it is the life of [all other] living things” (3.68 p 348). In this “oneness” there is
a cleansing or purifying process. What is at stake in filiation “is the removal of all otherness and
all difference” as filiation involves being elevated “above all contrarieties, figures, places, times,
images, and contradictions, above [all] alterities, disjunctions, conjunctions, affirmations, and
negations” (3.70-71, 349-350).
Thus, all “sensible objects” are unfolded from God so that, Cusa argues, they might be
mastered in the ascent of the intellect back to God (4.76, p. 352). This sheds light on the theme
of transcendence simultaneously toward God and toward the human mind. Cusa writes:
Therefore, in the possibility of an intellectual spirit’s power there is enfolded all the
power of the heavens and of the things subordinate to the intellectual spirit, so that all the
power in them is a certain unfolding of the intellectual spirit’s power. Now, this present
sensible world participates—in various sensible ways—in the one power in which the
intellectual [world] participates in various intellectual ways. Therefore, the absolute
power of the intellectual world is contracted by the sensible [world] by various modes of
participation. (5.81, p. 354)
The path of filiation, set in the “school of the sensible world” seeks mastery to come to know the
One and all things (6.85, p. 356). The intellect is “a living likeness of God” and, as such, also “a
likeness of all things.” In this way, “the intellect’s knowing all things is nothing other than its
seeing itself as a likeness-of-God—something that is sonship. Hence, by means of a single,
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cognitive intuition it sees all things” (6.86, p. 356-57). Filiation, for Cusa, is coming to inhabit
the absolute visio Dei. As I drive my argument to its close, I want to interrogate the “howness” or
facticity of this filiation—how it has manifested historically as the shaping of a moral geography,
driven by the beautification and (cultural) purity of human nature.
From Learned Ignorance to “White Ignorance”
We must continue to think out how modern perspective, as symbol, affects modern vision
by virtue of the dynamics of its apparatus, that is, how the mystical center which supports
modern thought is hidden but still functions. At the center of modern perspective and the thought
it engenders (with its “color code”), opacity takes on a new form and function, now as a
malignant ignorance; at its core already racialized, it disguises itself as a universal seer,
surveilling and marshaling forth an apparently benign advancement of its intellectual (colonial)
reach. White sight obscures its relation to this hidden, mystical center, and in so doing takes on a
certain dimension of evil. Utilizing logics of opacity and enigma to hide behind logics of
transparency and claim for itself a universality and transcendence from particularity, white sight
feeds off the basic “ignorance” or darkness of this center to obscure the way in which the
subjectivity engendered therein crafts itself upon a symbolism of evil. The conceptual apparatus
of the mystical ignorance in Cusan perspective is utilized for an insidious racially-centered
ignorance that cannot see its own limitations. The power structures of modernity which engender
social misrecognition and miscognition gain their operative power from social epistemologies
and cultural aesthetics that have codified and (ab)used this hidden mystical center to obscure
their own agency in harmdoing.
Charles Long helps us to situate what is at stake here. He discusses how the colonial
process was one of cultural contact in which the people of the non-Western cultures “newly”
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encountered were placed in a temporal tension or distanciation between non-rational/ primitive
and rational/civilized. This then “was translated into a distantiation in space … [one] defined by
the distance of these contemporary cultures from the western metropoles.” This spatiotemporal
symbolism was operationalized, Long writes, as “the cultures of the so-called archaic, primitive,
and backward peoples of the world became simultaneously the raw materials for the
technological manufacturing industry of the West and the ideological basis for various notions of
cultural evolution as well as the necessary substantiation for their notion of civilization.”66 Long
describes this as the enlightenment (and we can say, too, the Renaissance) arche, which operated
according to a “discourse of difference.” Here: “The actions, behaviors, and customs of other
cultures could then be seen as embryonic growths of reason or as reason hidden and obscured by
its shadows.”67 Ideas of modernity and “universal humanity” emerged from out of the
“biopolitical arithmetic” of the “epochal rupture” of New world slavery.68
Aníbal Quijano discusses, in a similar vein, the notion of “coloniality of power” as the
power structure of “the Eurocentric knowledge perspective [which] acts as a kind of distorting
mirror” that shows a partial and contorted image of reality.69 Arguing that a new historical world
was birthed when America emerged, Quijano focuses on how this emerging world was not
merely built around the rise of a new mode of labor (capital) and labor arrangement (capitalism)
but that it was as such in that “race” was constructed as a new category to differentiate
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conquered and conquering. Labor was configured anew insofar as race happened, granting the
logic not only for marking certain biological features but for distinguishing mental and cultural
capacity in a global economic arrangement. In this new economic arrangement, there was a
concentration of capital for Western European “Whites” as race articulated the arrangement of
capital and resources according to “roles and places in the division of labor and in the control of
resources of production.”70 Quijano ties this directly to the rationale and structure of modernity
itself, which came with a whole new way of thinking about space, time, and the body, defining
space, knowledge, and rationality according to the Western European perspective, and expelling
the body from thought.71 With this, non-European peoples became objects of knowledge, mythic
or mystical vestiges to be dominated and exploited: “All of it gave way to an evolutionist
historical perspective, so that all non-Europeans could be placed vis-à-vis Europeans in a
continuous historical chain from ‘primitive’ to ‘civilized’, from ‘irrational’ to ‘rational’, from
‘traditional’ to ‘modern’, from ‘magic-mythic’ to scientific’; in sum, from non-Europeans to
something that could be, in time, at best Europeanized or ‘modernized’.”72 In this new world,
race is co-articulated alongside the entire picture of the world and its economic arrangement.
This new economic-racial arrangement came as the “mythical” and “sensuous” elements
of human being were intentionally overcome in the new world, in the turn from the “irrational”
to the “rational.” Jennings argues that in its colonial reach Christianity “claimed to be the host,
the owner of the spaces it entered, and demanded native peoples enter its cultural logics, its ways
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of being in the world, and its conceptualities.” Herein, a theological imaginary of spatial
73

displacement led to physical actions of displacement. In this process, the body is separated from
and no longer gains identity from the native land: instead of the land, space, and place orienting
the body and giving it meaning, the European white male binds other bodies to itself in a form of
a new narration and of constant aesthetic judgment.74 “[W]hiteness,” writes Jennings, “replaced
the earth as the signifier of identities.”75 Jennings outlines a supercessionistic logic which
“jettisoned Israel from its calculus of the formation of Christian life” thus creating “a conceptual
vacuum that was filled by the European.” Now the European represents an ontic indication of
what it means to be Christian. Indeed, as Christian social space was reconfigured around white
and black, the European white male body would mark divine election and spiritual formation.76
While there was in all of this the claim that one could transcend particularity toward a rational
ideal, the world was shaped, rather, by that specific particularity which could extend itself freely
in its spatiality—that is, white bodies.
The key to understanding these ways in which the new world is constitutively built and
maintained as a racial world in a transparent and self-forgetful posture is to realize that it is the
mystical center of darkness being put to work out of sight, under the surface, in modern reason to
make transparent and thus unseen the fact that modern vision is always already racially
constructed. It is not just that opacity has been banished in modern thought: that is not the
significance of the link between the mystical self and the modern self. Instead, the modern self
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has taken to its center the potency of darkness—that portal from which one grasps meaning from
the depths and secures it therein. I find Charles Mills’ notion of “white ignorance” summarily
helpful here. Through white ignorance, racialization shows up in modern reason in an
unrecognizable but still malignant way, hidden in broader social epistemological practices. Mills
focuses on how ignorance is not merely “false belief” but also “the absence of true belief,” this
latter often being perpetuated through social epistemological practices that distribute
misinformation and error within the social practices of whites, and the practices that encourage
such things.77 This, argues Mills, is a kind of ignorance or “non-knowing” that “is not
contingent, but in which race—white racism and/or white racial domination and their
ramifications—plays a crucial causal role.”78 Such an ignorance, such “non-knowing” need not
be intentional or “based on bad faith.” Mills writes: “Obviously from the point of view of a
social epistemology, especially after the transition from de jure to de facto white supremacy, it is
precisely this kind of white ignorance that is most important.”79 White ignorance hides itself in
the darkness of the mystical center of modern rationality, engaging its secret power.
Kant and the Opaque: Reason and Freedom
To flesh out how the mystical center is carried into but hidden within modern reason in
this way, I want to examine Kant. Kant takes up the problem opened by the doctrine of mystical
darkness and brings it over the threshold into modernity as he crafts “reason” on this hidden
foundation. I will explore this by first discussing Kant’s (well-documented) problem with race as
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fundamentally a problem with the body and finitude more generally. Then I will explore how this
shows up in Kant’s notion of the sublime in his overall aesthetic theory. Lastly, getting to the
heart of the question of the symbolism of evil, I will examine Kant’s Religion within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason. Overall, this will move us in our argument toward how modern
reason forges itself through logics of opacity, thinking of pathologized opacity in terms of the
sublime and, centrally, the fetish. Noticing this deeper substructure in Kantian thought helps us
to see how a racial aesthetics is built upon a deeper symbolics of color and evil; most
importantly, it makes clear that Kant’s transcendental logic reflects similar ways in which
mystical darkness seeks to transcend the body and finitude.
Connecting Kant’s Problem with Race to a Problem with Finitude
Instead of rehearsing, as many others have done, the specific ways in which Kant’s
racism specifically manifests in his corpus, I want to focus on how the deeper transcendental
framework operates to affect this—in order to connect this to the larger point about opacity and
the hidden center of mystical darkness, specifically focusing in on Kant’s Groundwork for a
Metaphysic of Morals.80 In his Groundwork, Kant explains that rationality needs to be separated
and cleansed from the empirical in order to reach a pure, unmixed reason.81 Duty, the key
concept of morality for Kant, is when action is “abstract[ed] from the influence of inclination,
and with it every object of the will, so nothing is left over for the will that can determine it
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except the law as what is objective and subjectively pure respect for this practical law” (4:400, p.
16). This ultimately has to do with the freedom of the will: when the will in its causality is
autonomous and as such determined “independently of alien causes” (4:446-447, p. 63). The free
will for Kant is the will acting out of reason and not inclination. Thus, notions of purity and
mixing (thus a symbolism of defilement) are at the very center of modern thought.
In understanding why freedom is configured in this way, we must realize that for Kant
humans live both in the world of sense and the world of understanding. He writes that whatever
things might be in themselves is not known to us; we know things and cognize objects “only as
they affect us;” thus, “we can attain merely to the cognition of appearances, never to things in
themselves.” Behind, however, the appearances of things gleaned from the senses, we must
assume “something else that is not appearance, namely the things in themselves, even if of
ourselves we are satisfied that since they never can become known to us except as they affect us,
we can never come any nearer to them and can never know what they are in themselves.”
Though, because we are sensual, we must consider ourselves as part of the world of sense, “in
regard to whatever in [one] may be pure activity (what attains to consciousness not through the
affection of the sense but immediately), he must count himself as in the intellectual world, of
which, however, he has no further acquaintance” (4:451, p. 67-68). Reason is key here: though
our understanding works with our senses, reason is “pure self-activity:”
[Reason] shows such a pure spontaneity that it thereby goes far beyond everything that
sensibility can provide, and proves its most excellent occupation by distinguishing the
world of the senses and the world of the understanding from one another, thereby,
however, delineating the limits of the understanding itself. (4:452, p. 68)
The reasoning human being “has two standpoints,” one in the world of sense, ruled by the
heteronomous law of nature, and one in the intelligible world, ruled by the autonomous law
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“grounded merely in reason.” Though there is a split in this way between these two worlds, yet
“the world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense,” and so we cognize
ourselves as intelligible beings bound to reason and thus free (4:453, p. 70). Freedom comes
from grounding the will in the causality reason, resisting influence from the sense and nature.
What is especially interesting for us—as we interrogate the question of how a hidden
center of mystical darkness operates within modern rationality—is the way in which there is a
mysterious relation between these two worlds the human rational subject inhabits. The modern
subject experiences the tension of being caught in these two worlds as an intelligence, but is able
to understand himself as both affected by sensibility and conscious of being an intelligible being
(4:457, p. 73). Yet a person cannot will and act in freedom (from a rational place) as influenced
by “inclinations and impulses;” instead, “with a will free of the impulses of sensibility, he
transports himself in thoughts into entirely another order of things than that of his desires in the
field of sensibility” (4:454, p. 71). Indeed, this mysterious divide is exacerbated further because
freedom always remains an idea ungrounded in the world of sense: “freedom can never be
comprehended, nor even can insight into it be gained. It is valid only as a necessary
presupposition of reason in a being that believes itself to be conscious of a will.” One cannot
pretend to know the essence of things but must reckon “that behind appearances things in
themselves (though hidden) must ground them” (4:459, p. 75-76). Freedom roots itself in the
unknowable center of rationality, but a center which eviscerates the connection between the
senses and the intelligence.
Kant concludes the Groundwork by arguing that reason can better get to the constitution
of the thing in itself and therefore “what belongs to the mere appearance is necessarily
subordinated by reason to the constitution of the thing in itself” (4:461, p. 77). Thus is the shape

255
of modern rationality, of the transcendental imagination, which treats finitude in the same way as
linear perspective does and thus shows through the same mechanism of the mysterious opaque
center. Of the intelligible world that grounds reason, Kant writes:
although I have an idea of it, which has its own good ground, I still have not the least
acquaintance with it and also can never reach one through every striving of my natural
faculty of reason. It signifies only a ‘something’ that is left over if I have excluded
everything from the determining grounds of my will that belongs to the world of sense,
merely in order to limit the principle of motivation from the field of sensibility, by setting
boundaries to it and showing that it does not embrace all in all, but that outside that
principle I am still more; but I am not any further acquainted with this ‘more.’ (4:462, p.
78)
The intelligible world here is a kind of ever-escaping horizon. But not like that of Nyssa, in
which—through our center of freedom, our mirror-soul—we are able to participate and journey
toward. It is more like a Cusan leap, but one in which has been shed the theological tension. Kant
has transposed the unknowing center of mystical darkness into modern rationality, but in such a
way that he banishes and makes inoperable that mystical center that (in its potency) affected
sensible transformation toward the infinite divine.
Kant on Aesthetics and the Sublime
Let us nestle this consideration further into the problem of race according to the
pathologization of opacity in modernity by exploring how this plays out on the plane of Kant’s
aesthetics in his Third Critique, specifically in the matter of the sublime as mysterious,
unreachable center. The notion of freedom—that is, properly relating the world of sense to
reason—is connected in the Third Critique to aesthetic judgment. For Kant, aesthetic judgment is
that ability to bridge the great divide between nature and freedom, now in the matter of
reckoning our taste with our perception of beauty and the good. Kant was concerned to explain,
notes Paul Guyer, that it would be implausible for morality to be comprehended without sensible
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representation: “although the content of the moral law must be deduced by ratiocination alone,
we are not creatures who can really be expected to grasp the nature of morality itself by pure,
unaided reason.”82 As Kant wrote in the Groundwork: “In order for a sensibly affected rational
being to will that which reason alone prescribes the ‘ought’, there obviously must belong to it a
faculty of reason to instill a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in the fulfillment of duty, hence a
causality of reason to determine sensibility in accordance with its principles.”83 But of this center
of relation, this question of “how pure reason can for itself be practical, without any other
incentive that might be taken from anywhere else,” Kant writes: “all human reason is entirely
incapable of explaining that, and all the effort and labor spent in seeking an explanation are
lost.”84 Nonetheless, aesthetic judgment, for Kant, is this bridge of “the arbitrary realm of
sensation and the law-governed autonomy of reason,” the realms of nature and morality.85 And
so, in bridging this divide, for Kant aesthetic judgment is not a matter of a subject grasping an
object, but in fact is a matter of the “free play” of the imagination which allows the subject to see
beauty in the object without thereby subsuming the object under one’s subjective concepts.86
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There is here a radical otherness to beauty, an evasion of human understanding, and an escape
from human control.87 But the other side of this is that for Kant aesthetic judgments must have
“general communicability” or a “sensus communis” because an aesthetic judgment is a matter of
universal assent (CJ §40, 5:293, p. 173).88 Thus “[t]he necessity of universal assent in aesthetic
judgments opens a debate in which individual people make their private feelings about beauty
the object of public dispute.”89 With the notion of the sublime, Kant discusses the limit or hidden
center of this capacity to bridge the realm of nature and freedom.
There is a specific connection between reason and the sublime. While the beautiful is
concerned with objects and thus with limitations, the sublime “is to be found in a formless object
insofar as limitlessness is represented in it;” thus the beautiful is connected to understanding
while the sublime is connected to reason (CJ §23 5:244, p. 128). Kant also writes that the
sublime “cannot be contained in any sensible form, but concerns only ideas of reason, which,
though no presentation adequate to them is possible, are provoked and called to mind precisely
by this inadequacy, which does not allow of sensible presentation.” And yet, in this very
connection, the sublime presents an ambiguous, perhaps even negative feeling. So Kant writes
that the sublime both attracts and repels, and as such is a “negative pleasure.” Whereas beauty
can be connected in aesthetic judgment to the purposiveness of nature, the sublime “may to be
sure appear in its form to be contrapurposive for our power of judgment, unsuitable for our

87

Tobin Siebers, “Kant and the Politics of Beauty.” Philosophy and Literature 22 (1998): 39-41.

Kant writes: “In all judgements by which we declare something to be beautiful, we allow no one to be of a
different opinion, without, however, grounding our judgment on concepts, but only on our feeling, which we
therefore make our ground not as a private feeling, but as a common one.” CJ §22, 5.239 (p. 123).
88

89

Siebers, “Kant and the Politics of Beauty,” 45.

258
faculty of presentation, and as it were doing violence to our imagination.” Notions of chaos,
disorder, devastation rule here (CJ §23 5:245-246, p. 129-130).
We come to see that the sublime is connected both to reason and to notions of devastation
and undoing because the sublime has to do with the notion of infinity. Kant describes the sublime
as that “which is absolutely great” and thus “beyond all comparison” (CJ §25 5:248, p. 131). If
this is true, and if the sublime, being connected to reason, is not a matter of the senses, why does
Kant discuss the sublime under the notion of the aesthetic judgment? Kant writes that though
nothing in nature in itself is technically sublime, nature can evoke a feeling of the sublime:
Thus nothing that can be an object of the senses is, considered on this footing, to be
called sublime. But just because there is in our imagination a striving to advance to the
infinite, while in our reason there lies a claim to absolute totality, as to a real idea, the
very inadequacy of our faculty for estimating the magnitude of the things of the sensible
world awakens the feeling of a supersensible faculty in us … Hence it is the disposition
of the mind resulting from a certain representation occupying the reflective judgment, but
not the object, which is to be called sublime. (CJ §25 5:250, p. 134)
The feeling of the sublime is that which is evoked by absolute greatness, not from the object
itself, but from our sense of being able to go beyond our understanding in reflecting on sensible
nature—thus when we experience “a faculty of the mind that surpasses every measure of the
senses” (CJ §25 5:250, p. 134). Kant gives an example of observing the Egyptian pyramids up
close, which we start to measure and apprehend but soon can no longer comprehend: “For here
there is a feeling of the inadequacy of his imagination for presenting the ideas of a whole, in
which the imagination reaches its maximum and, in the effort to extend it, sinks back into itself,
but is thereby transported into an emotionally moving satisfaction” (CJ §26 5:256, p. 136). We
could say: one comes in touch with the mystical center here. But this is a negative place or a nonplace as the sublime in this way “resides nowhere in the things of sensibility (which can only
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suggest it), but only in the mind, which discovers, even in the instant of its rapture, its own
essential superiority over all of nature.”90
This brings us to the key point I want to highlight through Kant’s notion of the sublime:
an experience of imagining the infinite through a supersensible human power. Kant writes: “But
even to be able to think the given infinite without contradiction requires a faculty in the human
mind that is itself supersensible” (CJ §26 5:254-255, p. 138).91 Again, evoked by the magnitude
of an object, through a supersensible faculty connected with or related to reason, one can intuit
the idea of infinity: “Nature is thus sublime in those of its appearances the intuition of which
brings with them the idea of its infinity” (CJ §26 5:255, p. 138). Reason here “discovers in itself
a supersensible power that is infinitely free of and infinitely greater than the realm of
representation.”92 Hart observes here an overall mental striving from beauty to sublimity to
infinity, so that “the sublime serves as both median and partition, both indicating a continuity
and assuring an inviolable division between the beautiful and the infinite.”93 It is just this “going
beyond” the imagination, only to recover something of vital human powers, that is a drawing on
the power of the mystical darkness—thus betraying that which is hidden but necessary to the
intellectual project of modernity. Although, I should mention that while Kant must expose the
center in this way in order to think infinity and thus secure modern vision, there is some
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instability and disruption here, as I have noted. Jean-François Lyotard, in particular, comments
upon the sublime in Kant in this way, noting that it leaves a kind of irresolvable tension or
“destruction” of the terms intending to be resolved.94
Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
Finally, Kant’s framework for understanding reason and freedom directly pertains to how
he answers the question of evil. With the topic of religion in view, Kant equates freedom and
autonomy of reason to the expansion of “the good principle” which can outpace the human
propensity toward evil. On this plane, the tension just discussed between the sensible and the
intelligible is now a matter of how the idea of the good takes root in a society through the
sensible vehicle of the church. Ecclesiastical faith emerges from autonomous reason because “of
the natural need of all human beings to demand for even the highest concepts and grounds of
reason something that the senses can hold on to, some confirmation from experience or the
like.”95 But—and this is the center of Kant’s claim about the nature of evil—religion is properly
related to morality “not as the ground of its maxims but as a necessary consequence accepted in
conformity to them” (6:4-5, p. 58). A Kantian morality based in duty leads to and shapes a pure,
rational, and practical religion (6:6, p. 59-60).
Central to Kant’s claim is the difference between a human being of good morals and a
morally good human: “We can say of the first that he complies with the law according to the
letter (i.e. as regards the action commanded by the law); but of the second, that he observes it
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according to the spirit (the spirit of the moral law consists in the law being of itself a sufficient
incentive).” Evil, in this light, consists in impurity of duty: when “incentives other than the law
itself … are necessary to determine the power of choice to lawful actions.” What is at stake is not
any deed itself but “propensity” or the “subjective determining ground of the power of choice
that precedes every deed” (6:30-31, p. 78-79). Goodness and evil, for Kant, is about the relation
between incentives and moral maxim: evil lies in constructing morality that is interested or
incentivized by something other than the pure goodness of the good deed (6:36, p. 83). Drawing
on the Genesis account of the fall, Kant writes that the propensity of evil lies in the fact that
“instead of following this law absolutely as sufficient incentive … the human being looked about
for yet other incentives … which can be good only conditionally … And he made it his maxim
… to follow the law of duty, not from duty but, if need be, also with an eye to other aims.” Upon
questioning the absoluteness of the command and thus entertaining “merely conditional
obedience,” finally “the preponderance of the sensory inducements over the incentive of the law
was incorporated into the maxim of action, and thus sin came to be” (6:42, p. 87-88). Such an
evil is “radical” because “it corrupts the ground of all maxims.” And yet, writes Kant, “it must
equally be possible to overcome this evil, for it is found in the human being as acting freely”
(6:37, p. 83). Kant argues that a move away from evil and toward the good, then, lies in
the recovery of the purity of the law, as the supreme ground of all our maxims, according
to which the law itself is to be incorporated into the power of choice, not merely bound to
other incentives, nor indeed subordinated to them (to inclinations) as conditions, but
rather in its full purity, as the self-sufficient incentive of that power. (6:46, p. 91)
This turnaround is not a matter of “gradual reform” but instead “a revolution in the disposition of
the human being” (6:47, p. 92). This is possible because Christ as “prototype” is the ideal of
moral purity presented to our reason, the ideal to which we have a “duty to elevate ourselves”
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(6:61, p. 104). A vision of Christ is the answer to the question of evil, but now entirely as a
matter of rationality, as a call to escape from sensuality.96
The matter of good and evil quickly becomes, for Kant, a discussion about the apparent
difference between Christianity and Judaism, which itself is set in a symbolism of defilement and
purity which roots this notion of moral autonomy—that mysterious center of mystical darkness
rendered inoperative—deeper into the symbolics of evil. While “the good principle” retained
some kind of force through the setting up of a government (specifically “the Jewish theocracy”),
this “institutional order did no substantial injury to the realm of darkness;” with the advent of
Christ comes the dawn of rationality, tied into the Greek legacy of “moral doctrines on freedom”
(6:79-80, p. 118-119). Kant writes that Christ in this way “by exemplifying this principle (in the
moral idea) … opened the doors of freedom to all who, like him, choose to die to everything that
holds them fettered to earthly life to the detriment of morality; … while he abandons to their fate
all those who prefer moral servitude” (6:82, p. 121, emphasis mine). Freedom (with clear antiSemitic sentiment) is the shedding of one’s bodily nature, as salvation is radically interiorized:
to interfere with this [innermost] adoption [of genuine moral principles in their
disposition] is surely not the so often blamed sensibility but a certain self-incurred
perversity or, as we might otherwise also call this wickedness, fraud …: [this is] a
corruption that lies in all human beings and cannot be overcome except through the idea
of the moral good in its absolute purity. (6:83, p. 122)97
This interiorization and the need to shed sensibility as a kind of moral weight is so much the case
that the “ethical community” out of which the good principle spreads is itself a “sublime, never
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fully attainable idea” which is “at best capable of representing with purity only the form of such
a community” (6:100, p. 135).98 While human beings need something the senses can hold onto
that can represent the concept of the ethical community, and so “a historical faith attaches itself
to pure religion as its vehicle,” Kant expresses the hope that we can near a “pure religious faith
until finally we can dispense of that vehicle” (6:115, p. 146). In the end, writes Kant “religion
will gradually be freed of all empirical grounds of determination” at which point “at last the pure
faith of religion will rule over all” (6:121, p. 151).99 On this third plane of freedom, upon the
question of good and evil, the mystical center is now not only hidden yet operating but operating
specifically by employing a symbolism of evil to frame human freedom—and in this, weaving a
subterranean structure of justification for spinning out tangible violence.
This realization is further seen in how Kant connects Judaism to the notion of the fetish,
showing the way in which the hidden center of rationality with this symbolism of evil builds
itself upon the pathologization of opacity. Kant’s discussion of Judaism as separated from
Christianity upon logics of defilement and purity comes to a head in terms of the notion of the
“fetish-faith.” Kant contrasts the rational universal faith with Judaism, fundamentally noting that
the latter was constituted according to coercive laws, not moral laws (6:126, p. 155). The path to
the universal, reasonable community is not just to be found in the “origin of Christianity” but as
such in that it is “a total abandonment of the Judaism in which it originated, grounded on an
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entirely new principle.” Judaism—perhaps the entire body itself—was just a preparation for
Christianity, a “corporeal sign” that must be discarded (6:127, p. 156).
Kant differentiates moral, reasonable religion from the “fetish-faith” in this way: “Every
beginning in religious matters, when not undertaken in a purely moral spirit but as a means in
itself capable of propitiating God and thus, through him, of satisfying all our wishes, is a fetishfaith.” Again, this is connected to the body and finitude, for “the sensuous human being still
searches for an escape route by which to circumvent that arduous condition” of pure and rational
morality (6:193, p. 209). The fetish-faith yields a “counterfeit service” which is done to satisfy
“the will of a superior” instead of directly for the pleasure of the ultimate law-giver (God).100
The difference between rational faith and the fetish faith is less about outward forms of service
and more about how the form of service connects to purity of morality:
Differences of external form here count equally for nothing but everything depends,
rather, upon the acceptance or the forsaking of the one single principle of becoming wellpleasing to God – upon whether [we do it] through moral disposition alone, so far as the
latter manifest its vitality in actions which are its appearance, or through pious playacting and nothing-doing. (6:173, p. 192)
Fetishism, in view of this, is being “under the delusion of possessing an art of achieving a
supernatural effect through entirely natural means” when one “makes use of actions that in
themselves contain nothing well-pleasing to God as means nevertheless for gaining God’s
unmediated favor” (6:177, p. 196). In this way the fetish-faith, for Kant, is further connected to
“priestcraft” which obtains “wherever statutory commands, rules of faith and observances, rather
than principles of morality, make up the groundwork and the essence of the church.” Such
fetishism and priestcraft, Kant argues, robs one from their moral freedom, because it does not
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convince but only gives orders (6:179-180, p. 198); true faith is “a service of the heart (in spirit
and truth), and can consist only in the disposition of obedience to all true duties and divine
commands” (6:192, p. 208). Again, for Kant, freedom is tied to reason—strained out from
sensibility—but now enmeshed within an overall symbolism of evil.
At stake in the overall project of Kantian modern rationality is how the sensible, hidden
center or foundation from which the reasonable community arises and upon which it grounds
itself now comes to deal with those “visible” bodies excluded as “irrational,” that excess
materiality or refuse that cannot be subsumed in transcendence toward the ideal. This mysticalturned-rational center now expresses the anxiety over its own project of negating sensibility in its
infinite reach by marking as visible and corporeal that materiality that it cannot (yet) subsume
and negate. Fetishization just is this obsession over externalizing as material the anxiety over an
intelligible, supersensible ground. This speaks to how the sensible and bodily are not done away
with in the autonomy of reason, but are rendered inoperative as modern perspective makes the
claim to universality and transparency of vision. This topic of the fetish then reemerges as a
symptom of modern rationality trying to control its mystical center, wrestling with the opacity on
which reason depends (first revealed in the sublime) but cannot quite grasp.
Tracing Aesthetics toward the Sublime, the Uncanny, and the Fetish
Having traced out in the Kantian notions of the sublime and fetish a certain (ab)using of
the center of mystical darkness at the heart of modern rationality, I want to give a broader
account of how the sublime and the fetish—and now the uncanny intervening between them—
can be connected to a course of the pathologization of opacity in white subjectivity and the sight
it gives. In Chapter One, I pointed out how the question of the good and the beautiful has
historically all too easily turned, in the mode of the sublime, to differentiating and racializing

otherness and foreignness.
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Indeed, the sublime opens up toward the fetish particularly in view

of race, bridging a connection between the troubled foundation of reason and the racialized
patterns it engenders through internal and external spatiality.
Rudolph Otto’s The Idea of the Holy and his notion therein of numinous religious
experience provides a key for connecting opacity to race and then to a pathological unfolding
from the sublime, to the uncanny, and to the fetish. This starting point provides insight into the
broader problem at stake because the question of the sublime asks a larger question about
modernity and modern rationality. An exploration of the sublime is both to explore the hidden
center of modern reason and its very limits. This can be seen, for example, in David Bentley
Hart’s detailed work connecting the sublime to various narratives of postmodernity that seek to
disrupt or disintegrate an ontotheological unity between the good and the beautiful.102 Though
Hart sheds light on the ways in which the sublime is connected to opacity and the mystical center
which has always threatened to disrupt modern rationality, my own interest is not in how the
sublime has been configured in the history of the metaphysical or anti-metaphysical project, but
how the sublime is connected to symbolic logics of evil and color.
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Opacity and the Sublime
Otto helps us to think about how the dialectic of rationality and non-rationality pertains to
a symbolism of evil engendered by the pathologization of opacity, and what this might have to
do with moral spatiality. Otto connects opacity and darkness to the sublime within logics of evil
because of the matter of the profane and sacred. Reflecting on the experience of the numinous
“holy,” Otto writes that when we think about the divine we begin with the “rational” in the idea
of what we can grasp and conceive conceptually of God, but “beneath this sphere of clarity and
lucidity lies a hidden depth, inaccessible to our conceptual thought, which we in so far call the
‘non-rational.’”103 Otto connects this “non-rational” core directly to the mystical: “But
essentially mysticism is the stressing to a very high degree, indeed the overstressing, of the nonrational or supra-rational elements in religion.”104 How, for Otto, does this have to do with the
mystical? The experience of the holy, for Otto, is centrally the experience of one’s creatureliness
and profanity; Otto speaks of this in terms of a sense of self-depreciation and even selfannihilation—on this last point because one identifies with absolute reality.105 Thus the holy for
Otto is a “wholly other.”106 In this sense of transcendence of the sacred, this numinous feeling is
of the “mysterium tremendum” and of the fascinans. Here there is a sense of awfulness and
dread, even related to a demonic dread. Otto writes: “It has wild and demonic forms and can sink
to an almost grisly horror and shuddering.”107 All of this is described negatively but experienced
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positively.

108

The negative moment represents “the terrifying arbitrariness of the relation

between signs and the world, an aporia safely hidden when ordinary discourse functions
normally;” while in the positive moment “the terrifying procession of signifiers is halted by the
making of metaphor, by the act of symbolic substitution that resolves the crisis by making the
absence of meaning itself significant.”109
In framing this experience of the numinous holy as “wholly other” and sacred in these
ways, Otto is explicitly drawing on Kant’s notion of the sublime which, as we have seen, is an a
priori experience which provokes “the immeasurable gulf” between the ideal and the real, where
“[t]he task of the sublime then becomes that of affording passage between these
incommensurable orders.”110 The imagination fails here and yet harnesses a positive moment to
intuit the unlimited. Reflective of this, Otto fundamentally says of the holy that it is experienced
within an “overplus of meaning.”111 But the key, again, is how we experience the holy in this
absence and surplus: while we can indicate something “positive” of the experience with
concepts, the experience itself is only of something “negative.” Our words and concepts only
represent this overplus as a substitute. Otto tries to grasp at how to name the unnamable, thus
stressing the inadequacy of language to make meaning and reflect on the infinite.112 The
numinous is a “nothingness,” then, that is discovered, represented, and comes on the scene by
language, akin to the notion of being stained with a dye.113 In addition to the Kantian sublime,
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The uncanny is connected to the

sacred; in both cases, it is something that haunts.115
The holy and the sacred are connected to this numinous overplus before ethics, connected
to non-rational feeling before the conceptual and rational connecting of the holy to the idea of
“goodness.”116 The holy, then, is connected to the profane and sacred not firstly in terms of
ethical purity, but fundamentally in terms of transcendence.117 It is as the sacred and profane is
connected to matters of transcendence (that is, spatiality) that the feeling of the numinous and of
transcendence relates to symbols of purification and cleansing. Otto writes:
It comprises, first, a manifestation of the numinous awe, viz. the feeling that the
“profane” creature cannot forthwith approach the numen, but has need of a covering or
shield against the [wrath] of the numen. Such a “covering” is then a “consecration”, i.e. a
procedure that renders the approacher himself “numinous”, frees him from his “profane”
being, and fits him for intercourse with the numen.118
This covering or grace is conferred, writes Otto, “by the numen itself, which bestows something
of its own quality to make man capable of communion with it.”119 In light of our study so far,
this point is particularly poignant, and brings the notion of the (mystical) sublime closest to being
in touch with a symbolism of evil. The idea here is that the experience of the sublime, which is
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an experience of transcendence, makes transcendent the approacher, gives its own
transcendence in a mutual magnification of both numinous and subjective infinity.
This dynamic is folded into the matter of the connection between the nonrational,
uncanny core of numinous experience and primitiveness, again bringing us back to the matter of
colonialism and racialization. The transition from the non-rational to the rational also represents,
in part, the transition from savage mind and primitive religion to rationalization of feelings.120
Elaborating on this point, Poland argues that the historical context of Otto’s publication (1917),
him trying to make sense of the terror and anxiety of the First World War, explains the attempt to
make meaning through the sublime as one “pictures to oneself” infinity which “cultivates the
terrors of excess for the purpose of affirming that excess can be mastered and culture sustained.”
Otto converts the “‘merely natural’ fears of his historical situation into the universal structure of
the mysterium tremendum et fascinans.”121 Part of this fear was a larger concern over the future
of Western civilization:
[Otto] looked to culturally exotic and primitive sites of darkness for provocation …
evidence of the way dark continents threatened to confuse the difference between
imperialist self and other, blurring the edges of the West’s boundaries. For Otto these
terrors too become metaphors of the subject’s relation to transcendence: the obscurity of
blurred boundaries becomes a darkness ‘of quite another kind,’ numinous dread. This
uncanny, ‘wholly other’ fear becomes for Otto originary: ‘deeper’ than the filiations and
affiliations of natural and cultural history, it is ‘the starting point for the entire religious
development in history … the basic factor and basic impulse underlying the entire
process of religious evolution.’122
The sublime speaks to the opaque, mythical space of preconceptual and prelinguistic chaos that
threatens the meaning of cultural and ideational filiation. Sublime terror “is a glimpse beneath
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At

stake here is the demonic dread when one “glimpses behind any particular act of repetition the
demonic power of the compulsion to repeat … an invisible energy whose eerie operations
become visible only when ‘stained’ by particular repetitions.”124 In this way, the sublime, like
the uncanny and fetish (as we will see), symbolizes darkness of the other within a symbolism of
evil as it links to the Oedipus complex and the fear of castration.
Opacity and the Uncanny
The uncanny is a bridge between the sublime and the fetish; it also brings to the surface
the intersection of a symbolism of evil and the question of history, memory, and countermemory
which emerge as key themes in the spatiotemporal orientation of a symbolism of evil. I
mentioned in Chapter One how Ricoeur connects opacity to Freud’s Unheimlichkeit in
discussing the inhabiting of the dialectic between memory and history. With Freud’s
Unheimlichkeit we heighten the hidden/revealed dialectic at stake already in opacity, through the
sexual and racial pathologization on the level of history. Freud highlights the strange tension at
stake in uncanniness, noting it as “that class of the terrifying which leads back to something long
known to us, once very familiar.”125 But how is it that something familiar is terrifying? Freud
explores the internal tension in the German word heimlich, noting that it travels from a sense of
homeliness and intimacy into the sense of secretness and concealing from sight, nearly
coinciding with its opposite Unheimlichkeit; thus: “on the one hand it means that which is

123

Poland, “The Idea of the Holy,” 182.

124

Poland, “The Idea of the Holy,” 188.

125

Sigmund Freud, “The ‘Uncanny,’” in On Creativity and the Unconscious (New York: Harper, 1958), 123-124.

familiar and congenial, and on the other, that which is concealed and kept out of sight.”

126

272
Freud

connects this ambivalence to what he argues is a fundamental repression at stake in the uncanny,
which he divides into two classes: the second class relates to primitive, animistic beliefs, but the
first class, that which is related to infantile psychology, is what particularly interests us. This
category pertains to the example of the castration-complex and fundamentally has to do with
repression—thus the “hidden” and “familiar” dialectic. Here Freud decisively connects the
uncanny to the theme of the “double,” which he first connects to our primary infantile narcissism
and then to the development of self-criticism in our conscience; it is this early mental stage of
“friendly” doubling that through the progression of the ego begins to be a “vision of terror” that
thus gains purchase as “uncanny” (for example, being afraid for a second of your own
unexpected reflection in a mirror). Doubling is similarly relevant in events perceived as
“involuntary repetition” or fateful, inescapable, chance encounters or circumstances—events
which, for a moment, harken back “to a time when the ego was not yet sharply differentiated
from the external world and from other persons.”127 Such doubling is fundamentally uncanny
because it taps into this familiar-unfamiliar dialectic of repression, yes, but also to an infantile
repetition-compulsion principle in our unconscious mind. We perceive as uncanny those things
and circumstances that remind us of this inner principle. Both familiar and hidden, “this uncanny
is in reality nothing new or foreign, but something familiar and old-established in the mind that
has been estranged only by the process of repression,” now revived by some impression.128
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Ricoeur himself connects this notion of the uncanny to the problem of history, exploring
the thought of Pierre Nora, among others. Especially important to Nora’s project is les lieux de
memoire (“places of memory”) which emerge amidst the rupture between memory and history
and represent only “a memory in tatters” which resides there like a trace.129 It is such places that
initially preserve something of memory, that which has a certain prominence over history in its
connection to life and actuality but which can easily be lost. Womanist theologian and ethicist
Emilie Townes draws on Nora to show how history is incomplete and only carried along and
given life by living memory and living societies;130 and it is from here that Townes brings to the
surface the notion of microhistories. In view of Nora, Townes argues that the story of a society’s
dominant group can cover over other living memories.131 Countermemory, drawing on Nora’s
framework, is a “subversive place/space” opened up in the status quo as the fantastic, instead of
being “ghettoiz[ed] … can retain its subversive qualities without capitulating to narrow
categorization or classification designed to tame or make the fantastic sensible.”132 Thus
countermemory looks to the past “for microhistories to force a reconsideration” of history.133 By
recognizing microhistories—particularly for Townes those that pertain to Black lives marked by
the stereotyping of Black femaleness—one can discover the cultural production of evil at play.134
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Townes brings to our attention a certain pathologized system of thought that affects the
Black woman. “The fantastic hegemonic imagination,” Townes writes,
traffics in people’s lives that are caricatured or pillaged so that the imagination that
creates the fantastic can control the world in its own image. … The fantastic hegemonic
imagination uses a politicized sense of history and memory to create and shape its
worldview. It sets in motion whirlwinds of images used in the cultural production of
evil.135
Townes’ effort is both to exegete this system of thought through examining the various images
and myths it has produced and to highlight the power of countermemory in order to “resist
measuring Black realities by the ideological stereotypes, the denigrating myths, of the fantastic
hegemonic imagination.”136 For example, the image of the Mammy came to represent the idea of
a slave, and eventually subservient Black woman, who did not want freedom but was happy to
nurse the coming generations of White families even while she neglected her own children. This
image, which Townes argues coincided with the rise of the Southern Belle, was constructed to
provide “safety for an idealized patriarchal White family structure,” casting the female slave as
desexualized, unattractive, fat and old in order to strengthen the white woman’s ideal and to
obscure the ugly fact of the sexual exploitation of Black women by white men.137 Such an image,
though questionable historically, functioned mythologically to serve “the needs of nostalgic
White southerners seeking to make sense of and defend slavery and segregation.”138 Overall,
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images like the Mammy and other “images of Black womanhood serve as a reservoir for the
fears of Western culture,” as Patricia Hill Collins writes.139 Or, perhaps, as “a dumping ground
for those female functions a basically Puritan society could not confront,” as the Mammy was
constructed as uncannily physical and funky, “the part of woman that white southern America
was profoundly afraid of” and thus “is needed as an image, a surrogate to contain all those fears
of the physical female.” 140
Regarding uncanny “places of memory,” Ricoeur notes that over time Nora would come
to argue that these places have dissolved into a kind of commemoration-memory or
patrimonialization, “its crystallization into the ‘historical monument’ with its spectacular
topography and its archeological nostalgia” making a place out of the “symbolic instrument
whose heuristic interest was to render ‘place’ immaterial.”141 In this solidification and
appropriation, an uncanniness develops and then haunts, as in the end, notes Ricoeur, “the
‘uncanniness’ of history still prevails, even as it attempts to understand the reasons why it is
contested by commemorative memory.”142 The challenge and possibility of testimony amidst the
uncanny present of the historical past, is just what is at stake in Towne’s argument. The effort is
to speak of those things which have been veiled in silence; and the way in which a conversation
and a history have been built on the making-silent of those who do not have a voice in the
historical record. Toni Morrison notes how, specifically in reference to American literature,
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Africanism is so often “deployed as rawness and savagery [that] provided the staging ground and
arena for the elaboration of the quintessential American identity.”143 In this way “the Africanist
presence informs in compelling and inescapable ways the texture of American literature. It is a
dark and abiding presence, there for the literary imagination as both a visible and an invisible
mediating force.”144 With this reflection on the Mammy image and the fantastic hegemonic
imagination, we are not only nearing the most interior matters of the symbolism of evil but we
begin to make explicit how an inner psychic treatment of opacity gains purchase externally and
economically, through its sexual and racial pathologization transforming the material world in
real-worldly ways. With the uncanny, we make clear how the tension of given-hidden at stake in
opacity is represented pathologically in the psyche, one’s inner spatiality as it is manifest in
memory and history.
Opacity and the Fetish
Opacity as pathologized in the fetish allows me to explicitly come to coloniality and
racialized moral geography. From the psychic anxiety over the self’s spatiotemporal unification
in the uncanny we make the connection to the fetish, which brings to light the inherently racial
dynamics of this malady of the “inner eyes” of whiteness as it pathologizes and solidifies opacity
externally. In thinking the uncanny and fetishism together under the notion of opacity, we bring
to the fore how the multi-dimensional pathology of the symbol lies in the harnessing and
transmogrification of indeterminacy into a symbol of evil, which itself then builds tangible,
economic worlds of domination and control over the sexual and racial unknown.
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As Portuguese merchants came to interact with the Sub-Saharan Western coast of Africa
and encountered African approaches to matter, the modern “imagination of matter” began to
emerge through fetishization. European merchants encountered Africans prizing certain objects
and materials which seemed useless in their estimation but which the Africans were reluctant to
trade: for these prized objects like skulls or animal bones was “demanded great quantities of the
commodities brought by the merchants,” even though for the Europeans “these found objects or
objects crudely made of base materials were assigned value far in excess of what any rational
calculation of utility and exchange value would justify.”145 Moreover, European merchants were
repulsed and dismissive in their stereotyping. Through the notion of the fetish, the Europeans
distinguished and set apart their imagination of matter; so “the notion of fetish is less about
producing an accurate description of the practices of the people that European merchants
encountered and more about establishing the terms of a differential essence between peoples
based on claims about approaches to material objects.”146
In this way the fetish, as Long argues, was used “to describe an essential African
difference” in terms of how Portuguese merchants perceived African exchange and trade in
terms of “overvaluing [or overdetermining] matter by understanding matter and material objects
as living substances that can be alive with other presences.” Connected, then, to the charge of
animism, the specific claim “was that this was a nonrational approach to matter, manifest as bad
religion, as African religion, as fetish religion.”147 In this way, black flesh and its imagination of
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matter was understood according to an over-against-ness of the “universal man,” in the face of a
sublimity or uncanniness that is then solidified in the fetish: “As mysterium tremendum et
fascinosum, these cultures present an Otherness that is at once an immanent and transcendent
mystery.”148 Specifically this “otherness” was the other of a “new mode of humanity” developed
through modern perspective, as we have seen, one which is (as Carter writes) “figured as a selfpossessed, sovereign ‘I’ whose self-ownership or whose having a grasp or grip on the self as a
free agent without dependence on matter is conditioned by a disavowed (colonial and enslaving)
grasping after ownership or the right to own things including the ground or the earth itself.”149
Explaining the significance of the fetish, Long writes that the presence of Africans “was
the occasion around which the problem of value in the New world revolved.” He notes that the
“practices and ideologies of the Atlantic world” affected how human value and the value of
human products was understood. Whereas previously “this issue was defined in religious terms
that held together the religious and economic dimensions of human action,” these two
dimensions were separated as both human value and the value of human products was
reconfigured upon the body of the African.150 Long particularly draws on the thought of William
Pietz from a series of articles on the fetish written from 1985 to 1988. Pietz had defined the
fetish along a number of lines: as related to “the untranscended materiality of the fetish;” as
highlighting “the radical historical[ity] of the fetish origin” (heterogeneous fixation instead of
universal principles); as noting the “dependence of the fetish for its meaning and value on a
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particular order of social relations;” lastly, Pietz wrote of “the active relation of the fetish object
to the living body of an individual.” Long summarizes the significance:
Pietz in a masterful way demonstrates how fetishism as a theory about the origin of
religion in Africa was in one movement applied to the enslaved Africans themselves as a
false religion and in another, transferred to the notion of matter and materiality, this time
to African bodies, which became a locus of matter in the form of chattel.151
Thus the fetish on the one hand represents the incapability of the modern period to show “how
materiality enters into epistemological constitution.”152 On the other hand, as materiality was
rejected on one plane of the (rational) epistemological project, it was upon the materiality of
blackened flesh that “all material forms of the world and one’s relationship to them could be
disenchanted into commodities.”153 In this way, black(ened) flesh and its imagination of matter
was manufactured as “a locus of a new modality of matter in the form of chattel, which is to say,
property.”154 At the same time that the colonial encounter marked African understandings of
matter and religion as fetishized, the Europeans themselves were crafting a new valuation of the
matter of black flesh, solidifying this object they feared (as holy, sublime, haunted, uncanny),
and over-determining it—just in that it, being human flesh, was determined economically.
This return to the “imagination of matter” in view of fetishization sharpens all the more
what is at stake for our study of white sight. Fetishization is directly a response to the enigmatic.
Indeed, “[f]etishism is a mental strategy or defense that enables a human being to transform
something or someone with its own enigmatic energy and immaterial essence into something or
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someone that is material and tangibly real, a form of being that makes the something or someone
controllable.”155 In this way, fetishism “transforms ambiguity and uncertainty into something
knowable and certain”—an object or material that can then bring reassurance in the face of the
danger of the uncontrollable, unknowable, and ambiguous energies or forces. 156 Freud himself
explicitly discusses the fetish (like the uncanny) in terms of the castration-complex, repression,
and compulsion: an object is inexplicably excessively valued or prized, and one works to control
movements or emotions through it. Often worn on the body, fetishes are felt “to control the body
[as] substitutes for a missing body part. This missing body part is originally the phallus, seen
lacking in the mother.” The fetish, then, for Freud “owe[s] all its power to the subject’s anxiety
over something immaterial and invisible: the phallus projected into the maternal body.”157 In this
way, the fetish represents a pathologized course of sexualizing and racializing the enigmatic,
unknown, darkness of symbolic indeterminacy. Ultimately, the idea of the fetish was about a
valuation of black flesh, the value of matter, and the nature of religious experience, all caught up
in a symbolism of evil that shaped a moral geography (crucial as it was to crafting an entirely
new economic order). What is at stake here is fundamentally the pathologization of symbolic
“doubling:” the opaque unknown is “doubled,” so to speak, as it is substantiated into an object
for the purpose of controlling the darkness or unknown one fears. In the end, whiteness is a way
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of being that responds on the deepest moral and emotional register to its inner excess or
ambiguity that it cannot master, which it can never escape (in fact, from which it is continually
haunted), though it continually tries to externalize it through tangible worlds of domination.
The Moral Geography of Perspective and the Desiring Subject
As I come to the end of this hermeneutical-historical detour on perspective and
examination of white sight, I come to a psychoanalysis in light of the need to reckon with one’s
pathology and seek reconciliation. Here psychoanalysis is a tool to re-trace and untie one’s
pathology, a technique for a new creation of self through language. A Lacanian psychoanalysis,
specifically, can engage us in how the production of space comes to be developed through a
symbolic order that is crafted in response to the Other, and thus can expose the hidden “desiring
subject” at the center of modern perspective and its rationality. With Lacan’s focus on the
“mirror stage,” this is to return explicitly to the genealogy of subjectivity as crafted upon gazing
into the mirror (of mystical darkness). But this also returns us to the monk and the Ethiopian
demon (Chapter One). I explored there how the alterity of the black-skinned diabolical other “is
a projection of the monk’s own erotic desire,” the black figure facilitating the “‘othering’ of a
dimension of the self that the unformed monk must renounce.”158 Kristeva writes of “the archaic,
narcissistic self, not yet demarcated by the outside world” which “projects out of itself what it
experiences as dangerous or unpleasant in itself, making of it an alien double, uncanny and
demoniacal. In this instance the strange appears as a defense put up by a distraught self.”159 At
stake here is the hidden desiring subject and how it shapes a world through the symbol, how it
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shapes materiality through the imagination and the unconscious. The desire for the infinite that
had driven the epektatic journey for Nyssa and the expansion of the self’s transcendence for
Cusa, now has something to do with a new imagination of matter, a making of a new infinite
nexus between inner world and outer world.
Lacan, the Mirror, and the Desiring Subject
As I seek to bring to light this desiring subject, I want to highlight, in a final
consideration, the importance of the mirror in the making of modern subjectivity. This is the
final stage of opacification of perspective: the hiding of the “universal” see-er through the
obfuscation of the particularity of sight; the labyrinthine way in which the desires and power of
the modern self are made transparent and made to disappear; the way in which what is hidden
most deeply is the commitment this universal surveillance has to the sexual/cultural desire
concerned with proper generation and filiation. An inner vision, a world of desire, shapes a
material world—but hides those connections and subterranean channels. Now a psychotherapy
can show and re-align that desire; to enter this is to tap into that primordial, anterior mystical
core hidden beneath and at the center of modern rationality, upon which perspective has sought
to orient desire toward the “good” of a false synthesis. Psychoanalysis, like mysticism, is the
rearranging of interior (and anterior) space. Indeed, here psychoanalysis is like the mystical
journey inward that affects a relationship with the Other, going inward to go outward in
transcendence; exploring inner world to understand true reality of our world.
Let me briefly situate a psychoanalysis within my overall argument. Amidst the
dispossession and critique of the self, which was called for in view of the opacity of the self, a
productive understanding can still be recovered from out of the same depths from which
misunderstanding is forged. Ricoeur himself writes of the importance of psychoanalysis: “The
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realism of the unconscious, the topographic and economic treatment of representations, fantasies,
symptoms, and symbols, appears finally as the condition of a hermeneutics free from the
prejudices of the ego.” This indicates the commitment of hermeneutics to life and the world
instead of to the trap of language games; it indicates “a possible transcendence of reflection in
the direction of existence.”160 And so the cogito appears not as self-pretentious but as already
existing in being. As psychoanalysis leads to the matter of existence, it is always
in and through interpretation that this surpassing occurs: it is in deciphering the tricks of
desire that the desire at the root of meaning and reflection is discovered. I cannot
hypostasize this desire outside the process of interpretation; it always remains a beinginterpreted. I have hints of it behind the enigmas of consciousness, but I cannot grasp it in
itself without the danger of creating a mythology of instinctual forces …. It is behind
itself that the cogito discovers, through the work of interpretation, something like an
archaeology of the subject. Existence is glimpsed in this archaeology, but it remains
entangled in the movement of deciphering to which it gives rise.161
While in this way “the linguistic order [is drawn] back to the structure of experience,” perception
and experience is still already interpretation.162 Thus, juxtaposed to this archeology of the subject
is a philosophy of the spirit which looks in front of subject and draws it out of infancy towards
its telos.163 Though I have focused in this work on the pathologization of opacity in white sight,
there is a productive and teleological dimension to symbolic opacity.
Psychoanalytic therapy here is an effort, one could say, in critical countermemory. I am
reminded of Ricoeur’s thought on “the work of remembering against the compulsion to repeat”
when discussing blocked memory at the pathological-therapeutic level as a type of abuse of
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memory. Drawing on Freud’s essay “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through,” Ricoeur
notes how resistances to memory are due to repression which is the “compulsion to repeat:” thus,
acting out is substituted for memory as the patient, in the words of Freud, “reproduces it not as a
memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it.”164
But therapy occasions a working-through that is a work of remembering:
ceasing to lament or to hide his true state from himself, ‘[the patient] must find the
courage to direct his attention to the phenomenon of his illness. His illness itself must no
longer seem to him contemptible, but must become an enemy worthy of his mettle, a
piece of his personality, which has solid ground for its existence and out of which things
of value for his future life have to be derived’ …. Otherwise, there will be no
‘reconciliation’ (Versöhnung) of the patient with the repressed material.165
Belonging to this work, argues Ricoeur, lies “the courage required on the part of the analysand to
recognize himself as ill, in search of a truthful relation to his past.”166
Lacan is a helpful interlocuter for the psychoanalysis I want to engage here. In the first
place, with him we can reflect one more time on the problem of constructed subjectivity vis-à-vis
the mirror. Lacan names the “mirror stage” how, at a very young age (as early as six months), the
child recognizes their reflection image in a mirror and begins to notice, through this reflection,
the way in which they relate through their body to the world around them. Even before being
able to walk, the child can be captivated by their own gaze in the mirror.167 Lacan writes of the
significance:
This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infans stage, still sunk
in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem to exhibit in an exemplary
situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form, before it
164
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is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before language restores
to it, in the universal, its function as subject.168
This “Ideal-I,” Lacan argues, “situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a
fictional direction, which will … only rejoin the coming-into-being of the subject
asymptotically.” Thus, the mirror stage presents an apparatus or process that forms the self in a
tension with oneself-as-image, recessed in the unreachable past of the self—as imago and
mirage, more akin to how we see ourselves in dreams or in the uncanny of the double.169
Through defining and delineating the very fragmentation of the body in this way, the mirror
stage is decisive to the making of the subject. And it is decisive to shaping the self as a desiring
self. As one forms one’s I in the mirror of one’s own image, one not only comes to the world
through (what Lacan refers to technically as) the Symbolic realm, but the coming to selfhood in
the transition from the “specular I” to the “social I” is normed by what one experiences in the
mirror: “the desire of the other” as an outgrowth of one’s “primordial jealousy.”170 That the self
is fundamentally constituted through gazing at oneself in the mirror as one constructs oneself and
the world—which we have seen to be the case with modern perspective—means the self is
constituted in desire for the other, an Other that one can never reach: failed desire.
A second point. At the center of Lacan’s project is the notion not of knowledge but of this
desire, that is enjoying, and the way in which our enjoyment or jouissance is related to lack, or
our inability to fully reach the true thing we seek to enjoy (we always miss it by aiming at
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something other than what we seek).

171

Thus with Lacan we can foreground “the centrality of

fantasy and enjoyment to racism.”172 What I want to specifically examine here is how race is
problematically connected to desire in this regard, especially concerning the issue of filiation.
Part of the construction of the ego amidst the symbolic order, for Lacan, is how the moral law
situates the subject socially through the prohibition of jouissance, first regarding one’s mother
but then more broadly in the incest taboo—a prohibition that protects and perpetuates sociality
and kinship.173 Seshadri-Crooks, however, critiques this in view of the historical taboo against
miscegenation (interracial marriage). Although it would seem at first that both these taboos are
similar, Seshadri-Crooks argues that prohibition of miscegenation threatens and undoes the
moral law at stake in the incest taboo: by refusing to admit those racially-other into the family,
historically the white slave master relied on the voiding of the incest taboo to widely cohabitate
with slaves though they were (legally) in the same kinship circle. Thus, the miscegenation taboo
both makes incest possible and also threatens the incest taboo at a deeper level, since it suspends
the moral law.174 In this way: “The prohibition of miscegenation should above all be understood
as the tenacious refusal to grant legitimacy in order to preserve the possibility of incest.” In this
way, she argues, whiteness seeks to escape the moral law “even as it upholds it ferociously at the
level of the racial family.”175 This analysis in a Lacanian framework regarding the complication
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of desire and the problem of illicit enjoyment finally sets the problem of filiation in its truest
light: as a fundamental force for racialization in the modern world.
Modernity’s Moral Geography
This final horizon of how the enigmatic, symbolic mirror affects subjectivity is crucial to
bringing us to the hidden desiring subject at the heart of modernity’s moral geography. The
question of mystical darkness and perspective has always been a question about the nature of
space and positionality, and all the more so as it is paired with the “color space” of modernity.
This mystical center does not merely shape interior spiritual or intellectual space but also
external material space (as we have seen)—issues of external geography and cartography. My
point about the “coloniality of power” and historical connections between geography, geometry,
and racialization means white sight is a matter of the process of constructing material spaces
from out of ontological, symbolic, and epistemological commitments—that is, the “points” and
the lines drawn out from the center to craft a world in the gaze of modern vision.
The idea of thirdspatiality is helpful here to understand how a space can be enmeshed in a
symbolism, can be created out of the “imagination of matter.” As I mentioned in my
introduction, Ed Soja insists that all social and historical processes are also spatial processes and
that different types of spatiality must be accounted for. Again, Soja distinguishes three spaces: 1)
perceived space or spatial practice (Firstspace); 2) conceived space or representations of space
(Secondspace); and 3) spaces of representation (Thirdspace). 176 Consider an illustration, a city
bus. In firstspace, we consider that this space is such and such dimensions and located at such
and such a position in the road of a city. In secondspace, this measured entity is now conceived
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as a bus, and as such, something that one can sit in to move from this point to that point of the
city, a space that can get us somewhere we want to be—perhaps even a particular bus, like Rosa
Park’s bus. In thirdspace, this bus is more precisely a segregated, social space—space
represented according to a symbolics of evil—that locates bodies differently according to skin
color (whites seated in front, black people in the back); it is lived space, a bus in Alabama in the
1950s from which a political stand will be made. Parks’ movement from the back of the bus to
the front of the bus will literally change the social production of space across the United States.
That bus becomes an icon instead of a piece of transportation. A whole phenomenology of
spatiality comes through. Each space has its own epistemology and intentionality; each produces
a different kind of intended space. The key is not getting locked into one kind of space, but to be
able to navigate through and perceive the manifold spatiality. Thirdspace is a place of political
struggle, of peril and problem, of creativity, of resistance; it is ambiguous, as both dominated
space but potentially counterspace.177 Thirdspatiality is a way to theorize the kind of space at
stake in what the icon (and mystical darkness) gives. The point I want to make regarding the
modern thirdspatiality or moral geography is that bodies and finitude are lost in modernity,
bracketed or excluded by the point of the perspective apparatus. This is not only the case in
thirdspatiality. Reflecting on Rosa Parks bus, we realize that first- and second-spatiality were
configured too narrowly, already compromised by a symbolism of evil that attempted to negate
and physically erase space for certain bodies.
What is at stake here is how the perspective apparatus organizes the gaze according to a
“geometric dimension” which shows “how the subject is caught, maneuvered, captured inside the
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field of vision.” The development of the perspective painting and its promise to give the subject
a God’s-eye view only exploited and reinforced what was already constitutional to a new
humanity and a new world: the “captivat[ion] [of] the ‘subject’ in a [geometric] relation of
desire, but one that remains enigmatic.”178 This finally focuses us again, in a sharper manner, on
what modern perspective has to do with geometry, that is, “measuring” the earth. A certain
obsession is involved in Alberti’s and Filarete’s quest to find the definite origin and beginning to
painter’s perspective in Florence and to Brunelleschi, an obsession which relates, ultimately, to
the question of finding a definite and universal origin point for geometry, in order to craft an
objective world that is available to master.179 Geometry and measuring the world emerges from
out of the perspectivists.180 The question of and obsession with the origin of perspective always
had to do with the nature of the “point” of linear perspective, out of which the subject unfolds
the world. The point that engenders the fundamental cleavages of the modern subject: firstly, the
point of view that somehow also encapsulates the total viewpoint; secondly, the point between
the historical, incarnate subject and the historicizing, intellectual subject.181 The “mad” point that
(in the thought of Freud) is connected to the “madness that comes from God” reflected in the
“primal scene” of patricide—a point reason must turn away from but upon which it builds itself,
thus a point out of which it fetishizes that which escapes reason. 182 The point that, as Atlantic,
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originates a new humanity, fashioning upon the mirror / water / black flesh an edifice—or
abyss—of a “free” and “rational” society.
Even when, as I have already mentioned from Panofsky’s analysis, this point-of-view-aspoint-of-infinity comes together in Lorenzetti’s Annunciation, the point, argues Damisch,
“doesn’t appear as such; it is dissimulated, or, to be more precise, obliterated, obstructed by a
column in low relief.”183 Damisch writes, in fact:
Numerous other examples of such contradiction could be cited; it is almost as though the
point designated by the construction was somehow so powerful, yet so suspect, that it
cannot be openly acknowledged, that it had to be dissimulated behind a mask or veil.184
This point is the center of mystical darkness, hidden but still operating in its potency—for good
or for evil—and a whole world is measured out of it. Wrestling with this question of the relation
between perspective and the desiring subject is to wrestle with the question of the origin of
modern perspective—this, after all, for me has to do with the construction or development of
whiteness. As I have already shown, within the perspective apparatus, the seer is a “voyeur”
reducing to an eye, shed of their body.185 The modern scientific mindset and the modern world it
has engendered does not leave behind this obsession with the geo-graphical/metrical point of
origin, the point from which and symbolic system from within which seeing and being is
engendered. Indeed, linear perspective opened the way “to the most rigorous developments of
descriptive and projective geometry, perhaps even anticipating them, while it furnished the
ideology … of the apparatus that seemed most suitable for its operation.”186
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The contribution I have made here is that this spatiality that emerges from out of modern
perspective is rooted in a deeper symbolism of evil in which the doctrine of mystical darkness is
enmeshed. Concrete space is engendered through transcendental ideation especially as it is
normed by notions of sacred and profane, pure and impure, genuine and adulterated. Racialized
space, the essence of modern space, is developed out of these logics and the need to create realworldly boundaries to avoid transgressions and contamination.

In the end, a psychoanalytic therapeutic for white sight is not a recovery of premodernity so
much as a different way of treating opacity in light of what has been done in the (ab)use of
opacity. One cannot simply “go back.” As Dupré writes: “Not merely our thinking about the real
changes: reality itself changes as we think about it differently. History carries an ontic
significance that excludes any reversal of the present.”187 He continues: “A genuinely new
synthesis, if ever to come, will have to rest on newly established principles. … Our present task
may well be the humble one of exploring how the fragments we are left with may serve as
building blocks for a future synthesis.”188 Because of this treatment of opacity, postmodernism
(our present condition) “is a phenomenon of modernity’s bad conscience; it betrays suspicion
that modernity lacks legitimacy, suspicion that has shadowed the modern world from the very
beginning.”189 The freedom granted to the modern subject in the infinite expansion of ideational
and lived space would eventually bequeath to us in our time (for those who inhabit whiteness) “a
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new sense of homelessness” and thus of “nihilism and self-loathing.”

190

This is because, as I

have shown, the very concept of modern freedom was an empty promise in that its engine to
release us into the skies and release us from the bonds of our present evil was itself grounded in
a symbolism of evil. Nietzsche, and others, then, are our true prophets who reveal the nihilistic
foundations of the modern age. “Freedom thus appears,” writes Harries, “as both the ground that
supports the modern world and as the abyss that threatens its destruction.”191
So a new foundation must be built, a new freedom envisioned. But not a freedom crafted
out of a single powerful viewpoint that seeks universal dominion. Getting free, however, of
white sight is a challenge for white people. As I have shown, it frames even what seems like
naked perception.192 Still, those who are white in this postmodern world must seek to re-found
their perception in a kind of “starting over” through a radical critique as we have done here. 193 I
will argue in my conclusion that this best happens through a “jolting” or “amazement” through
the genuine recognition of another’s perspective. I am reminded, as Damisch argues about clouds
in Renaissance painting, that “wispy phenomena nevertheless find their way into painting despite
being marginalized by perspective’s ‘structure of exclusions.’”194 The mystical center has all
along empowered other ways of being that have survived and at times flourished alongside
modern subjectivity, even if there has been a constitutional effort to banish, hide, marginalize,
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make inoperative, and in every way attempt to exclude that potent center. As Long argues, the
opaque ones of the modern world have thrived and existed.
To untangle, then, the pathology over opacity and recover perspective “from the
technological oblivion into which it has been plunged by ideology” will certainly be, as Damisch
has argued, an “anamnestic project.” 195 It will also be, as I have shown here, a psychoanalytic
project. But more than that, this critical way forward is less about a turn inward and more about a
hermeneutical turn outward toward the neighbor who already lives in, speaks out of, and calls us
into an alternative geography—a thirdspatiality of the icon released from its fetishization of
radical alterity.
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CONCLUSION
Trying to get at the phenomenon of white sight has engaged us in a mostly deconstructive
path. To come to see that framework in whiteness that makes sight and perception possible in the
first place—which also happens to operate, like a cataract, by screening-out or obstructing
vision—we had to take a certain hermeneutical-historical detour around the immediacy of sight
to unearth the experience that enlivens the phenomenon. This focus on white sight is central to
the overall formation of white subjectivity because it gets to the heart of the symbolic process of
constructing the world which has engendered the white way of being. Our exploration has also
traced a complicated theological puzzle because white sight fetishizes black flesh as it
symbolizes it as evil in response to anxiety over the hidden and repressed mystical darkness at
the center of modern thought. This mystical darkness represents the potency of the possibility of
self-formation in the face of transcendent otherness. Thus, on the very place of the freedom of
the self, the evilest evil erects itself under a cloak of transparency and invisibility.
Through my project, I have tried to engage George Yancy’s call to turn the gaze back on
the (purportedly) universal gaze of whiteness, through a counter-gaze marking the white gaze as
particular and historical. Coming to a close, I want to sketch a path forward to the possibility of
an ethics. Now the key ethical question can be asked: whether this claim of iconic sight as a
“seeing being seen,” this mutual recognition, really gives an opportunity to properly see the other
and be seen by the other—whether this is possible in light of the project having gone so wrong
historically. Is it possible to recover, out from the fetishization of theological vision, the mystical
294
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imperative and possibility of “together seeing ourselves as seeing and being seen”? Even if such
1

a recovery is possible, how do we engage an ethics if we are to take seriously the opacity of the
self spoken of in mysticism? That is to say, how do we think about the question of agency and
accountability if the self is not only fundamentally opaque to itself, but if it is opaque to itself
precisely because it is rooted in a primordial dependency and interrelation?2 What follows is only
a sketch of the way forward, not only because such a project would be, in a sense, the beginning
of a new task, but because I am wary of the kind of false synthesizing that has been at the very
root of the problem of white sight. Despite such a caution, we may very well be in need of some
kind of universality to ethics—although, one that comes from the radicality of the gift.3
The work I have done in this project clears the ground and opens the way for more
properly ethical considerations concerning white sight and whiteness as a whole, considerations
such as the notions of guilt, sin, and responsibility. I am reminded (considering our constant
theme of the mirror) what James Baldwin writes about the color of his skin operating for white
people “as a most disagreeable mirror” that, despite white people not wanting to look at, shows
“an appallingly oppressive and bloody history, known all over the world … [and] a disastrous,
continuing, present condition which menaces them, and for which they bear an inescapable
responsibility.” Despite efforts to free themselves from guilt, for white people the “guilt remains,
more deeply rooted, more securely lodged, than the oldest of old trees.”4 My study has sought,
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on a pre-ethical, pre-rational, symbolic level, to orientate us for building towards more rational
constructions related to the question of whiteness and evil. In view of where our hermeneuticalhistorical detour has brought us—how white sight engages in an “imagination of matter” through
the fetishization of black flesh, thereby building a new world through a moral geography—the
way forward is to sketch a new vision-cum-spatiality for white people. I must match in a
therapeutic teleology the depths of pathology revealed in our psychoanalytic archeology. The
key will be, through a new mysticism, to engage in the promise and potency of thirdspatiality. To
get here, I will review the tension between the modern and mystical self, working my way
toward recovering the mystical core through inhabiting a thirdspatiality of zones of opacity. I
offer that white people can enter such a spatiality through a theological reading of scripture. In
the end, though, two aspects are part of the new mystical posture which prevent false
synthesizing of finitude and infinitude in theological vision: that of tragedy and that of the gift.
Recovering the Mystical amidst Modern Perspective
Let me summarize the claim I have made regarding how white sight is crafted through
modern perspective. This summary is not meant to obscure the specific details we have traced,
but to bring into focus the contrast between the modern self with its white sight and the
possibility of retrieving a mystical core still. I will then draw out the key implications of the
mystical core we must recover.
The Modern Self and the Pathologization of Opacity
More than a mere subjective aspect of habit, whiteness through white sight comes to act
as a material reality and ontological force that engenders a new concrete world. From the
particular point-of-view that claims universal, infinite vision, white sight interprets black skin
through a symbolism of evil by attaching to the material fact and first intentionality of black skin
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a second intentionality moored in a symbolism of color: blackness is obscurity, deviation and
materiality, sin and impurity, evil. In the shaping of the colonial world, blackness comes to be
associated first as obscurity against the transparency of modern vision, then as impurity and
defilement—a wholly otherness represented in dark bodies in opposition against which meaning
is made by the whiteness that encounters it. The symbolization of black flesh as evil through
fetishization comes to shape the materiality and finitude of the world. The symbol of perspective
fundamentally forms a material space back from out of an immaterial ideal of the mental space.
The colonial or modern self, having dislodged the opaque relation between the finite and
infinite held in tension by the mystic self, objectified opacity itself as the nothingness of the
unknown and then set opacity-as-objectified over against the self’s finite perspective. The
modern self was ontologically magnified so as to inhabit a totality and universal vision, even in
its particularity (a particularity now obscured). This new self appropriated the unknown or
darkness of infinity as a drive within one’s subjectivity, because the over-determining nature of
enigmatic opacity can never itself be eliminated but must be used in some way in the making of
the self. This subjective drive is now infinitely moved by the lack of the fullness of one’s finitude
and limits, which the opaque unknown marks by a first-order negation. As Achille Mbembe
writes, blackness and race “have constituted the (unacknowledged and often denied) foundation,
that we might call the nuclear power plant, from which the modern project of knowledge—and
of governance—has been deployed. Blackness and race, the one and the other, represent twin
figures of the delirium produced by modernity.” The “Black Man” emerges from the nothingness
of sight—“when one sees nothing, when one understands nothing, and, above all, when one
wishes to understand nothing.” And as such, blackness encountered “unleashes impassioned
dynamics and provokes an irrational exuberance that always tests the limits of the very system of
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reason.” Whiteness is a way of being that responds on the deepest moral and emotional register
5

to its anxiety in the face of “excess” and “ambiguity” that it cannot master and from which it can
never escape and from which it is haunted.
Opacity is now ignored as a potent catalyst for self-formation in the face of otherness and
stands as an obstacle for the certainty of self-saturation and self-limitlessness that a powerful
particularity needs to maintain its purity. The modern self holds within itself the potency of the
symbol’s opacity but must hide it. So the very source of freedom of the modern self—its
limitless reaching-out as it shapes a material world through expanding its intellectual domain—
becomes the source of the evil of the modern self. And as the modern self attempts all the more
to cleanse from within itself the banned and inoperative enigma of mystical opacity, it pushes
this opacity deeper into its unconscious foundation through a radical, technical externalization
into the “other” of the dark body. The modern self as a total saturation of finitude cannot tolerate
the other. At this point, opacity was fully objectified as unknown or unseen otherness that needed
to be conquered and made transparent; opacity was placed upon dark bodies whereupon would
play out the brutal aesthetics of white empire. The dark body then begins to bear the weight of all
the hidden desire and dissimulated meaning, the enigma, lack, and confusion that self-saturation
continually tries to cleanse from its own making. Depth here has finally been defaced—even
defiled—and deflected into a new hierarchy (that is, holy order or arrangement and structure of
world) which emerges on the wings of clear-eyed white sight. Now, goodness and evil take on
new dimensions and valences of meaning as a new external economy of salvation is constructed
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upon this existential color symbolism, all while hiding the ethically problematic deployment of
logics of transparency rooted in violence.
Recovering the Mystical Core
In the wake of this legacy, the visio Dei potentially stands as a rebuke to the infinite reach
of human vision; with its opacity (to human vision), it calls forth an absoluteness and anteriority
that resists any particular contraction and capture—that is the key to the survival, potency, and
subversive quality of the mystical core. But the key is, for my interest: that this absoluteness and
anteriority then does not work to engage human vision in an absolute vantage point itself, but
that it makes possible the integrity and inner possibility of each particular and finite vantage
point to be in network with the infinite. Let me work in the opposite direction from the
hermeneutical detour I have engaged in the preceding chapters. I start with Cusa because we
inherit from him perspective as an entirely new way of seeing and thinking, one which is now
ours. Once we recover perspective from white sight, we can reengage the delicate coincidentia
oppositorum of finite/infinite that mystical sight offers to us. Perspective that develops out of this
mystical core puts us in touch with the genuinely universal because it frees us to our finitude.
At its theological core, mystical subjectivity can give a perspective which provides an
access point to infinity and the absolute, but not such an access point that is necessarily particular
in this certain way or that; in fact, it calls for a necessary plurality of viewpoints. Falque argues
that herein Cusan perspective is different from Husserlian perspective in that by understanding
absolute vision as that which “hold[s] all the modalities of seeing in one same act,” Cusa
proposes a model of “synthesis” over a Husserlian model of “bracketing,” reflecting on the
experience of vision in its unfolding and multiplicity instead of its simplicity. Falque explains the
significance: “the ‘absolute gaze’ of God contains at once and in unified fashion the totality of
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profiles on the world (Abschattungen) at the same time as it bursts the apperceptive transfer of
the other by persisting and adopting the ‘here’ (hic) where I am, without leaving the ‘there’ (illic)
where I no longer am.” The varying of legitimate perspectives authorized here “pushes us to
accept the diversity of our points of view” and brings amazement that arises from the “plurality
of modalities of our lived experiences” that is shared together from neighbor to neighbor in the
sharing of God’s vision.6 A genuine alterity and infinity allows for the truthfulness of my vision
as particular—and also (amazingly, according to Cusa) the truthfulness of the other’s viewpoint,
as both obtain within the absolute vision of God in which they share. We remember how Cusa
describes the visio Dei as giving intense identity and a nascent subjectivity to the Tegernsee
monks, but only as they hear the testimony of their neighbor. Remember, too, how Cusa ends his
reflection on perspective in De visione Dei: Cusa writes that “each intellectual spirit sees in you,
my God, something which must be revealed to the others if they would attain to you, their God,
in the best possible way,” as each “reveal[s] their secrets to one another” (DVD 25 §117, p. 288).
I am reminded of Patricia Hill Collins here, when she writes: “Each group speaks from its own
standpoint and shares its own partial, situated knowledge.”7 Cusa develops perspective in order to
build a communal space found only through the multiplicity of perspectives.
What we need to particularly hold onto in Cusa is the intersection in perspective of
interpretation and perception, hermeneutics and phenomenology, self and other. As Harries
explains, Cusa radicalizes the notion that perception “already imposes a human measure on
whatever presents itself to our senses.”8 Because of Cusa’s radical perspectivism, what appears
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to us has already been subjected to our human measure. In this de-centering and re-centering of
the subject in Cusan perspective, numbers and mathematics (as we have seen, with figures like
the infinite circle or triangle), help us “to redescribe nature in a way that makes it more
commensurable with our mind’s mode of operation.” This “mathematization of the science of
nature,” Harries argues, marks “a shift from the heterogeneity of the immediately experienced
world to the homogeneity of a world subjected to the measure of number.”9 In this “we do not
construct the world we experience” but, as we have seen with the Cusan experiment, we
construct “a similitude, an enigma, an image, or a picture” which gives some distance between
our experience and our understanding.10 This re-presentation of reality through a “mathematical”
and intellectual theology is possible through the unfolding of God’s intellect in nature. Through
the exercise of one’s own mind as an image of the divine mind, the nascent modern subject
creates an abstract or virtual “second world” which “provides the linguistic or logical space in
which what we perceive has to take its place if it is to be understood at all.”11 What I seek to
emphasize is that though Cusan perspective does lay open in advance the apparatus that the
modern transcendental subject seizes upon, Cusa himself—insisting on the coincidence of
opposites that grounds his docta ignorantia—sought to chasten the knower’s reach into the
infinite absolute even as the infinite was opened up in a new way through the particularization
and historization of the project of human knowing.
This is why Cusa is such a crucial figure for us in asking the question about the value of
finitude, even if in Cusa this moment of self-discovery all too quickly seems to close up—and
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indeed does so in modern perspective as a whole. Speaking toward this point, Gadamer
highlights the “real importance” of Cusa is in his showing how the meeting of Christian and
Aristotelian thought in Scholasticism newly turned “the distinction between the divine and the
human mind into something positive.”12 Especially with Cusa’s notions of unfolding and
enfolding, “discursive multiplicity” or the variety of human thinking and language, is accepted as
the unfolding of divine truth. Still in Cusa there was a connection between this variety of
language and thought, and the unity of absolute truth. With this unitive focus, Gadamer notes that
Cusa is still a long way off from the notion of different languages yielding different worldviews;
still for Cusa, there is a “real affinity” or “concordance” of word and concept.13 Peter Casarella
draws out from Gadamer here how “Cusanus did not merely mediate a solution to the attack on
universals posed by the nominalists. Cusanus’s position differs from those of his contemporaries
because he forged a wholly new basis for addressing the problem.”14 Casarella himself highlights
the theological, indeed christological, nature of Cusa’s unique thought. Thus he pushes back
against the notion that Cusa separates linguistics (word, figure, particularity) from metaphysics
(a point that I myself have tried to stress in pointing out Cusa as a threshold figure who is trying
to hold together a tension theologically).15 Casarella writes: “Rather than de-linguistifying
metaphysics, Cusanus redivinizes language in an abstract, intellectual, and Christocentric
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vestment.” In the end, Cusa attempts in the sharpest way possible to mutually magnify
16

particularity and universality—a project which brings human subjectivity to a new plane.
But in view of the dangerous way in which such a project was taken through the course
of modern thought, and as a way to retrieve the promise of Cusan perspective from its seizure in
the modern age, I find Gregory of Nyssa especially helpful for retrieving the mystical potency
and promise at stake in the doctrine of the darkness of God. In fact, by retrieving Nyssa only
after Cusa, I am equipped to be sensitive to the racial symbolism in Nyssa’s own project.
Gregory gives a coherent and influential framework for perpetually keeping in tension the
transcendence of God and transcendence of our imagination and reason as we progress in the
human project.17 His notion of epektasis represents a way of thinking that insists that our bodies
are inextricably bound up in any transformation toward the infinite—and hold within their nature
radical possibilities for transformation toward the good. Such a notion helps us to restore the
theological insistence on the simultaneity and integrity of universality and contextuality, and of
the material (body) and the immaterial (spirit) in symbolic transformation.
With Nyssa we can consider how the rigor of finitude and creatureliness (I resist saying
the rigor of reason), is a rigor fundamentally opened toward infinite distance by being a rigor
focused on ethical transformation toward virtue. Our virtue in our embodiment is what opens us
out toward the unlimited, but keeps us back from going beyond it since we are created beings. In
this way, the mystical darkness of infinity is embraced as one accepts their creatureliness (thus
particularity) and yearns after continual transformation as one is stretched out upon the face of
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the deep. This juxtaposition is made possible because our bodies are inherently malleable (as a
positive quality), allowing us to stabilize only as we asymptotically transcend toward the infinite
(never letting go of our body). In Nyssa’s epektasis, opacity is relation-as-possibility, that is,
relation of materiality to possibility—to its ownmost possibilities manifoldly transplaced upon
the unlimited. In the fleshiness of our finitude we participate in the infinite God.
With Nyssa’s insistence on the experience of the infinite only as and always as one is a
creature, we can engage the possibility of a different kind of perspective, which I have described
throughout as reverse perspective. In this, we fundamentally accept with Nyssa the importance of
bodies, words, and materiality as the only entry-point into the infinite. Such an “anagogical”
intentionality traverses all at once the depths and surfaces of life only through formation in virtue
and love of neighbor. If we were to reengage perspective (and the icon) in this light, we begin to
shift the framework from an ontological to an ethical one. We move away from quasi-ontological
considerations of the icon that are bound up in thinking too closely the icon and the mirror within
a light-dark aesthetics; we move toward the notion of relation and an ethics of use. In such a
framework, as bodies or words meet one to another in their particularity, a genuinely new
intentionality is opened up, not otherwise possible in the individuality of each entity itself (as
seen in metaphorization on the linguistic plane).18 Finitude is released to the vastness of its own
inmost possibility by radical alterity. Possibility here is not about the surpassing of or catching
up into the “spiritual” through ontological differentiation, but about explosion toward agency,
freedom, and transcendence (in the sense of always traversing new horizons, experiencing more
plenitude and fullness of finitude released to itself and its potential).

I make this point about metaphorization in light of Ricoeur’s interpretation of the Song of Solomon, which I will
soon explore here.
18
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Nyssa’s notion of epektasis and its transposition to an iconic or anagogical aesthetics
provides the kind of aporia of rigor and open-endedness that is necessary to bolstering an ethical
aesthetics that can receive well opacity in its manifold variety. It presents an opportunity to move
theological thinking on the icon away from a mere eidetics to hermeneutical consideration of the
icon-made-flesh in the world. Epektasis engenders an aesthetics of opacity as one’s spiritual
formation is tied to the reception and embrace of productive darkness. Overall, this presents an
opportunity to move away from dependency on the eyes, and opens a theological and
phenomenological route through other senses—especially of hearing the witness of the neighbor.
Thirdspatiality and Zones of Opacity
Despite the challenges of white sight for white people, I argue for the possibility of a
recovery of mystical subjectivity. I begin to unfold here a new mysticism for a racialized age that
can embrace radical otherness. A key to unfolding this mysticism is to make clear the alternative
thirdspatiality that must be inhabited from which a new world can be (or is already) engendered
with its different kind of material spatiality.
Thirdspace and the Icon
We can imagine a thirdspatiality of the icon released from its fetishization by returning to
the radical alterity at stake in the project of mystical darkness. Thirdspace is key to moving space
beyond a mere dialectics and to the third of othering—responding to the fact that, in the words of
Henri Lefebvre, il y a toujours l’ Autre—there is always the other.19 Thirdspace is Soja’s unique
conception which tries to speak of that space which is both dominated space but potentially

Soja, Thirdspace, 30-32. Soja writes: “Whenever faced with such binarized categories …, Lefebvre persistently
sought to crack them open by introduction an-Other term, a third possibility or ‘moment’ that partakes of the
original pairing but is not just a simple combination or an ‘in between’ position along some all-inclusive continuum.
This critical thirding-as-Othering is the first and most important step in transforming the categorical and closed logic
of either/or to the dialectically open logic of both/and.” 60.
19
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counterspace, a space of political direction, of creativity, of definition and struggle; a space of
“radical openness and teeming imagery,” of “subliminal mystery and limited knowability.”20
Soja defines thirdspace more fully in this way:
a knowable and unknowable, real and imagined lifeworld of experiences, emotions,
events, and political choices that is existentially shaped by the generative and problematic
interplay between centers and peripheries, the abstract and concrete, the impassioned
spaces of the conceptual and the lived, marked out materially and metaphorically in
spatial praxis, the transformation of (spatial) knowledge into (spatial) action in a field of
unevenly developed (spatial) power.21
Thirdspace is fundamentally “a space of radical openness, a vast territory of infinite possibilities
and perils” that is “intentionally incomplete, endlessly explorable, resistant to closure or easy
categorical definition.”22 Thirdspace seems to break apart firstspace (measured space) and
secondspace (conceived space) as, for example, what once was a tool or a jersey or (to revisit the
example I shared in the last chapter) Rosa Parks’ bus becomes an icon or artifact in a museum.
Here we can recall Cusa’s perspectivism and the spatiality the perspective experiment
entailed, where around the center of mystical darkness a multiplicity of perspectives was
engendered. This compares directly to Soja’s discussion of “the Aleph” as he elaborates on the
nature of thirdspace. Reflecting on the Aleph, Soja writes of it that it is “the space where all
places are, capable of being seen from every angle, each standing clear; but also a secret and
conjectured object, filled with illusions and allusions, a space that is common to all of us yet
never able to be completely seen and understood, an ‘unimaginable universe.’”23 Such a space
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“envisions a complex totality of potential knowledges but rejects any totalization that finitely
encloses knowledge production in ‘permanent structures’ or specialized compartments/
disciplines.”24 As such, thirdspace properly opens up a space of freedom and political
emancipation, because it moves against the “illusion of transparency” of the kind of ideational
space engendered as the mystical center is hidden and rendered inoperative in modern
perspective.25 Following this notion of thirdspace, we begin to understand how the theological
aspect of perspective and sight can be retrieved from modern rationality despite its racialization
of this very darkness. In this recovery of thirdspatiality as genuinely iconic (that is, not as
fetishizing), white sight can be transformed. If whiteness is fundamentally about an identity that
sees and constructs space in a particular way, undoing white sight will be about re-organizing
space, untying it from its commitments to form and a color code that creates a racialized world.
In thirdspatiality, through showing “the existence of multiple forms of the gaze in various
cultural productions and … the challenge of contradictory perceptions,” not only can white sight
be seen for what it is, but it can possibly be disengaged. 26
Zones of Opacity
Considering the argument I have made, the overall challenge before us lies in realizing
and responding to how in any particular arche the “inner structure of matter … [is] the basis for
cosmic order.” And, moreover, reengaging “the possibility for the rediscovery of the life of
matter as a religious phenomenon—an equal and sometimes alternative structure in the face of
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the dehumanizing and terroristic meaning of history.” This is potential of thirdspatiality,
27

specifically as such spatiality manifests on the ground as “zones of opacity”—that is, alternative
political-public (universal) spaces for the emergence and flourishing of “dark bodies” that is not
a withdrawal from the mess of finitude but an entering-differently into the folds of the world. In
this case, “[r]esistance is about the cultivation of invisibility, opacity, anonymity, and
resonance.”28 Such zones of opacity necessarily resist the “zoning” of the Western arche and
biopolitical arrangement, which are catalyzed by obfuscation through the pathologization of
opacity. As Mbembe puts it: “This ‘imperialism of disorganization,’ which feeds on anarchy,
leverages practices of zoning to manufacture disasters and multiply states of exception nearly
everywhere.”29 Working against such zoning of white sight, zones of opacity are already thriving
and being inhabited in spite of modernity. This spatiality treats opacity and its heterogeneity with
productive poesis instead of fetishizing it within a logic of universal transparency and
surveillance. White people can only enter into such spaces but not themselves create them (their
way of seeing has made this impossible). But the very transformation of white sight will involve
coming to sit in this spatiality, from which one can see a new world.
This (third)space is already present in our world and is expressed in any number of
projects that are forging authentic black subjectivity. Andrew Prevot highlights the challenges of
thinking positively of darkness of race in the frame of mystical theology, and yet still shows how
the notion of opacity can be recovered theologically as a hope for the re-making of the self in
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light of the darkness or possibility of the future. Carter discusses black life as “anarchic” and,
30

as such, able to resist and unsettle the reigning arche of modernity. He writes: “To think that
beyond, that an-archē, which is irreducible to any archē or Being of Rule, is the task of
theorizing black religion.”31 bell hooks testifies of “choosing marginality” as a black woman,
claiming right to subjectivity as she forges a space of “radical openness and possibility.”32 hooks
discusses “homeplace” as a space of inclusivity and a site of resistance. 33
Directly to the point of opacity as recovered and re-used, Édouard Glissant in his Poetics
of Relation argues that opacity protects diversity in the post-colonial situation. While
generalization and universality operate under a claim to transparency, the opaque for Glissant is
a kind of infinite abyss and “absolute unknown” that becomes a kind of subversive knowledge.34
Here opacity fundamentally opens to diversity, engendering a kind of “errantry” which, as a kind
of learned ignorance, “conceives of totality but willingly renounces any claims to sum it up or to
possess it.”35 In this, Glissant stresses the idea of the rhizome, as opposed to the notion of the
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root, to explore how the good and beautiful might be connected as ideas to the infinite: “The
notion of the rhizome maintains, therefore, the idea of rootedness but challenges that of a
totalitarian root. Rhizomatic thought is the principle behind … the Poetics of Relation, in which
each and every identity is extended through a relationship with the Other.”36 For Glissant, the
Tout-Monde or All-World expresses the world as a totality, as one part in a weave of livingness.
Glissant also connects the notion of opacity to a kind of tragedy or tragic knowledge.
Mbembe describes how Glissant discusses the silt of the world, the mass of apparently dead
things and bare matter, becoming fertilizer for new life, out of the debris; “language is
reconstituted in the place where the human being meets its own animal form. The durability of
the world depends on our capacity to reanimate beings and things that seem lifeless—the dead
man, turned to dust by the desiccated economy; an order poor in worldliness that traffics in
bodies and life.”37 Highlighting this theme of tragedy and possibility, Glissant writes:
A modern epic and a modern tragedy would offer to unite the specificity of nations,
granting each culture’s opacity (though no longer as en-soi) yet at the same time
imagining the transparency of their relations. Imagining. Because this transparency is
precisely not en-soi. It is not rooted in any specific legitimacy, which thus implies that
the disclosure of tragedy would be directed toward a continuum (in expansion) and not
toward a past (set in filiation).38
In this way opacity demands a resistance to a “reductive transparency” instead of provoking it. It
demands a kind of “visibility” to logics of opacity. It is not a totality that can leap beyond and go
without finitude, but one that only grows out of the integrity of that finitude. There is hope here:
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“The refusal to perish may yet turn us into historical beings and make it possible for the world to
be a world.”39 The wholeness of the whole both radically critiques and gives radical hope.
Theological Tool of Opacity: Theological Reading of Scripture
I ended my historical-hermeneutical detour of white sight at the point of a psychoanalytic
or psychotherapeutic in order to diagnose the pathology of white sight and bring one to the
threshold of a new way of being. Let me briefly comment on the tension between this
“scientific” route to address a theological concern, especially if my interest is to try to re-engage
the integrity of a theological project. On the one hand, for Freud “psychology” as a science and
technology moves forward the project of culture against nature and the danger of instinctual
forces; but religious ideas are only “illusions,” not that they are inherently in error but that they
are based in a wish-fulfillment that pursues its end detached from the need to verify by reality.40
On the other hand, Lacan writes that mysticism testifies of a “jouissance that is beyond”—that is,
beyond the phallus or symbolic order that prevents proper desire. Reflecting on the coincidence
of the “contemplative eye with the eye with which God looks at” the mystic, Lacan writes of
how the mystic must “partake of perverse jouissance.” Indeed “mystical jaculations” testify to
experiencing a coming “but know[ing] nothing about it.”41
My prescription amidst the critical therapy is not merely to ask white people to “look at
things differently” (which is certainly unhelpful, and might not even be possible as simple
advice). Like Cusa, I want to lead desiring mystics in a practical way to the experience of (new)
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mysticism. I propose an “easy” or facile theological tool: a theological reading of Scripture that
embraces opacity and enigma. This theological route can work alongside a psychoanalysis as
both are a type of inward journey that explores the inner world that comes to affect one’s outer
world.42 This begins the work of transposing the quasi-ontological iconic framework of
theological vision to an entirely different schema—one which remains on the textual-linguistic
level and can achieve a certain kind of ontological suspension. I take my clue in this regard from
Ricoeur who, reflecting on especially Origen’s allegoresis at stake in his Commentary on the
Song, argues for a model of intertextual theological reading. One can, Ricoeur argues, follow the
“movements of love” in the Song, in order to move outside the text itself toward metaphorization
and intertextuality. In this, Ricoeur argues for the value of such an intertextual “allegorizing”
over a Platonic one: “to speak of an intersecting metaphor [or intertextuality] is to give allegory a
much broader field than that of Platonizing allegorism conceived of as the vertical transfer from
the sensible to the intelligible, at the risk of abolishing, denying, even of defaming the
sensible.”43 Ricoeur here invites us into an understanding of enigma that gives justice to the
sensible. Elsewhere he writes of how the “limit-expressions” and parabolic “bursting” at sake in
this kind of intertextuality can orient us to radically new possibilities. 44
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To give an example and paradigm of the theological reading at stake, consider Luke 24
concerning Christ on the Emmaus Road as a stranger with certain disciples just after the
resurrection. I draw out three main exegetical points which themselves highlight what is at stake
in such theological reading in general. First, in meaning-making the particularity of the body is
embraced both as a scandal and a promise: one’s understanding is disoriented twofold because
Jesus’ body is between the text and understanding, and one’s own body is between the self and
the recognition of the body of Jesus. There is a scandal here in that bodily particularity must be
traversed doubly (first one’s own body and then that of the risen Christ) but also a promise in
that to embrace the body and its depths is to re-form the imagination and see a new world.
Second, however, to avoid the idolatry (or ideology) of particularity, we note the importance of
distance: the double-traversal of embodiment means that at the very heart of Christian
development is the presence of an Other who is infinitely distant and cannot be subsumed into
the sameness of oneself. Third: the traversal of the body of Christ/scripture/self is simultaneously
an opening up to the other in view of the Spirit at Pentecost and the path it creates toward Gentile
inclusion in the people of God. In the end, even through traversing this whole course of
recognition, visibility itself is not secured: Christ disappears upon recognition; the visio Dei is
not given—or rather, it is deflected horizontally, away from even the greatest visible and Icon, to
the human community as it is reconstituted in the gift of the Spirit. Through such a theological
hermeneutics, the radical alterity of symbolic opacity can be recovered in text, self, and other.
Tragedy and Catharsis
Still, in view of our study, we could say that the whole process of patri-religio and
cultural filiation is sent awry from the beginning because it is anteriorly rooted in the
fetishization of black flesh (from the beginning as diabolic, sexual other). Thus, even in the best
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of theological vision, “fornication disrupts the relationship between a disciple and an elder.”

45

Reading does not untie how racial logics define and secure filiation. Two radical ideas, then,
need to be embraced amidst a theological reading of scripture: the tragic and the gift. As to the
first of these, the matter of tragedy holds us back from reconciling to the good all too quickly.
Because a false synthesis is the “evil of evil,” we hold back hope in order to preserve it. By
finally bringing our study on white sight and opacity under this theme of tragedy, I am pressing
into the emphasis in tragedy on character formation as caught in a certain vision or horizon that
is limited and destructive. Second, tragedy critiques the project of an ethics which thinks of evil
merely as a corollary to freedom. I am also pressing on the transformational potential of
classical tragedy: how in tragedy “we await the shock”—even to ethics as a whole, but certainly
to our subjective formation—“capable of awakening our mistrust with respect not only to the
illusions of the heart but also to the illusions born of the hubris of practical reason itself.”46
Tragedy and the Opaque White Self
Earlier in my argument, I surfaced certain tragic notions that are key in dealing properly
with opacity as it intersects with whiteness: in light of George Yancy’s “opaque white racist self”
we are left to realize that whiteness is fundamentally a tragedy, always-already having been
forged through the symbolism of evil, perspective, and color. In this tragic vein, Yancy speaks of
the need to indefinitely tarry with one’s whiteness and recognize one can never escape their
whiteness and the privilege and power it brings. Whiteness cannot be escaped and one cannot
rush past one’s racism; in fact one always already arrives too late in this regard and is unable to
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give a full account of one’s racism: “Rather, the reality of the sheer depth of white racialization
is far too opaque.”47 Yancy discusses how this tragic dimension of opacity puts an epistemic
limit on white understanding and vision:
there is no ‘dry-dock’ where white people can go to rehabilitate their whiteness. The
white self is already on the open sea of white power, privilege, and narcissism … One
must begin with the racist white self. … And there is no innocent, fictive tabula rasa to
which one can return … Indeed, the white self that desires and attempts to ‘rebuild’ or
‘rehabilitate’ itself does so precisely within the context of complex and formative white
racist social and institutional material and intrapsychic forces.48
Yancy writes that even as white people might use the mirror as “gift” to reveal a more truthful
sight, white people “do not magically become black.”49 The white self is always already given
over from the start and embedded in white privilege and the power it brings; whiteness “is a
profound site of concealment.”50 In this case, Yancy argues that white people must allow
themselves to feel like a problem, to “tarry under the weight” of the tragedy of opacity.51 The
notion of tragedy suspends the effort to close up being in some kind of quick (re)conciliation.
The Tragic Dimension of Evil
I also want to make a point about the tragic aspect of evil. As I have discussed previously
(in my Introduction), the tragic dimension of evil is in tension with the ethical vision of evil
wherein freedom and evil are thought in relationship to each other.52 Ricoeur writes that what is
lacking in this ethical vision, however, is “the darksome experience of evil which surfaces in
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different ways in the symbolism of evil and which constitutes properly speaking the ‘tragic’
aspect of evil.”53 I hope I clearly brought out this tragic aspect of evil in discussing the tension
inherent in the primary symbols of evil (expressed conceptually in the “servile will”): the
acknowledgement in our confession of sin of “evil as evil already there, evil in which I am born,
evil which I find in myself before the awakening of my conscience, evil which cannot be
analyzed into individual guilt and actual faults.” In the sense of “captivity,” which seems to
weave itself in unique ways in each primary symbol and then fundamentally in the servile will,
there is the sense of being bound by evil as a power.54
The tragic aspect of evil even shows up in the doctrine of original sin, where there is a
sense of being deceived and led astray by the serpentine Adversary before evil is found in the
world through human choice. Ricoeur, though, says it is not so much the tragic per se here that
resists the ethical vision of the world, but “an aspect irreducible to the ethical, and
complementary to every ethics, which has found a privileged expression in the tragic.” The tragic
itself, Ricoeur says, prevents both theology and philosophy. But:
The function of the tragic is to question self-assurance, self-certitude, one’s critical
pretensions, we might even say the presumption of the moral conscience that is laden
with the entire weight of evil. Much pride is concealed, perhaps, in this humility. It is
then that the tragic symbols speak in the silence of the humiliated ethical. They speak of a
‘mystery of iniquity’ that man cannot entirely handle, that freedom cannot give reasons
for, seeing that it already finds it within itself.55
In this way, as we move toward a more constructive account of the question of whiteness and the
problem of evil, we will have to continue to take into account the ways in which (as I have begun
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to reveal here) whiteness and white sight can act as an object force back upon white individuals
to reinforce a white racial way of being. This means that notions such as white guilt, shame, and
responsibility may not always come back to the question of intentionality and of conscious will.
Tragedy as a Form of Thinking and Being
Tragedy, in a final sense, can be enlisted as a form of critical thought that seeks to
explore and keep open the productivity of the tension between the finite and the infinite. In this
way, tragedy turns us toward the practical. Ricoeur explains that tragedy teaches ethics not in a
didactic sense but “more closely resembling a conversion of the manner of looking.”56 Tragic
wisdom, Ricoeur explains, speaks toward the limited horizon or vision of ethics. Tragic wisdom
goes deep into the ethical problem (to its heart in the question of symbolism of evil), marking a
problem or rift that threatens to render asunder all wisdom, deliberation, conversation, and
understanding. Ricoeur proposes recovering a phronesis or wisdom at stake here as a kind of
ability to navigate the tragic situation. I call this phronesis “tragic-critical thought,” a practice
and thought (which includes but reaches beyond a psychoanalysis) that accepts the
pathologization of opacity yet seeks to re-charge the symbol’s opacity for a more hopeful future.
Tragedy calls forth an audience to experience catharsis in the face of tension and death.
Tragic-critical thought can work with and yet reframe this matter of purifying. The ultimate end
of such catharsis is radical hope. From these same depths of pathologized opacity there is still a
possibility for hope and for setting right. Thus Emilie Townes, for example, speaks of the power
of countermemory, retrieving for the good what has been deemed “fantastic” and used for evil.
We could also think here with Cornell West about tragicomic thought: “A tragicomic view is one
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that … locates human beings as already in ‘the mess’ of the world with no way to ever fully
escape it.” Such thought, as West writes, involves both a courage to affirm life and think
critically but also a caring for suffering; and it is rooted both in the insistence of objective moral
law and, as West puts it, “the blood-drenched tearsoaked traditions of resistance, critique, and
contestation—and in the agency of the wretched of the earth.”57 Tragedy is key here because we
do not seek a cheap present or future that erases the past. Still, the opacity of the symbol can give
ethical thought, even though it is masked, occluded, and diverted towards a symbolics of evil; it
does this by drawing from its fecundity toward superabundant promise. The potential, then, of
tragic-critical thought is to go “deeper into the symbol’s fragility to reorganize its defilementlogic,” as I have written elsewhere.58 The catharsis undergone in such a project would seek a
certain removal of a cataract that clouds or opacifies the lens of our vision. Though, white people
in such tragic thought can never see “clearly” (for that is the desire of whiteness), but, in the
mode of Cusa’s docta ignorantia, can speak out of the particularity of their own journey while
they recognize the limited horizon of such a vision.
The Gift of Mutual Recognition
Mysticism is a mode of subjectivity strewn between the tragic and the gift. On the one
hand, the mystic “flight” is “the painful stripping away of all that is alien or accessory to
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identity;” one the other hand, “it also signifies an integral meeting and union which gives
meaningful existence, grace, and light to everything which will come from it.”59 So, the other
side of the tragic is the gift. Tragedy puts us in touch with finitude. The gift reminds us that
finitude is always oriented toward openness and potentiality. If embracing a posture of tragiccritical thought is akin to embracing the possibility of death of self, hoping for the gift of mutual
recognition is embracing the experience of radically new life. Mutual recognition is not
something we can secure by our own efforts and finitude, because it is necessarily a communal
project. The thirdspatiality of the icon, now retrieved from its pathological obsession with
filiation and sexual generation, under the sign of the tragic, is given as a radical gift as we seek to
pay attention to the testimony of the other.
In my last thoughts here, I want to establish a framework for how we might be able to
approach the issue of mutual recognition, especially how this can happen in the midst of troubles
with filiation. This will set us in a place to begin to address the issue of guilt and responsibility
that James Baldwin spoke of in the opening of this chapter. In Ricoeur’s The Course of
Recognition, he traces out the paths that recognition takes, from recognition as identification, to
recognizing oneself, to mutual recognition. What I want to focus on is this last stage of mutual
recognition, but one section in particular which will bring my own thoughts to a close. Ricoeur
discusses mutual recognition in part under the theme of “Recognizing Oneself in One’s
Lineage,” and he touches fundamentally upon a topic that has been central to my own
examination of theological vision—that is, filiation.

Corrigan, “‘Solitary’ Mysticism,” 41. See, too, what Lossky notes about Dionysius, that what is at stake in his
thought is not a mere dialectic but a purification or katharsis. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church,
27. In this way, catharsis goes beyond some facile symbol of purity and defilement to a deeper purging of the
ontological economy, a katharsis focused on repentance and purgation in view of God, a repentance of putting
oneself at the center of the world, so to be open to the other.
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Here, Ricoeur writes about how filiation in the context of the family means that
verticality intersects with the horizontality of conjugality and parenthood; and as such,
“unvarying factors structure our being-in-the-world through the family” such as being born to
certain parents and born in a set of (possible) siblings. The ego here also finds itself split in
matrilinear and patrilinear directions. Filiation is not only at the intersection of conjugality and
parenthood in this way, but filiation intersects the incest prohibition, which is the “constraint
imposed on all the socially accepted variants of conjugality.”60 In this sense the ego, under
filiation, finds itself in a “system of places,” placed—fixed—in a lineage at birth, given a name,
and now part of a priceless process of transmission along a number of planes (of life, of name, of
inheritance, and so on). I become actualized when I am mutually recognized in filiation by my
parents.61 In this way, the matter of recognizing oneself in one’s lineage leads us to a crossroads:
we can hypothetically look backwards and forwards from the fixed place of our lineage; but
looking backwards towards our birth only leads to an enigma because it is not itself a pure
beginning but part of something before it, part of a broader parental project. We only “escape
this speculative vertigo … by replacing ourselves and our parents in the sequence of generations”
as we move forward.62
In this way, we begin to see how the genealogical principle which norms filiation can
come to represent a displacement and dispossession. In one’s lineage, one is set “in the
unbounded scale of ages, [where] each rank is both instituted and instituting, none of them being
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the foundation.” This dispossession is heightened by a doubling (or splitting) in the face of both
paternal and maternal lineage. This is further heightened in the sense of “indebtedness” in terms
of the ascending forward look in filiation, and “heritage” in terms of the descending look
backwards in filiation. Thus, the genealogical principle norming filiation is faced with the
problem of “absolute foundation” and “the limits of its patrilinear and matrilineal lines,” all of
which is “sufficient for confronting the fantasy of being all-powerful.”63 This is all the more
heightened in the intersection, specifically, of the genealogical principle and the incest taboo.
The genealogical principle, in order to move filiation forward, objects against the “incest drive,”
Ricoeur writes, that drive which is “the bearer of nondistinction.”64 For the genealogical
principle to reach its target of filiation, “the objection to incest has to strike down the fantasy of
omnipotence.”65 In this way, genealogical ordering, when set in tension with the incest
prohibition which norms it, leads us to dispossession and strips sovereignty from filiation.
Filiation, understood in this way, can be recovered as a thoroughly mystical concept and
one under the sign of the radicality of the gift. The notion of filiation, as the end goal of spiritual
transformation and the visio Dei, can be recovered as an analogue of the “economy of the gift”
wherein we can experience genuine mutual recognition. Space does not allow a detailed analysis
of Ricoeur’s thought on gift and the economy of the gift. As John Wall describes it, the economy
of the gift for Ricoeur is about the “dialectical exchange between the good and the right that is
never resolved but rather rendered more or less productive. … The good and the right are
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integrated only on the theological grounds of humanity’s encounter with God.” One could
66

examine the importance of each of the theological virtues with Ricoeur and the gifts they give:
faith as “radical dependence;” love as radical, hyperethical obligation to the other; hope as
radical trust in the possibility of reconciliation.67 The gift carries a “logic of superabundance”
which supervenes upon and interrupts the ethical “logic of equivalence” and the economy of
reciprocation. Under the dialectic of love and justice, these two logics are brought in productive
relation, as the demand of love pulls justice up toward extra-judicial notions like the “sense of
justice” and hospitality, while the call of justice makes love practical.68 If filiation and
theological vision could be rediscovered as a moment within the economy of the gift that in this
way pulls love toward justice and justice toward love in the logic of superabundance, notions of
responsibility and guilt could be addressed afresh as a part of a process or course of mutual
recognition. Here, instead of being addressed all too often within the logic of equivalence
(where, for example, guilt necessarily comes from something I did or did not do in the past),
concepts like responsibility and guilt could be discovered anew as part of a broader opportunity
to hear my neighbor so I can see and be seen by my neighbor. In this way, filiation brings us into
a new beyond and into a new ignorance where we are obligated to each other in the bind of love
and justice—even when we can only, in our own strength and sight, grope in the dark after what
we have done and have left undone in loving and failing to love.
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